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In this dissertation, I examine what mobilized the simultaneous discourses of 
charm and anti-charm rhetoric in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British 
and American modernist literature. Charm moves through texts as a trojan horse of 
sorts, ostensibly supporting normative ideologies of the social order while its use 
actually imagines sociopolitical transformation. I look to Oscar Wilde’s works to 
assess how charm possesses an aesthetic magic that bonds persons across normative 
time and social stratification. Charm becomes an experimental force of social form in 
the early decades of the twentieth-century. In the works of Gertrude Stein and Sylvia 
Townsend Warner, charm’s play with concealment and revelation renders new 
understandings of the female body in modernist culture, and presents radical feminist 
revolutionary potential. By the 1930s, however, charm’s rebellious force of form 
becomes subsumed by global capitalism, and re-latches to normativity; namely, to 
white masculinity, which repossesses and subsumes the rebellious powers of charm to 
become a powerful capitalist slickness in works by F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith 
Wharton. Charm’s presence in the era, I argue, not only formulates a compelling 
narrative of modernism that deserves critical attention, but also exists as a force that 
wounds accepted paradigms of contemporary modernist studies. As modernist studies 
attempts to move toward questions of theoretical approach as well as scale (historical, 
geographic, and even planetary), charm serves as example of what new approaches to 
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The little charms, the little charms, the little charms, the little charms,  
the little charms, the little charms, the little charms, the little charms… 
THE LITTLE CHARMS PRICK. 
The partridge’s eye is red. 
Little things, little things, little things, little things, little things, little things,  
little things, little things, little things, little things, little things, little things…1 
– Salvador Dalí, “Poem of Little Things” [Poema de les cosetes] (1928) 
 
It is only a question of finding the right words and putting them in the right order. But we cannot do it 
because they do not live in dictionaries; they live in the mind. And how do they live in the mind? 
Variously and strangely, much as human beings live, by ranging hither and thither, by falling in love, 
and mating together.2 
– Virginia Woolf, “Craftsmanship” (1937) 
 
During the modernist era—which, according to many, existed in the rough 
timeframe from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century—the antiquated platitude 
charm enjoyed odd ubiquity in Britain and America, peaking in usage in the middle of 
modernism in 1925.3 Charm is a bizarre affective-aesthetic notion that, by all 
accounts, does not appear to belong in literary modernism. The term is dated, 
outmoded, and irrational. It is feminized and trivial. Charm’s presence in the era 
therefore wounds our accepted narratives of modernism—namely, the dominance of 
post-Enlightenment projects of futurity, individualism, and the separation of aesthetics 
from capital, politics, and science or technology. To focus on charm in literary 
modernism is to refocus our gaze on the era, its objects, and its politics. When we turn 
our critical interests toward charm’s emergence in modernism, other engines of 
accepted narratives in modernist studies begin to turn in response—to put pressure on 
which writers we find to be prominent in modernism, for instance, means that 
emergent or marginalized voices begin to appear as central. Accepted approaches to 




affectively motivated attentions. And the presumed relationship of the aesthetic to the 
sociopolitical begins to blur into an altered dynamism that renders an estranged 
aesthetic autonomy. Bodies and identities as a result are themselves altered through 
shifting mechanisms of minoritization, sociality, and relationships to language and the 
literary. 
To paraphrase Salvador Dalí’s “Poem of Little Things,” charm’s ubiquity 
pricks me. Like Roland Barthes’s punctum, it is a literally touching—tactile—detail to 
modernism. Both a physical object (such as a lucky token) and the state of a subject 
(to be charming, to be charmed), it typically denotes a pleasant interest or delight in 
something. Often, “charming” is used to refer to female attractiveness, a blank 
descriptor of a woman who presents as enticing or alluring in a generally non-erotic 
way.4 But more than a noun referencing an object or adjective referencing a person, 
“charm” also references language itself—it is a word or phrase with magical 
properties for healing, protection, or otherwise controlling one’s surroundings, dating 
from Medieval incantations and healing verses. It shifts uneasily through a range of 
grammatical contortions—one can “be charming” oneself and charm someone else, 
and one can also “be charmed” by someone or something else—the ability to 
manipulate, to make one’s surrounds malleable.  
Charm points to proximity—the closeness between persons through allure or 
attraction, or the wider social position of influence, the potential for control and 
manipulation. Charm brings relationality into being by making the transparent tenets 
of such relationalities apparent. It is because charm plays with closeness that it is 




formations of social cohesion emerged during the mass upheavals of the twentieth 
century, including war, the increased disparities between upper and lower 
socioeconomic classes, and changes to the social and legal status of women. 
Definitions of social groups were iterated through collectivities of nationhood or 
patriotism, as well as through differences in identity categories of gender, race, class, 
and so on. In the throes of such evolving and confounding formations, charm promises 
proximity—social cohesion or closeness among individuals in a sociopolitical or 
national group with those outside of that group—as a false hope or fleeting potential, 
never to actually be held, grasped, or fully enjoyed. The modernist moment of charm 
is a site in which to deduce how modernism allows charm to occupy a paradoxical 
space of attraction and revulsion, an allure toward closeness while maintaining 
wariness of what such closeness may do. To activate charm in modernist projects, 
then, is to activate a logic-less logic of individuality and sociality, desire and 
discomfort, power and disempowerment. 
 To ask what charm is doing in modernism means to ask quite literally what 
charm is doing: performing, enforcing, supplanting, shattering. In an era presumably 
focused on Ezra Pound’s dictum toward “the new” of experimental aesthetic projects, 
that endured a sociopolitical upheaval that included two devastating world wars, and 
that pushed toward a future of scientific and technological innovation, charm seems 
useless, a mere anachronism. But, as I argue here and throughout this study, charm 
becomes a rupture to modernist rupture. It interrupts a modernism already envisioning 
itself as an interruption. Modernism as rupture has been theorized almost since its 




generated for itself (many of which have become “academic folk wisdom,” as Tyrus 
Miller puts it), yet, is the most pervasive.  
As early as 1967, critics determined the central narrative of modernism to be 
synonymous with revolt, negation, and other forms of “rupture.” Irving Howe, in The 
Idea of the Modern, declared that modernism “must be defined in terms of what it is 
not, the embodiment of a tacit polemic, an inclusive negative.”5 It is a “revolt 
against… prevalent style, an unyielding rage against the official order” that somehow 
still “does not establish a prevalent style of its own.”6 David Harvey characterizes 
modernism as embedded in discourses of ephemerality and change, insecurity and 
fragmentation.7 Jurgen Habermas calls modernity a “project” that stems from 
intellectual efforts in the eighteenth century “to develop objective science, universal 
morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic.”8 In other words, 
“the idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals 
working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the 
enrichment of daily life,” including science’s dominion over nature, and rationalized 
forms of social organization that would lead to freedom from “the irrationalities of 
myth, religion, superstition” and “the dark side of our own human natures.”9 The 
“project” of modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then, is 
likewise a secular movement that “sought demystification and desacralization of 
knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from their 
chains.”10 Yet, twentieth-century modernists began to suspect that such a project was 
doomed to turn against itself, rendering the “quest for human emancipation into a 




Enlightenment, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer propose that Enlightenment 
rationality held the logic of domination within it, rendering the domination of nature 
as akin to “the oppressive power of purely instrumental reason over culture and 
personality.”12 The project’s emphasis on technology, for instance, obscures “the 
exploitation of others’ work, and capital.”13 Effectively, “what men want to learn from 
nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the only 
aim… Power and knowledge are synonymous.”14  
Charm appears to have no place here. If the modernist project works in 
responsivity or dialectic to the Enlightenment’s own project, charm’s insistence on 
production (that a thing can emerge from nothing, that incantation creates from mere 
words, sound, or look) opposes modernism’s obsessions with negation including 
Vorticist vacuity and the appropriation of “make it new” as destruction, or 
Nietzschean nihilism. Charm as itself emblematic of the continuity from the 
nineteenth century, as carryover from earlier eras that insisted on the primacy of the 
social institutions including religion, moral education, and the elevation of the 
domestic which included women’s docile roles as “angel in the house” as the heart of 
the nation. Charm’s roots in religion and spirituality confound the idea of modernism 
as secular, and its applicability to women and minorities fractures modernism as 
primarily masculinist. 
Charm as rupture within modernism is thereby a meta-rupture, as it is equally a 
wound to modernism as much as it is a wound to our critical faculties in examining the 
era within the field of modernist studies. It is itself able to expose a modernist system 




dictating that which we find and that which we miss in our scholarly inquiry. We 
cannot see what we are not equipped to see—seemingly invisible tenets emerge when 
we look at the era askance. To view charm as “alluring blank” opens a space in 
modernist projects to newly apprehend a range of fantasies on the nature of 
modernism’s ideas about itself—particularly, its construction of systems of 
minoritization. What results is renewed ability to interrogate modernist aesthetic 
values, concerns of sociality and individuality, and the requisite categories of gender, 
race, and nationhood as linked to capitalist economic and social practices. 
 
A History of Charm and Charm as Method 
My central claim in Charmed Modernisms requires groundwork to be laid on 
charm’s emergence and usage. While this work is the first to examine the term as 
explicit force in the modernist era, I also seek to acknowledge those philosophers and 
writers who have engaged with charm to sketch its shape-shifting history. Therefore, 
what follows is two-fold: first, I will track charm’s emergence in Western literary and 
intellectual history, dating from the Middle Ages. Major ideas within this include 
charm’s mystic roots, its vocality, and its emphasis on the aesthetically felt, or in other 
words, its affective dimension. This includes charm’s etymological roots in Latin and 
Old French, which Chaucer references in his Canterbury Tales (c.1300), and aesthetic 
philosophy from Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century. It also includes the clearest 
engagement with charm in modernism from Walter Benjamin, who spent much of his 
work theorizing an elusive, mystical grasp through art–the fleeting “thereness” of 




affect and aesthetics, which I find is still embedded in charm’s attractions, and its 
ability to drive our experiences with literature, with others, and with the world writ 
large, yet still be able to defy categorization, consequent to the “trauma” of social 
contact and categorization (femininity, sexuality, racialization). 
That charm tends toward the multifold, slippery, and mercurial is no surprise 
given the bends in its etymological history. Dating from the twelfth to thirteenth 
centuries, charm touts multiple roots, including the Latin carmen (n.) or “song” and 
the Old French charme (n.) and charmer (v.) or “to enchant.” Charms tended to refer 
to pagan and Christian incantations alleged to work magic, or refer to a small object 
meant to bring healing or luck. Charms both verbal and physical addressed a range of 
bodily and environmental concerns, and were aimed at resituating the body and its 
substances with a physical and spiritual environment – from toothaches to childbirth to 
marriages. Geoffrey Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale (c. 1385) makes mention of such healing 
properties: “To oothere woundes and to broken armes / Some hadden salues and some 
hadden charmes.”15 Only in the seventeenth century did charm begin to lose its 
religious or mythic significance and become an ostensibly positive, secular, and 
quotidian term of praise. These aspects once associated with the religious or mythic 
were transformed in subsequent centuries to become forcibly secularized, though 
uncertainty as to its power remained. 
Charm in the modern era supplanted religiosity with aesthetic perception, its 
own secular form of “magic” – frequent concern of modernist artists and writers, 
aesthetic perception could influence, delight, or otherwise elicit spontaneous feeling. 




Benjamin explains a “unique apparition of a distance,” or, that which solidifies the 
singularity of an original artwork, is always attached to our encounters with art. It is 
“the here and now of the work of art—its unique existence in a particular place.”16 
Aura is a kind of presence, a temporal distance with a simultaneous closeness, that has 
been lost as contemporary perception has changed with the advent of photography and 
cinema. Benjamin finds aura “identical to its embeddedness in the context of 
tradition,” or, art as it was used in its origin, “in the service of rituals—first magical, 
then religious.” Its “original use value” was that of authenticity. In the twentieth 
century, “for the first time in world history, technological reproducibility emancipates 
the work of art from its parasitic subservience to ritual,” founding it instead “on a 
different practice: politics.”17 I reference Benjamin’s outline of the trajectory of 
artistic perception through modernity to draw parallel to the rough outline of charm’s 
position through history. Charm, like “aura,” retains a lost referent, replaced in the 
modernist era with capitalist consumption and politics. These forces, in other words, 
become the driving aspects of charm’s manipulations and allures, and too are subject 
to capitalism and politics’ assumptions of value and primacy. 
The term seems an ideal example of secularized aesthetic concept within 
modernism, confirming modernism’s own interest in the secular and rational. Indeed, 
charm had already appeared long before within aesthetic theory. Immanuel Kant, of 
course, was one of the first aestheticians to incorporate charm in a study of aesthetics, 
albeit to negate its purity for proper assessment of the beautiful. Kant not only names 
charm (Reiz) as such in his account of aesthetic experience in the Critique of 




beautiful.18 Kant finds design to be that which is essential in art, not emotion or 
“sensation”: “it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, 
that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste.” Beauty, he notes, “which ought properly 
to be a question merely of the form,” is often confused with the lesser “charm and 
emotion.” Beauty is conceived as distinct from charm as the “intrinsic” over mere 
“ornamentation.” This duality is essential to what Kant finds to be pure, rather than 
empirical, thinking. Pure perception is thus pitted against the ornamental and 
emotional. “A judgement of taste,” Kant concludes, “which is uninfluenced by charm 
or emotion… and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form, is a 
pure judgement of taste.”19 Kant colludes emotionalism with charm, implicitly 
indicating that he finds emotional or affective response may affect the quality of our 
perception, and thus, that the object of our gaze may not be indeed objective. The 
legacy of such thought in Western aesthetics exists in perpetuity. Any impure or 
otherwise “not pure” judgments of beauty are encounters in which “every interest 
corrupts the judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality.”20 Those judgements 
deemed not pure for reasons of interest are “charms” (Reize). Such impure judgements 
seem to be already embroiled in modernist caution toward emotionality, aesthetic 
investment, and the dangers of interest over “disinterestedness.” Despite colloquial 
interpretations that note otherwise, charm is therefore theorized as on the fringes of the 
beautiful, but not a degree or modality of the beautiful in itself.  
Rosalind Galt underscores the link between social inequity and aesthetic 
categories, including the beautiful, in Pretty: Film and the Decorative Image (2011). 




be feminine and non-Western) to the more significant “beautiful” throughout Western 
aesthetics and philosophy. “The rhetoric of cinema,” Galt argues, “has consistently 
denigrated surface decoration, finding the attractive skin of the screen to be false, 
shallow, feminine, or apolitical.”21 The “resilience” of the idea that cinema is “empty 
spectacle” is proof positive for Galt that the critical terms used to assess and evaluate 
art are themselves embedded in modes of reading learned from “a transhistorical 
Kantian schema of beauty.”22 Galt aims, as I do here, to trouble such a history, yet I 
find charm’s viability as not cinematic but literary quality rendering texts and textual 
experience as incantatory necessarily also caught in particular kinds of questions about 
form. Charm is both aesthetically formal and affectively of form. It is a structure that 
is, paradoxically, a mysterious force difficult to precisely identify but that occupies 
some dependency or asymmetry of aesthetic feeling and form. 
To examine charm in the purely aesthetic sense as aspect of aesthetic 
perception, literature, and art is to place charm into the often-theorized tangle of 
aesthetic response. Sianne Ngai, who tracks minor negative aesthetic emotions in Ugly 
Feelings (2005), defines aesthetic response simply: aesthetic emotions are those 
“feelings unique to our encounters with artworks.”23 These feelings’ “objective or 
subjective status,” however, poses continual problem in aesthetics: one of the oldest 
theories of aesthetic experience, Aristotle’s Poetics, failed to clearly distinguish 
whether particular emotion (catharsis) occurs within an audience in response to drama 
or is located in the dramatic object itself.24 She refers to Gérard Genette’s attempts to 
get around the very question of subjective or objective emotion by emphasizing the 




feeling in you) that Kant and other philosophers have tried to outwit. Genette’s 
“unapologetically subjectivist theory of aesthetic judgment as a mode of illusory 
projection,” Ngai writes, is “what amounts to a fundamentally subjective appraisal 
[…] treated ‘as if’ it were one of the object’s own intrinsic properties.”25 Aesthetic 
judgment, then, “is this illusory objectification,” something that Genette deems 
“aesthetic predicates” such as precious, momentous, or imperious, either created from 
or stemming from our initial perception of the aesthetic object.26 Eve Sedgwick offers 
an alternative affective-aesthetic framework as she turns to Proust’s In Search of Lost 
Time (A la recherche du temps perdu). Proustian “modes of being, of relation to self 
and the world,” she writes, becomes contemplation as a search to understand “his 
continuing access to a psychology of surprise and refreshment, as well as his 
nourishing relation to work.”27 Sedgwick’s idea of such capacity for “surprise and 
refreshment” became unofficial groundwork for contemporary affect studies. Feeling 
or affect functions as political and social currency, yet, remains an unknown variable 
that in most cases is not reliably predicated, manufactured, or exerted, and thereby is 
independent of power, while it may work within and beside it.  
Such aesthetic-emotional responses encounter particular problems in the realm 
of not only aesthetics, but also affect. This is largely due to the significance of form or 
structure, which tends to be avoided in contemporary affect theory. For example, 
Brian Massumi finds affect not a language or form but an “intensity” involving 
movement and sensation which “holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after 
ideology.”28 Defined as the Spinozan “capability to affect and be affected,” affect is 




social matrix of power and domination in Foucault’s formulation. Massumi argues that 
such a positional matrix concretizes an ideological fixity of the subject, rendering both 
accordance to power and subversion to power already “scripted” in the social matrix. 
Massumi finds affect theoretically necessary to abandon such fixity in favor of a mode 
that explores the dynamic subject’s potential for non-predeterminate change. Affects 
are both virtual (“the autonomy of relation”) and actual (“functional limitation”) in 
that they “virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in (functionally limited by) the 
actually existing, particular things that embody them.”29 This is why emotions and 
feeling tend to be seen as disorienting, he notes, or described as outside of oneself. 
From that point, we may then imagine an ethics composed on the basis of such 
change, he argues. This change is enacted by “the perception of one’s own vitality, 
one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability (often signified as ‘freedom’).”30 Emotion, 
such as that which is elicited by artworks (or, in most of Massumi’s examples, media, 
art, and popular culture) contrasts with affect, then, because emotion is a formalized 
naming or the “socio-linguistic fixing” of affect which reduces it to signification.31 
Lawrence Grossberg adds, “affective states are neither structured narratively nor 
organized in response to our interpretations of situations.”32 To examine an artwork 
and experience aesthetic emotion, then, fails to occupy either realm of aesthetics or 
affect/emotion on the basis of form.  
However, it is here that I offer charm as remedial and necessary force in this 
perceived split. Charm occupies positions as affect and aesthetic emotion uniquely 
because it is equally referent to subjective state and physical object. In other words, 




aesthetic experience. Eugenie Brinkema summarizes: “the turn to affect has 
corresponded with a disciplinary turn away from detail, from specificity and the 
local.”33 This is because affect is seen as “the place where something immediate and 
automatic and resistant takes place outside of language,”34 as Massumi’s “force” and 
pre-linguistic intensity suggests. However, the turn to affect “does not obliterate the 
problem of form and representation. Affect is not where reading is no longer 
needed.”35 Affect as critical apparatus alone fails to allow affect to press back against 
theory, she cautions. Instead, we ought to be asking, “What… would happen to the 
study of both affectivity and form if we were to reintroduce close reading to the study 
of sensation, not as felt by moved bodies, but as wildly composed in specific 
cinematic, literary, and critical texts?”36 Consider that charm can be an experience 
between persons (in which case, who holds the experience of charm – the charmed, 
the charmer, or both, and to what degree?), and the difficulty of reading such 
interactions. How we formally may account for the feeling that one person is “putting 
on the charm” artificially, a gimmickry that we are coded to detest, or determine 
whether charm is present at all, must rely upon form. This drives my focus on charm 
as a modernist literary and cultural phenomenon. Moreover, this approach follows 
Raymond Williams’s notion of structures of feeling, structures which named those felt 
social experiences which “do not have to await definition, classification, or 
rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on 
experience and action.” Instead, they lie “at the very edge of semantic availability,”37 




As Brinkema indicates, a return to form and to close reading is critical for 
affect to “do” anything for the Humanities. In doing so, I find we may better approach 
the work of social judgement, power, and politics. If I am “being charming” to you, 
for example, I am putting on a relation, and therefore, I am showcasing the “charm 
and charisma” that Pierre Bourdieu calls “the power,” or cultural capital, “which 
certain people have, to impose their own self-image as the objective and collective 
image of their body and being.”38 In saying you are charming, or in “being charming,” 
I have established an asymmetry of power between us that thereby constructs each of 
us. In both scenarios, I have power over you, in some form, because “I” am the one 
who judges. “You” become the object to my subjecthood. And yet, you retain some 
kind of magnetic, manipulative influence in your charm, under the guise of 
innocuousness or inertness. Desire and pleasure from this asymmetry challenges what 
the “beautiful” would have established. This new, strange asymmetry occurs through 
language, judgement, and aesthetic feeling. Furthermore, following Bourdieu, this 
aesthetic feeling is a social one. Charm under this theorization—as a placeholder of 
judgement or legible structuring apparatus, arising from formal engagement, and 
necessarily indicating a lost or absent object—becomes a modernist fantasy. As 
fantasy, this fantasy's “magic” of “bringing into being” is already at odds with 
modernism's notions of itself as secular, rational, and future-focused, a modernism that 
is accepting of paradox, rupture, and revolt against objectivity and closure.  It shows 
the modernism still sought the possibility of meaning, the ability to envision futures 
that were very like the present rather than "new" or progressive, still believed in 




consciousness, or the ability for individuals to retain power to manipulate their social 
status amidst the rise of twentieth century global capitalism. That modernism knew 
these things to be false or untrue was not deterrent. This provides hope for us in the 
present to see what formal affective engagement with literary and cultural 
representations of fantasies can offer for us as we live through our own time of 
rupture, revision, and uncertainty. 
To call attention to “charm,” then, instead of the beautiful, the “interesting,” or 
the negative “shock” or “disgust,” is to newly apprehend the details of form as a social 
placeholder—a form of judgement—that has the unique ability to bring things and 
relations between things into being (or, in other words, “magicking” things into being) 
while laying bare the means of the production of this relation. It is because of this 
asymmetry that I argue for charm to be considered an important point of interrogation. 
Furthermore, charm is particularly of import in modernism as it becomes signal of 
multiple antimodernist notions. It is an antagonism to modernism, a catch in its 
narrative of itself, that was magnetically alluring to modernists. Our attentiveness to 
this phenomenon finds charm as a formal affective relationality, a force of evacuated 
form that moves our critical apparatuses into an otherwise that recognizes the 
foundations of our apparatuses in systems of power and difference.  
Many recent studies in modernism have approached early twentieth-century 
literature and culture with a single controlling principle, as I am doing with charm. 
Other controlling principles have included glamour, boredom, melancholia, and 
ambiguous thermality, studies of which include Judith Brown’s Glamour in Six 




Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom (2012), Jonathan Flatley’s 
Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism, Jessica Burstein’s 
Cold Modernism: Literature, Fashion, Art (2012). Such works have surged as part of 
literary study’s so-called “humanistic” or social turn, motivated in part by the 
impasses left by poststructuralism through the last decades of the twentieth century. 
Like these studies, this project, too, ultimately seeks to worry accepted boundaries of 
modernist literary studies via a singular, evocative concept in order to “retain 
modernism’s unique resources for thinking […] in a noninstrumental fashion.”39 Yet, I 
push my project away from generalized “feeling” in modernism, since this tends to 
occlude the other components of modernism, particularly the problems of form. In this 
way, I develop the approaches and commitments of Eugenie Brinkema in The Forms 
of the Affects (2014). As I’ve indicated, much of what I work with here is purposefully 
at odds with traditional definitions of modernism, including its allegedly dominant 
masculine aesthetics, its emphasis on rationality and the secular, and its concern with 
individuation and subjectivity over the social or collective. To discuss glamour or 
boredom in modernism, for example, is to address accepted notions of modernist 
aesthetic and political project – glamour’s aesthetic smoothness or hollowness, and 
boredom’s demonstration of modernist difficulties with individuation, agency, or 
subjectivity. Charm, on the other hand, does not participate in any of modernism’s 
common narratives; instead, charm ruptures these narratives to propose a kind of 
modernism on the margins that helps us locate the structures of modernists’ values, 
desires, and fantasies. This marginality is not to be confused with the notion of a 




essay on the subject, minor literature is characterized by its composition by a minority 
“within a major language,” with the common characteristics of “deterritorialization,” a 
political domain, and a collective value.40 What I look at instead is a modernism that 
premises itself on the mechanisms of such minoritization, that does not deterritorialize 
through minorization but actually reterritorializes the same ground for itself. 
My study of charm is important to modernist studies because, I find, as we 
examine lesser-studied or dismissed forms circulating in modernist thought and 
literature, we may better come to know modernism. Urmila Seshagiri finds that 
despite an immensity of contemporary work in alternative modernisms, including 
cosmopolitan modernity, comparative modernities, and postcolonial modernisms, 
modernist studies writ large has largely accepted modernism as I described it above – 
striving for the masculinist, secular, and rational. Syllabi across English departments 
continue to list expected, dominant authors as foundational: D.H. Lawrence, James 
Joyce, Wyndham Lewis, T.S. Eliot, and so on, for fear that teaching modernism 
without these figures decenters what modernism allegedly is. Other authors including 
Virginia Woolf or Dorothy Richardson, Jean Rhys, Jean Toomer, May Sinclair, or 
H.D. are of interest because they engage directly with such dominances, such as 
H.D.’s turn to Sigmund Freud or Woolf’s frequent address of masculinity in literature 
and politics throughout her career. Despite the current field’s alleged acceptance of 
“the relationship between modernism and modernity was elementally shaped by 
women, feminists, and feminist women,”41 then, Seshagiri finds that there remains the 
continued “gap” or “aporia between feminism’s vitality for modernism, on one hand, 




Stephen Ross characterizes it, as he reminds us of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the 
“minor” to “signify an overlooked but perfectly symptomatic literature, one that 
illuminates its context and the ‘major’ works, figures and traditions around it, as the 
canon cannot.”43 Rather, I find charm’s ability to loop us in uncertain delight as itself a 
hopeful act of this sort of critical revitalization to examine modernism’s mechanisms 
of minoritization. (I use “delight” deliberately – etymologically, “delight” is of mixed 
origin, in part out of Latin delectare or to allure, charm, or please, thereby is itself a 
loop back to charm.) Hope, like “happiness’s promise,” for Sara Ahmed, is a “hopeful 
performative,” something that is “container of diverse objects” actually “might also 
contain the forms in which desire can be realized.”44 Such a suggested tautology, 
Ahmed observes, “may tell us something by not telling us anything. Without the word 
happiness, we would perhaps not have a word that desire could point to.”45 In slow 
study of the difficult-to-pinpoint category of “charm”– in all of its middling quotidiana 
and its reliance upon both a feminist modernism and othered modernism – I hope that 
we may also begin to realize what it points to. Reading charm is a way of reading 
modernism’s own conflicting desires, judgements, and fantasies. 
 
Charm in Literary Modernism 
Despite its oddities, charm did not solely exist in what the field today may 
consider modernism’s margins. Rather, canonical modernists were highly interested in 
charm. In the case of F. Scott Fitzgerald, the classic novel The Great Gatsby (1925) 
came about via Fitzgerald’s self-proclaimed “idea” about “a woman’s charm.”46 




nonresponse. After the publication of her feminist essay on women’s creativity, A 
Room of One’s Own, in 1929, Woolf predicted: “I shall get no criticism, except of the 
evasive jocular kind… that the press will be kind & talk of its charm, & sprightliness.” 
In other words, she says, “I am afraid it will not be taken seriously. Mrs Woolf is so 
accomplished a writer that all she says makes easy reading…this very feminine 
logic…”47 Tristan Tzara bitterly noted his own “charm” in an ironic Dada manifesto. 
The work was composed after Tzara allegedly took insult at being deemed “charming” 
at a social event in 1920: 
A few days ago I was at a meeting of imbeciles. There were a lot of people 
there. Everyone was charming. Tristan Tzara, a small, absurd and insignificant 
individual was giving a lecture on the art of becoming charming. He was 
charming, at that. Everyone is charming. And witty. It’s delightful, isn’t it? 
Everyone is delightful, at that. 9 degrees below zero. It’s charming, isn’t it? 
No, it isn’t charming. God isn’t up to it. He isn’t even in the directory. But 
even so he’s charming. 
 
Ambassadors, poets, counts, princes, musicians, journalists, actors, writers, 
diplomats, directors, dressmakers, socialists, princesses and baronesses are 
charming. 
 
You’re all of you charming, very subtle, witty and delightful. Tristan Tzara 




idiot, a practical joker and a hoaxer. Be sincere for a moment: what I’ve just 
said to you – is it charming or idiotic?48 
  
 Charm in each of these literary moments appears as de facto response to 
literary incomprehensibility—Fitzgerald’s notion of women as mysteries or 
inscrutable femme fatales, Woolf’s writing glossed as unserious, and destabilizing 
Tzara’s sense of control over his own expression. Modernism is of course no stranger 
to such opacity. James Joyce’s Ulysses, for example, was deemed so difficult as to be 
unreadable – a reviewer in 1922 noted that the novel put so many barriers in front of 
readers’ attempts at understanding that “it appear[s] Mr. Joyce ha[s] taken some half 
million assorted words […], shaken them up in a colossal hat, and laid them end to 
end.”49 But charm’s incomprehensibility relies on particular presumptions. In any 
formulation, charm inescapably plays upon the incomprehensibility encountered when 
one hits against the particular paradoxes of what charm blankly polices—the abutting 
social categories of gender, sexuality, or racialization. These categories, while 
complicit in the engendering of difference in modernity, are further complicated when 
modernist projects use charm to critique the limitations of such categories, and 
furthermore, to propose aesthetically driven transformations of the social fabric 
through forms of feeling rather than normative structures. 
As I have established, charm takes up the position of paradox in modernism. It 
is an alluring blank, a space of trauma, of incomprehension, in which a logic-less logic 
emerges. This is the sort of logic modernists use to think through the changes to social 
categorizations of gender, sexuality, class, and race. It also suggests on an aesthetic 




a fallen promise of social cohesion or an attempt at navigating the shifts in what is 
considered social cohesion. Charm seems to indicate a near nostalgia for the 
aesthetically autonomous beautiful.50 The term assumes a superficiality, a stylistic 
gimmickry, or a degraded falseness. It becomes, in other words, a polite indication of 
emptiness, uselessness, or extraneousness, and thus, an indication of the “feminine,” a 
“feminine” that is embedded in modernist aesthetic practice.51  
I use charm’s central operation as gloss on degradation and devaluation as 
arbiters and upholders of difference (gender, race, and sexuality), and the fantasies of 
how to navigate (and indeed, what responsibility exists to even begin to navigate) such 
difference to explain charm’s perceived normativity in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, then rebelliousness in the early decades of the twentieth century, 
and finally, after the boom period of the 1920s, its fatalism in 1930s modernism. This 
fatalism is iterated acutely by white male modernists, such as D.H. Lawrence. While it 
was in the nineteenth century a desirable, genteel quality acceptable for women, charm 
shifted to become an engine of revolution for women writers who harnessed charm’s 
force of form while it became emasculating and melancholic for men. It indicated 
some failure of expression and nostalgia for a fantastic, imagined past. Instead of itself 
holding meaning, charm ended up as an evacuated placeholder for the search for a 
language and vocabulary to express the crisis of man (and I do mean man) in 
modernity.  
As this shifting valuative marker, “charm” in modernist literature and culture 
names the formulation of a constrictive, then revolutionary, then lost object. I propose 




of these two terms as responses to loss either real (such as the death of a close friend) 
or imagined (in the case of a lost romantic partner at the end of a relationship). I aim to 
retain the capability of both terms’ emphases on loss as alternately conscious or 
unconscious, and with result in a “poor emptiness” belonging either to the world or 
one’s own ego. This subject/object relation is akin to Ngai’s assessment of the trouble 
between subject and object in the affective-aesthetic relation. Freud writes in his essay 
on the subject: “the obvious thing is for us somehow to relate melancholia to the loss 
of an object that is withdrawn from consciousness, unlike mourning, in which no 
aspect of the loss is unconscious.”52 The “melancholic inhibition seems puzzling to us 
because we are unable to see what it is that so completely absorbs the patient,”53 and 
the loss of the love-object “is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence of love 
relationships to come to the fore.”54 When mourning becomes pathological, it becomes 
melancholy, and “the conflict of ambivalence… forces it to manifest itself in the form 
of self-reproaches for having been oneself responsible for the loss of the love-object,” 
particularly, “for having wanted that loss.”55 
Charm construed as loss, however, is slippery, as it expresses the violent, 
colonialist, racist, and misogynist machinery that social, national, and economic 
structures depend on. From the early twentieth century, charm was already read as a 
loss—particularly, as a mourning for a lost, masculine pastoral, in Britain. D.H. 
Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920) is critical example. After the sudden death of her 
lover, Gudrun muses on her uncertain future, a future that she is pleased to find is 
unexpectedly now “perfectly vague.”56 “All possibility,” she thinks, “that was the 




because death was inevitable, and nothing was possible but death.”57 The precipice of 
uncertainty itself holds charm for her as she “did not want things to materialize, to 
take any definite shape”58 In this deathly hope for stillness, for the not-yet, the hopeful 
expectance of the start of the novel is wholly overturned: in its early pages, Ursula 
thinks her sister Gudrun “so charming, so infinitely charming, in her softness and her 
fine, exquisite richness of texture and delicacy of line. There was a certain playfulness 
about her too, such a piquancy or ironic suggestion, such an untouched reserve.”59 In 
his introduction to the novel, Lawrence explains: “Man struggles with his unborn 
needs and fulfillment. New unfoldings struggle up in torment in him… Any man of 
real individuality tries to know and understand what is happening, even in himself, as 
he goes along.”60 Lawrence deems this struggle “the struggle for verbal 
consciousness,” the “passionate struggle into conscious being.”61 As Lawrence 
indicates here, charm seems to be an evacuation of language’s ability to express; 
resultantly, to express anything is to express loss. From the “charming Jersey cattle… 
breathing hoarsely from their velvet muzzles at the human beings”62 to the Criches’ 
family home at the Shortlands, described by Ursula as “Very peaceful and 
charming,”63 charm seeps into the landscape of Lawrence’s English countryside to 
mark a nostalgia for quintessential Englishness, the Englishness of manor houses 
made possible by the financial boons of empire. The “thing” that charm suggests but 
cannot express, then, is the unspoken reliance of white English masculine identity 
upon the back of the British empire’s gendered and racialized exploitation. 
Charm as masculinist fantasy has remained so pervasive that, as recently as 




“The Rise and Fall of Charm in American Men,” an article appearing in The Atlantic 
by its former editor, Benjamin Schwarz, commits this same egregious fantasy-
building. “[W]e live in a culture all but devoid of male charm,” Schwarz laments. He 
names George Clooney as the last of the male charmers, a final holdover from lost 
Cary Grants and James Garners. “Only the self-aware can have charm,” he points out, 
and “what used to be called good breeding is necessary (but not sufficient) for charm: 
no one can be charming who doesn’t draw out the overlooked, who doesn’t shift the 
spotlight onto others—who doesn’t, that is, possess those long-forgotten qualities of 
politesse and civilité.” By calling charm’s key components both “politesse” or 
“civilité” and an indication of “good breeding,” Schwarz makes apparent the 
assumptions of charm as its own “eugenics” of sorts, an indicator of socioeconomic 
status, gender, and undoubtedly, race. The supposed purity of white male sociality as 
embodied by Cary Grant is held as fantastical ideal. And the stakes for such a loss are 
high, for Schwarz. Not only does the loss of charm as quality for socializing lead to a 
degraded society, he argues, but it also leads to a bevy of dissatisfied women who 
“commonly complain about the difficulty in gaining any conversational purchase 
when, say, trying to engage the fathers of their children’s classmates or the husbands 
of their tennis partners.” Men, unfortunately, “don’t indulge in the easy shared 
confidences and nonsexual flirtations that lubricate social exchange among women,” 
and thereby “consistently fail to meet the sort of obvious standards set by guides to 
etiquette and to the art of conversation common 50 years ago.”64  
Schwarz’s comments clearly demonstrate the ease with which charm slips into 




value systems that place heteronormativity, whiteness, and masculinity as objects 
worthy of preservation and attention. Schwarz is excellent example of the way in 
which these notions align with an American conservatism, including the current 
political view trotted out in defense of supporting “blue-collar America” that places 
capitalist concern squarely in the realm of white men (chapter four furthers this 
argument). These are the stakes of inquiring into charm at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Charm’s status as space allows us critical inquiry, an inquiry that holds 
significance beyond mere historical description of social codes at the turn of the 
century.  
Charm, in other words, has real consequences as it entertains a blank space of 
impossible logics. By “impossible logics,” I mean the space of paradox, where overly 
complex logical machinations occur. As Lawrence and Schwarz show, charm is a 
conservative notion that seems to reinforce normative ideologies and the mechanisms 
of a society bell hooks would later recognize as white supremacist capitalist 
patriarchy. But what charm also does is become itself a force of form, evacuated and 
alterable. While charm in the conservative context is marker of preexisting social 
boundaries that divide labor classes, gender categories, and whiteness from other 
races, modernists such as Gertrude Stein, Oscar Wilde, Virginia Woolf, and others 
find that charm does not mark the preexisting, but points to the open blackness, the 
transformability, of these notions of social cohesion or division. Charm becomes a 
transformative mechanism because it points out that social divisions are not concrete 




addressed in this project will show, charm thereby can render new social bonds, ones 
predicated on aesthetic grounds.  
A casualty of early twentieth century political, technological, and social 
upheaval, charm as indicator of the “death” of particularly British (male, and 
nationalist) potentiality in the face of modernization is itself a consequence of 
modernity. It is a bizarre consequence of modernity’s push toward human and social 
progress, a push that was actually not itself a rupture but a continuation. Specifically, 
it was a continuation of the Enlightenment’s utopian project that emphasized the 
promise of endless human perfectibility, equality, and improved living conditions 
made possible by advances in science, technology, and medicine. More than “an 
experience of temporality and a set of social transformations,” modernization for the 
sake of modernization was a goal in itself.65 These moments of “modernization” 
evidence the ambiguous relation and curious agential and non-agential turns 
modernists had in the move toward modernity. Modernism or modernity is therefore 
not necessarily a specific aesthetic project in response to or product of historical 
factors (industrialization, urbanization, the rise of mass culture). Jonathan Flatley 
instead describes modernity as itself a “symbolic space in which what counts as 
modernity, what modernity is or should be, and for whom, is contested, debated, 
reevaluated, or otherwise articulated.”66 In other words, looking to charm as indicator 
of masculinity’s melancholia in modernism is to look to one barometer of the gap 
between what modernity is and what it should be, what promises could be made or 




This loss is, I argue throughout this project, embedded in aesthetic practice in 
modernism, where it becomes entwined with varied confrontations of otherness. This 
is, as I’ve described above, an encounter with heteronormative masculinity’s binaristic 
opposite, the feminine. Yet, to be sure, it is also non-whiteness, a non-whiteness that is 
compositional of that whiteness. As Frantz Fanon describes in “The Fact of 
Blackness” (1952), the experience of a raced subject is a Hegelian “being for 
others.”67 “[N]ot only must the black man be black;” he writes, “he must be black in 
relation to the white man,” leaving a black body to be returned to one “sprawled out, 
distorted, recolored, clad in mourning.”68 When “all that is solid melts into air”69 in 
modernity (a phrase that itself conveys the diffuseness of the modern, as well as the 
urgency of the “now”70), charm becomes synonymous with what Anthony Blanche 
decries in Brideshead Revisited (1945) as that “simple, creamy English charm.”71 The 
“creaminess” of English charm conveys a milky rurality, an agricultural past that 
Lawrence mourns in Women in Love, but moreover, a racialized whiteness.  
In Women in Love, this coded melancholy for whiteness is echoed in the 
emphasis Gerald places on coal mining’s laboring “blackness.” While “hideous and 
sordid” during his childhood, in adulthood, he “saw them with pride,” the “stream of 
miners flowing along the causeways from the mines at the end of the afternoon, 
thousands of blackened, slightly distorted human beings with red mouths, all moving 
subjugate to his will… They were ugly and uncouth, but they were his instruments.”72 
The same blackness plagued his father, manifest in “internal pains” he suffered: 
The pain seemed to absorb his activity. He knew it was there, he knew it would 




had not the power, or the will, to seek it out and to know it. There it remained 
in the darkness, the great pain, tearing him at times, and then being silent. And 
when it tore him he crouched in silent subjection under it, and when it left him 
alone again, he refused to know of it. It was within the darkness, let it remain 
unknown. So he never admitted it, except in a secret corner of himself, where 
all his never-revealed fears and secrets were accumulated.73  
The unnamed darkness that lurks is the confrontation with otherness that the senior 
Crich is unable to contend with. It would radically alter his subjecthood to the point of 
annihilation—precisely Gerald’s fate on the snowy mountaintop in the final chapters 
of the novel. The darkness, moreover, operates in uncanny connection with the plight 
of the senior Crich’s wife: 
By some strange association, the darkness that contained the pain and the 
darkness that contained his wife were identical. All his thoughts and 
understandings became blurred and fused, and now his wife and the consuming 
pain were the same dark secret power against him, that he never faced […] He 
had rather ignore its existence. Only, in his vague way, the dread was his wife, 
the destroyer, and it was the pain, the destruction, a darkness which was one 
and both.74 
Crich’s assessment of what forces are acting upon what entities within him meanders. 
First, the pain exists as darkness within him, and his wife is contained within this 
darkness. Then, these forces begin to blur, even as he refuses to face them and to see 
what lies within him. He instead projects this inner darkness outward, locating the 




status as woman and property, his wife herself bears the reminder of the reach of 
English nationalism’s colonization—it “contains” not only other nations, but its own 
subjects. 
Racial difference and femininity expressed through English “charm” are finally 
also in conversation with sexual orientation. Anthony’s warning to Charles in 
Brideshead extends beyond racialization and gentility. Cautioning him against the 
Flyte family’s alluring siren song to him, Anthony declares to Charles that charm is a 
suffocation, “the great English blight.”75 Indeed, charm seems to snuff Charles’s 
artistic talents – when out with Charles after Charles’s exhibition late in the novel, 
Anthony insists: 
I was right years ago – more years, I am happy to say, than either of us shows 
– when I warned you. I took you out to dinner to warn you of charm. I warned 
you expressly and in great detail of the Flyte family. Charm is the great 
English blight. It does not exist outside of these damp islands. It spots and kills 
everything it touches. It kills love; it kills art; I greatly fear, my dear Charles, it 
has killed you.76 
Even Charles’s supposedly successful, feral paintings showcased just prior to this 
moment are not true art, but “English charm, playing tigers,”77 says Anthony. This is, 
of course, not a mere statement of aesthetic critique, but a statement of concern over 
the coded threat of charm. In this brief phrase, Anthony identifies charm’s reliance on 
racialized colonial power – “playing tigers” recalls England’s imperial hold on where 
tigers may exist (namely, South Asia) and moreover, suggests the “game” of power 




or contagiousness, is critical component of its very allure. Its ability to not only set 
new relations into motion, but to spread such new relations through influential 
proximity. If “others—defined through gender, sexual orientation, or race—remain 
quite close, the melancholic loss of white, nationalist masculinity becomes all the 
more bizarre. The threat of charm is a revelation of difference’s falsity, its “too 
closeness” that signals the shift from relation to influence and social transformation.  
 
Charming Effects 
On the subject of Parisian actresses, critic Alan Dale once mused in 
Cosmopolitan Magazine in 1908: 
What is charm? It is something that you cannot see. It is something that an 
actress in repose never possesses. It is something that the photographer cannot 
catch. It is something that eludes the pen of the artist, and is but fleetingly 
guessed at by the caricaturist. Sometimes it lurks in a shrug or an unsuspected, 
graceful gesture; it is to be found in the method of addressing the audience; it 
exists in an unconventional way of wearing conventional clothes; it may hide 
itself in facial expression—in a smile, a pout, a frown, a laugh. I have seen it in 
a toss of the head, a sudden movement of the arms, even in the manipulation of 
draperies or a swish of the dress.78 
Others from the era assigned charm not to French women, but to American women. 
French fashion designer Jean Patou’s 1925 fall-winter show was a sensation for his 
Taylorist management of staging and production, keen manipulation of the press, and 




issue that also featured Patou’s advertisement for the show, “MANNEQUINS 
WANTED FOR PARIS”), Patou declares, “The American woman is a charming 
creature… Women here have so many varied interests and activities that it keeps them 
young. They go in for sports and that causes them to retain their splendid figures. And 
their feet and ankles are the most perfect in the world.”80 While, as Dale notes, charm 
in the early twentieth century cultural imagination is “elusive,” and never “possessed”; 
it is something that “lurks,” “hides,” and “manipulates,” it is also, as Patou 
emphasizes, external, seemingly objectively located in (or on) female bodies, 
rendering charm highly visible (and enforceable) markers of social class, gender, and 
race. Yet, at the same time, these highly visible markers are—in the works of Oscar 
Wilde, Gertrude Stein, and more discussed in these pages—opportunities for 
subversion, and thereby, for transformation. Protagonist Miriam Henderson, a working 
class British woman who seeks an independent life for herself and a place for her 
writing in Dorothy Richardson’s novel series, Pilgrimage, is keenly aware of charm’s 
duplicity in this way. In the second volume of the series, Miriam evaluates the figure 
of Dr. Hancock, her employer, whom she believes holds romantic interest in her. As 
she considers him, the narration offers a slowly sharpening critique of the “charming 
effects” Miriam believes would be necessary for his attentions. Miriam then doubts the 
entire system of courtship that these effects manifest, knowing that she herself 
possessed none of these charms:  
[H]e... was one of those men who do not know that an effect like that was just 
an effect, a deliberate ‘charming’ feminine effect. But if he did not know that, 




plunging fall of the feet down the steps-‘I am late; look how nicely and quietly 
I am doing it; look at me being late and apologetic and interested’-out of place 
in the circumstances, then what was he doing here at all? Did he want science, 
or would he really rather be in a drawing-room with ‘pretty ladies’ advertising 
effects and being ‘arch’ in a polite, dignified, lady-like manner? How dingy 
and dull and unromantic and unfeminine he must find her.81 
What Dale finds innate to Parisian actresses (the profession of whom is, of course, to 
elide the boundaries of the “real” and the “put-on”), is for Miriam a deliberately 
curated “effect,” one that she may see through while many men cannot. Finding 
women’s “charms” admittedly vapid or false – like “advertising” – Miriam still 
recognizes charm as alluring and desirable, becoming insecure as she determines she 
has none. Much like Miriam, British and American modernism writ large was both 
fascinated by, yet intensely wary of, what charm may do. Likewise, charm as a term to 
police women’s bodies and social behaviors turns on its head in the hands of the 
writers I discuss in this project. To attend to charm in all of its variations, in a return to 
the “scene of the modern” (to borrow Michael North’s subtitle from Reading 1922 
[1999]), is to allow a deepened grasp on modernist value systems, the working through 
of loss, and the hopeful potentiality of social transformation. 
In my initial chapters, I set out the workings of charm in modernist literature 
and culture. I find charm reveals modernist urgings toward the social and the 
communal, or toward a futurity, while also anxiously cautioning against these urgings’ 
ills. In chapter one, I find Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) as case 




More broadly, too, I find the trace of charm left in works that turned the feeling into a 
highly linguistic, textual aesthetic that begs engagement and transformation as it 
applies language to the body in chapter two. I argue there that modernism offers an 
alternative take on gendered embodiment through charm operating within the poetry 
of Gertrude Stein and the rise of a mass-marketed women’s culture. Charm for women 
was something to be “schooled” on, inhabited, and embodied, establishing an 
economic and social register of female or feminized bodies through repetition that, 
unlike theories of gendered embodiment from Judith Butler or bodily biopower from 
Michel Foucault, presents the woman’s body as a uniquely styled set of desires.  
Then, in my later chapters, I take up questions of how charm allows us to 
critically read texts, politics, and ultimately, the contagiousness of epistemology in 
interwar Britain. Charm becomes literary tonal atmosphere by curating magical 
thinking, a kind of feminist cognitive dissonance, in Sylvia Townsend Warner’s 
interwar fantasy novel, Lolly Willowes (1926), while charm as atmosphere ties itself to 
feminist rebellion. Charm as arm of American capitalism emerges in the final 
chapter’s study of short fiction from F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith Wharton. Both 
seeking charm and enforcing its denigration, Fitzgerald’s and Wharton’s 
representations of charm’s work present it as a force bound within twentieth-century 
American capitalism’s value systems that prioritize white masculinity. Ultimately, 
charm uniquely recasts modernism’s preoccupations with feeling and responsivity, 
individual and community, art and politics. My conclusion explores what may emerge 
if we in contemporary criticism take modernist charm to task. Would we more 




it is rational, secular, masculinist? If we read the former modernism into the latter, we 
find that modernism’s projects occur under a new set of possibles or conditions – 
cognitive or perceptual concerns, problems of pleasure and desire, or social and 
aesthetic divides. What results is a modernism seen anew by fully making apparent 
our critical apparatuses to apprehend modernist projects—particularly those projects 
that exist outside of accepted literary histories within modernist studies. As a result, 
we see a modernism that foregrounds rupture’s own ruptures: the compositionality and 
embeddedness of feeling that cannot stand apart from form in what we now consider 
“modernist.” 
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THIS CHARMING MAN: OSCAR WILDE, AESTHETICS, AND INFLUENCE AT 
THE FIN-DE-SIÈCLE 
Punctured bicycle 
On a hillside desolate  
Will nature make a man of me yet? 
When in this charming car, 
This charming man 
Why pamper life’s complexity 
When the leather runs smooth 
On the passenger seat? 
– The Smiths, “This Charming Man” (1983) 
Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things  
are corrupt without being charming. This is a fault.  
– Oscar Wilde, Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) 
 
Famously, Oscar Wilde was convicted of gross indecency after a highly 
publicized trial in 1895, and received the harshest possible sentence—two years’ hard 
labor in solitary confinement. Wilde spent the initial months of his prison term at 
Newgate and then Pentonville Prison, before finally serving the majority of his 
sentence at Reading Gaol. Throughout, Wilde remained in solitary imprisonment. This 
isolating sentence was designed specifically to allay the fear that his hypnotic persona 
would “infect” other prisoners, as many perceived Wilde’s alleged conduct with Lord 
Alfred Douglas and other men served as clear evidence of aestheticism’s aim to spread 
throughout Victorian society morally dubious notions that would undermine the very 
grounds of that society.1 
A critique in the Daily Telegraph summarizes the pervasive sentiment against 




We have had enough, and more than enough of Mr. OSCAR WILDE, who has 
been the means of inflicting upon the public patience during the recent episode 
as much moral damage of the most offensive and repulsive kind as any single 
individual could well cause. [The] general concern… [is] with the man 
himself—his spurious brilliancy, inflated egotism, diseased vanity, cultivated 
affectation, and shameless disavowal of all morality—the best thing would be 
to dismiss him and his deeds without another word to the penalty of universal 
condemnation…2 
The language of this criticism is suggestive: Wilde’s faults as a man are described as 
“spurious,” “diseased,” and “cultivated.” Or, in other words, his is a put-on and 
practiced mien, which has been carefully crafted with attention to form—an attention 
to form that has been theorized as the very hallmark of the aesthetic.3 His ability to 
exist in society without punishment has reached its limit, the critique claims, as the 
public has allegedly had “enough,” even an excess of enough—his content exceeds his 
form, and his very personality is itself an indulgence, a decadence, for society. The 
description of Wilde’s “infliction” of “damage” to the social realm presents him as a 
violence against social cohesion, a scourge or disease of falsity, inflation, and affected 
amorality. This critique effectively confirms Wilde’s persona as itself part of his 
aesthetic practice. 
If persona (and thereby, social relations) is cultivated or formed as a specific 
positional relationship to the social in the way Wilde’s persona seems to suggest, then 
charm enters as a unique affective-aesthetic that makes apparent the relation of the 




individuals into social relations. When we fall under one another’s spell, in other 
words, by being charmed by another, or being charming to another, we knit ourselves 
together in aesthetically and affectively-driven relation. Yet this knitting is not without 
its snags—aesthetics and the social are two realms notoriously at odds with one 
another during modernism. I link charm with Wilde through this criticism in order to 
explore how charm sinks to this denigrated status by the early years of modernism. 
After functioning as indicative shorthand for social etiquette, unthreateningly pleasant 
delight, and proper behavior for both men and women in the earlier decades of the 
nineteenth century, charm’s place as respectable manner slips by the fin-de-siècle. It 
becomes increasingly untrustworthy as marker of good character. Namely, its link 
with Wilde and his highly publicized trial begins charm’s clear descent, as it becomes 
synonymous with Wilde’s perceived aesthetic asociality. In other words, only in 
Wilde’s era does charm begin to appear in spaces of exclusion. Yet, charm also makes 
clear—as Wilde does—the central paradox of this movement. As the nineteenth 
century’s implicit trust of the social’s value moves to the twentieth century’s distrust 
of all things social, the role of the aesthetic as either social or individualist grows 
unclear. Charm’s valuation as desirable or undesirable follows this movement.  
I seek to track how charm moves from marker of a valuable sociality to marker 
of asociality. Crafting one’s persona loses its place as a social activity, leading to the 
integration of a self into society, as it was in the nineteenth century. Instead, it became 
an indicator of an asocial tendency. The aesthetic and the social, then, are resultantly 
in direct contention with one another. We will find that charm is a force that renders 




find that this movement occurs just as modernism launches toward fulfilling the 
Enlightenment’s promise of the individual, as a creeping anxiety over the social as in 
itself an intrinsic good. The structure of criticisms against Wilde are precisely the 
structures of charm—a catching, contagious influence, aesthetically-crafted and 
affectively-driven, and a destabilizing force evincing the era’s nascent belief in 
individualism. I will first examine the theoretical underpinnings of this movement 
before turning to Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) to track charm’s role in 
early modernity. 
 
Charm’s Anxious Modernism 
Far from an extraneous force separate from the political realm, art was still 
anxiously perceived as holding significant sway in social formation in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.4 In Degeneration (1895), Max Nordau attacks art and 
aesthetic, bohemian or unusual types (including criminals) for their role in the 
degeneration of society at the turn of the century. Naming Oscar Wilde, Henrik Ibsen, 
and Richard Wagner, among others, Nordau finds aesthetic types a common “illness”: 
“In the fin-de-siècle disposition,” he writes, including “the tendencies of contemporary 
art and poetry” and “the life and conduct of men who write mystic, symbolic and 
‘decadent’ works and the attitude taken by their admirers,” there exists “two well-
defined conditions of disease […], degeneration and hysteria.”5 Effectively, Nordau’s 
main argument is that contemporary degenerate aesthetes’ egomania threatens the 
social order. Not only does his finger-pointing at the perennial scapegoat, art, signal a 




thinking science and technology, Nordau inverts what forces control the circumstances 
of his criticism. While among the first to point out the very phenomenon of the fin-de-
siècle, Nordau paradoxically fails to recognize what characterizes the era—the 
tumultuous lumbering toward a new social order that will characterize modernity, one 
that (like Nordau’s accusation of art) focuses primarily on the individual and breeds 
distrust of sociality and its institutions. And, as Wilde demonstrates in The Picture of 
Dorian Gray as well as in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” it is actually art that 
lays the foundation for society, not the inverse. Anxiety like Nordau’s over art’s 
degenerate potential is relieved, Nordau would surely have been happy to know, when 
the notion of aesthetic autonomy later meets its alleged demise under late capitalism. 
As Fredric Jameson writes in his landmark essay on postmodernism, “aesthetic 
production today has become integrated into commodity production generally,”6 
making it near impossible to consider art to be separable from economic or 
commercial interests. Likewise, Jameson argues, art retains a “political unconscious” 
that keeps art tethered to those influences of the sociopolitical realm—however hidden 
or ambiguous these “unconscious” ties may be—that aesthetic autonomy alleges to 
excise.7 (Aesthetics and capitalism in the context of charm will be discussed in chapter 
four.) 
As Nordau portends, growing fervor over occultism, spiritualism, mesmerism, 
and forms of theosophy emerged in both Britain and America at the fin-de-siècle. 
Aestheticist, decadent, and consumerist materialism morphed back and forth from and 
into fantasy and spiritualism. Because phantasmatic spaces – whether occultist or 




against the usual patriarchal models of inheritance and community via marriage and 
the nuclear family,”8 the “dark arts” posed a threat to normalized social order.9 Leigh 
Wilson writes in Modernism and Magic that public interest in magic actually “made 
possible the privileged status of that crucial institution of modernity, science. While 
different theorists proposed sometimes opposing views of magic’s relation to social 
order... Making magic anathema to contemporary ‘civilization’ works to justify not 
just the systems of anthropology [and moreover, of patriarchal systemic order], but 
also the instrumental rationality necessary to carry out capitalism’s domination of the 
natural world.”10 The danger of occultism, spiritualism, and theosophy seemed 
multifold, then – such orientations of thought moved outside of scientific rationality, a 
rationality necessary for both patriarchal and capitalist rule; it placed power (of capital 
and of influence) in the hands of women and many times, racialized or ethnic “others” 
including many of Eastern European or “gypsy” heritage; and finally, made possible 
non-normative forms of transmission, or, the ability to send and receive missives in 
new modes across time and place. In other words, like occultism, Wilde’s aestheticism 
was seen as threat to traditional social forms because it introduced new modes of 
occupying spaces of kinship and relation. Influence, then, became an associated 
transmitter of these new modes, rendering them “doubly transgressive, disrupting both 
sense boundaries and traditional codes of behavior and alliance.”11 
The Telegraph’s critique of Wilde in this context is not precisely a critique of 
his falseness and excess but rather, the uncertain, anxious roil of formless influence. 
This is the language of spiritualism and occultism, as it is the language of aesthetic 




according to those who condemn him, is the accepted relation of art to the social order. 
That the Telegraph article links a “real sense of beauty” as under threat by Wilde’s 
“profligate taste and profane mockery” suggests a policing of artistic morality. Such 
policing is emblematic of the notion that socially acceptable ethical values are in 
contest with aesthetic ones. This is an essential assumption of this chapter’s theory—
that while social order and organization is perceived as separate from the aesthetic 
realm, it is, in fact, reliant upon it. The threat of the aesthetic is not the absence of 
ethics, but is an innovated ethics. Søren Kierkegaard argues in Either/Or (1843) for 
the binary that the aesthete is opposed to the ethical (though Wilde is not known to 
have read Kierkegaard’s work). While both the aesthete’s view and the ethical stance 
“considers the personality in relation to the surrounding world,” and “the expression 
for this in its recurrence in the personality is enjoyment,” there is a difference. The 
“esthetic expression for enjoyment in its relation to the personality is mood. That is, 
the personality is present in the mood, but it is dimly present. The person who lives 
esthetically tries as far as possible to be engrossed completely in mood. He tries to 
bury himself completely in it so that nothing remains in him that cannot be modulated 
into it, because a remainder like that always has a disturbing effect.”12 Mood, 
intriguingly, becomes the critical sentiment of the aesthete. As Wilde’s critics have 
also noted, it is mood and its closely related terms—affect, tone, bearing—that are 
themselves the crime Wilde commits, and the central threat Wilde poses to society. 
Later, Kierkegaard theorizes a particular mood, the mood of anxiety, with anxiety’s 
movements and forms. In describing Antigone’s tragic negative affect, Kierkegaard 




assimilates it. Anxiety is the motive power by which sorrow penetrates a person’s 
heart. But the movement is not swift like that of an arrow; it is consecutive; it is not 
once and for all, but it is continually becoming.”13 While Kierkegaard refers 
specifically to sorrow, I find that this anxious, aesthetic “becoming” is like his notion 
of “mood.” This mood is the structural, formal movement of charm. Charm is an 
alluring blank within the social relation – a catching, transformative energy, and an 
orientation toward the social, or to otherness. Charm catches an individual and an 
other in a relation, one that transforms the matter of the other, that reforms the other 
through often non-conscious affective-aesthetic manipulation.  
Wilde’s work allows us to see the way in which charm may be read as socially 
motivated force. The Telegraph found it abhorrent, and Wilde himself believed it 
potentially dangerous (he compared himself in his prison writing De Profundis to 
pederasts and child-murderers, including the Marquis de Sade and Gilles de Rais). 
Yet, charm as social force becomes an intoxicating, alluring “blank” of new social 
potential, a partial and impossible fulfillment of social progress in entirely alternate, 
aesthetic terms, previewing what would obsess later modernists—the idea of aesthetic 
autonomy. 
 
Dorian and the Magic of Affective-Aesthetic Influence 
Wilde’s engagement with “charm” as an aesthetically-driven social theory of 
relation is most apparent in The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), in conjunction with 
his theoretical essay, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” (1891). These works 




and in doing so, are invested in the phenomenon of aesthetic transmission of emotion. 
Both texts’ engagements with charm not only attest to charm’s function as marker of 
difference as I have elaborated in this project’s introduction, but more significantly, 
use aesthetics to postulate alternative bonds of sociality and social identity through the 
transmission of emotion, or, the catching of affect, through form.  
Charm drives The Picture of Dorian Gray. The term appears eighty-five times 
over the novel’s pages, beginning with the novel’s epigraph on charm, already 
knotted: “Those who find ugly meanings in beautiful things are corrupt without being 
charming. This is a fault.”14 This twist on the aesthete as intrinsically good 
immediately introduces the novel’s work with form, sociality, and morality. Dorian 
Gray’s entrance into the novel comes via Basil Hallward’s mention of meeting him as 
an encounter with a personality that has irrevocably changed him. And, just as charm 
does, the notion of who influences whom slips from figure to figure. Dorian is first, 
influencing Basil Hallward upon their first meeting, which Basil retells to Lord Henry 
Wotton. “When our eyes met,” Hallward tells Lord Henry Wotton: 
‘I felt that I was growing pale. A curious sensation of terror came over me. I 
knew that I had come face to face with some one whose mere personality was 
so fascinating that, if I allowed it to do so, it would absorb my whole nature, 
my whole soul, my very art itself. I did not want any external influence in my 
life. […] I have always been my own master; had at least always been so, till I 
met Dorian Gray.’15 
He was decidedly a “[c]harming boy,”16 as Basil’s friend Lady Brandon says of 




transmission and influence are forces of terrifying intensity, and are linked with 
artistic experience, and “terror” or danger as early as the first chapter. Then, influence 
slips into anxiety, as Basil worries that Henry’s presence may mar Dorian’s perfection. 
Just before Basil introduces Lord Henry to Dorian, Basil admonishes Henry, “Don’t 
spoil him. Don’t try to influence him. Your influence would be bad. The world is 
wide, and has many marvelous people in it. Don’t take away from me the one person 
who gives to my art whatever charm it possesses: my life as an artist depends on 
him.”17 Basil’s “charming” artistry, in other words, relies itself on the charm of 
another, Dorian. (Lord Henry later says to Dorian, “Basil, my dear boy, puts 
everything that is charming in him into his work.”18) Lord Henry’s influence on 
Dorian becomes the final component. He tells Dorian when they finally meet, “‘There 
is no such thing as a good influence, Mr. Gray. All influence is immoral—immoral 
from the scientific point of view.’”19 Yet Basil is proved right in his early warning, 
which goes unheeded. Henry holds immediate influence upon Dorian, who finds 
Henry’s influence “bewildering,” “fresh,” and the cause of a “vibrating and throbbing 
to curious pulses.”20 Dorian imagines Henry’s presence as having touched a “secret 
chord” within Dorian, which “seemed to him to really have come from himself.”21 
Dorian’s revelatory experience is vaguely autoerotic, brought on by the transmission 
of unspoken, secret knowledge that Lord Henry realizes may be similar to his own 
revelation at sixteen years old, after reading “a book which had revealed to him much 
he had not known before.”22 An essential component of this dangerous transmission is, 
of course, charm, the thing that was initially a component of Dorian’s identity that 




less a substance of its own than a structure, a musical “secret chord” that sets charm 
forth into sociality, an anxious force that continuously reverberates and roils, that 
alters normative kinships and social links. If charm is originally an incantation, verse, 
or song, it is in a pure etymological sense that Dorian feels himself musically 
“incanted,” brought into a form of existence or liveliness by Henry’s influence in a 
way he is brought out of such existence by Basil’s influence—namely, through the 
macabrely deteriorating painting of Dorian. This is the novel’s alleged primal scene, a 
moment of aesthetic-affective transmission via form.  
Eugenie Brinkema elucidates how this phenomenon can be conceptualized. In 
The Forms of the Affects, Brinkema looks to a Grimm brothers fairy tale about a boy 
who cannot feel fear or horror. “I cannot feel my flesh creep!” he cries repeatedly, as 
“affective knowledge resists him.”23 Later in life, the boy is finally able to feel that 
very sensation when a bucket full of small fish is poured over him. For Brinkema, this 
dramatizes what is decades later iterated by William James, the theory that emotion 
works from the outside in. In other words, external stimuli produce emotion, instead of 
the commonly-believed expressivist model where emotions move from the inside 
outward in answer to stimuli. To reference James’s often-quoted example, one does 
not run from an attacking bear because one is afraid, but one is afraid because one 
runs from an attacking bear. The Grimm tale literalizes this model of affect. “[P]ut 
another way,” Brinkema offers, “the ending appears to suggest that a wet, cold 
shudder is an adequate affective form of textual interpretation.”24 In Gilles Deleuze’s 
formulation, it is a relation that “force has with itself, a power to affect itself, an affect 




notion of affect renders it as exteriority, is to consider affect as a visible phenomenon 
(such as “creeping flesh” or goosebumps on the skin, and the widening of the pupils 
when one is afraid), or at least, a phenomenon based on the language or structuring of 
what constitutes appearances. The “power” of affect—as Deleuze, James, and 
Brinkema suggest—is its work as force upon itself. It is, thereby, a force upon the 
body, and the body’s relation to other bodies—the social relation.  
The proximity of charm to both occultist or spiritualist discourse and 
aestheticism, together with new forms of sociality or kinship driven by aesthetic-
affective forces, renders legible the perceived dangers of “charm” and the anxieties it 
produced over transmissible, influential contagion. This contagion is, as Nordau 
indicates, assessed as an “outbreak,” or breaking out of systems of social order. As 
Dorian Gray maintains his youth while Basil Hallworth’s portrait of Dorian 
deteriorates, Dorian holds a “strange and dangerous charm,” one that catches him 
between the desirability of his wealth and charm: “Society, civilized society at least, is 
never very ready to believe anything to the detriment of those who are both rich and 
charming… For the canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons 
of art. Form is absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a ceremony, as 
well as its unreality, and should combine the insincere character of a romantic play, 
with the wit and beauty that make such plays charming. Is insincerity such a terrible 
thing? I think not. It is merely a method by which we can multiply our personalities.”26 
Like the Telegraph’s criticism of Wilde’s cultivated personality, Dorian, too, bridges 




as the same as the “canons of art,” with an unreality and insincerity that points toward 
the artistic creation of it. 
In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” Wilde expresses this very view on the 
relation between art objects and their audiences. Individual artists, he notes, have been 
thus successful:  
creating in their audiences… the temperament to which Art appeals. And what 
is that temperament? It is the temperament of receptivity. That is all. If a man 
approaches a work of art with any desire to exercise authority over it and the 
artist, he approaches it with such a spirit that he cannot receive any artistic 
impression from it at all. The work of art is to dominate the spectator: the 
spectator is not to dominate the work of art. The spectator is to be receptive. 
He is to be the violin on which the master is to play. And the more completely 
he can suppress his own silly views, his own foolish prejudices, his own 
absurd ideas of what Art should be, or should not be, the more likely he is to 
understand and appreciate the work of art in question.27 
Receptivity to form, to become able to receive incantatory forces or become subject to 
such aural forces (“to be the violin on which the master is to play”), becomes the core 
of Wilde’s “radical” socialism. Charm, thereby, is an integral affective-aesthetic force 
upon bodies that brings bodies into kinned relations outside of biological, economic, 
or other organizational models.  
Wilde is effectively voicing the project of the New Critics, decades prior to 
I.A. Richards and Cleanth Brooks. Indeed, a world in which no governmental 




To achieve such independence, Wilde proposes a new Individualism, one that is 
“unselfish and unaffected,” an unselfishness that “let[s] other people’s lives alone, not 
interfering with them.”28 This Individualism would also cultivate sympathy in a wider 
context. Not merely sympathy for the poor or for those in pain, but “with the entirety 
of life,” “with life’s joy and beauty and energy and health and freedom.”29 This kind 
of sympathy is “more difficult,” Wilde acknowledges, because it “requires more 
unselfishness. Anybody can sympathize with the sufferings of a friend, but it requires 
a very fine nature – it requires, in fact, the nature of a true Individualist – to 
sympathize with a friend’s success.”30 What Wilde proposes, in other words, is a new 
sociality, one that—once removed from the political and aligned with the aesthetic—
permits new, ethical modes of interaction with one another. It is a new individualism, 
a transformed sociality, founded on the aesthetic. 
An early scene in Portrait tracks these influential affective relations, ones that 
are founded upon, and structured by, aesthetic experience. The aesthetic sources of 
these affective relations are not relegated to those objects easily considered art objects, 
such as Dorian’s much-discussed yellow book. It carries into social experience. When 
Henry and Dorian are at dinner with Mr. Erskine and Agatha, Henry suddenly takes 
off on a philosophical flight of fancy on the ability to make mistakes in youth: “He 
played with the idea, and grew willful; tossed it into the air and transformed it; let it 
escape and recaptured it; made it iridescent with fancy, and winged it with paradox.”31 
As Henry speaks, he notices: 
the eyes of Dorian Gray were fixed on him, and the consciousness that 




fascinate, seemed to give his wit keenness, and to lend colour to his 
imagination. He was brilliant, fantastic, irresponsible. He charmed his listeners 
out of themselves, and they followed his pipe laughing. Dorian Gray never 
took his gaze off him, but sat like one under a spell, smiles chasing each other 
over his lips, and wonder growing grave in his darkening eyes.32  
Henry performs the social relation on affective-aesthetic terms. He gives his ideas the 
force of movement (it is “winged,” “tossed,” and “transformed”) and color (it is 
“iridescent,” and literally “color[ed]” by the imagination). The “spell” he produces 
that “charm[s]” his listeners out of themselves is conducted via musical metaphor. The 
“pipe” Henry’s listeners follow seems initially to suggest what could be a smoking 
pipe dangling from his lips. Yet, it more rightly references the musical Pied Piper, 
whose multicolored coat of lore (the “pied”) is doubled by the narration’s reported 
“iridescence” and “color” of Henry’s wit.  
This moment of intense social affective-aesthetic influence, in which listeners 
are carried away by Henry’s social mien, stands in contrast to a scene I find of 
undertheorized importance to Dorian Gray, and from which I will build out to 
connected scenes both before and after. The critical scene involves Sibyl Vane as 
subject of conversation, Dorian’s doomed love object. When offstage, Sibyl’s 
performance of a lovestruck girl is as successful as Lord Henry’s musings in the scene 
prior, though to different ends. Sibyl, in contrast to Henry, is pre-staged, lending a 
meta-awareness of the context of the performance as a performance. Dorian first tells 




reported interaction with her was backstage, not onstage. She is “unconscious of her 
power,” Dorian reports to Henry. 
Sibyl Vane is of course aptly named as already an enticing, prophetic illusion. 
Defending his love for her when Lord Henry disapproves, Dorian declares why he 
finds Sibyl attractive: “she is divine beyond all living things. When she acts you will 
forget everything. These common, rough people, with their coarse faces and brutal 
gestures, become quite different when she is on the stage. They sit silently and watch 
her. They weep and laugh as she wills them to do. She makes them as responsive as a 
violin. She spiritualizes them, and one feels that they are of the same flesh and blood 
as one’s self.”33 Dorian and Lord Henry are described as becoming will-less on their 
own, subject to Sibyl’s “divinity,” which “spiritualizes” them. When Sibyl appears 
onstage, Dorian’s description of her powers comes true through charm: “Motionless, 
and as one in a dream, sat Dorian Gray, gazing at [Sibyl]. Lord Henry peered through 
his glasses, murmuring, ‘Charming! charming!’”34 Yet, the illusion dissipates. While 
Sibyl “looked charming as she came out into the moonlight” as Shakespeare’s Juliet, 
all charm is quickly lost when she begins to speak. The “staginess of her acting was 
unbearable, and grew worse as she went on. Her gestures became absurdly 
artificial.”35 This is a form that does not speak, but that moves, acts, and appears.  
 Dorian tells Henry that Sibyl said to him, “‘You look more like a prince. I 
must call you Prince Charming.’”36 Charm here seems unaffected, natural. Yet, it is a 
casting strategy. Sibyl assigns the role to Dorian of “Prince Charming,” which, 
unbeknownst to Sibyl, forms her in the Prince’s love interest, Snow White. In her 




beyond linear temporality of past, present, and future. In casting Dorian as her Prince, 
she both previews her own later death (much like Snow White “sleeps” in a false 
death), as well as arranges an aesthetic lineage of her onstage roles as Shakespeare’s 
Juliet and Imogen, and as Snow White. Collapsing the three figures in herself is a feat 
only made possible by charm’s work in the persona of Prince Charming, a figure who 
is able to resuscitate the socially dead. 
These fictional figures’ doubled deaths—three in the aesthetic realm from 
Juliet, Imogen, and Snow White, one in the novel’s “real” realm, from Sibyl—
themselves double Dorian and his portrait’s own connectivity. This calls attention to 
the ease with which we dismiss Dorian and his double as one real, and one false. 
When Dorian says that she is Imogen that evening, then tomorrow, Juliet, Lord Henry 
retorts, “When is she Sibyl Vane?”37 There is no direct answer, because—like 
Dorian—Sibyl is never a “true,” singular “self.” Dorian instead responds, “She is all 
the great heroines of the world in one. She is more than an individual.”38 In other 
words, she is not a void, but a blur, a form. She is a new kind of individual that is not a 
haeccetic singularity, but an indistinction. Charm blurs, fogs, and obscures, while 
seeming to reveal. The affective-aesthetic of charm is thereby at the center of a new 
sociality, enabled by Sibyl in this under-read scene, and later confirmed by Dorian’s 
doubleness. In affective aesthetic relations, a new sociality is thereby made possible 
when new forms of individuality are allowed to emerge.39 This blurs the boundary 
between those modes of self-identification or self-distinction that are within the “real” 





Sibyl’s scene is itself a doubling of Dorian’s “primal scene” near the start of 
the novel, when Dorian’s portrait is created. Dorian arguably only “begins” at the 
painting’s creation, much like Sibyl’s transfixing presence. Upon seeing the painting, 
Dorian simultaneously identifies with it and fails to recognize himself in it: “Is it the 
real Dorian?’ cried the original of the portrait, strolling across to him. ‘Am I really like 
that?’”40 Dorian sees himself in a painting as though he were seeing his reflection in a 
mirror, through the eyes of another/an other. Moments later, Lord Henry bemusedly 
asks Basil to identify the referent when Basil speaks of Dorian, “[W]hich Dorian? The 
one who is pouring out tea for us, or the one in the picture?”41 Both Lord Henry and 
Dorian here seek Basil’s confirmation as to who Dorian is. Basil as observer/creator 
here makes him the primary “witness” of the doubling, and the only one who may 
distinguish the two. The “old” Dorian has no relation to the “new” Dorian, outside of 
the narration’s linking language.  
The scene featuring Sibyl is also a preview to the end of the narrative. After he 
meets with Lord Henry to discuss Basil’s death, Dorian finally decides he must be 
free—he will “kill” the painting after years of moral immunity. He looks at the 
painting, horrified to see that the blood that had appeared on the painted Dorian’s hand 
“seemed brighter, and more like blood newly spilt.”42 He first declares it “an unjust 
mirror, this mirror of his soul that he was looking at.”43 Mirrors in nineteenth-century 
literature tended to be conventional images of beauty, playing with Medieval accounts 
of pride and vanitas, or Hamlet’s claim to hold a mirror up to nature. By both 
revealing and concealing, the mirror itself is a visual trick in that it may distort 




and moral transgressions and reversals, as in William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity 
Fair (1848), Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass (1871), or Mary Elizabeth 
Coleridge’s poem, “The Other Side of a Mirror” (1896). This is, of course, the 
“mirror” of representational play, the very magic or “charm” that conjures perverse 
doubles through textual or aesthetic representation. Dorian radically misreads the 
painting as in direct correspondence to his moral reality, thereby flattening the ability 
of art to be anything but a separate “other” that nonetheless exists within him, outside 
of the painting. The painting exists, in other words, in direct correlation to the real, 
rather than in a more slippery, perverse relationship. Mirrors, like art, appear to 
present reality or truth, whether external or internal. But this is the trick of both the 
mirror and the art—both labor at curating this sense of direct reflection while relying 
on the murky craft of conjuring. Believing that the painting is therefore evidence of 
the real, Dorian characterizes the painting only as incontrovertible proof of the real’s 
existence. It is “evidence… The picture itself,--that was evidence”44 of Basil’s murder. 
“It had been like a conscience to him,” he realizes, “Yes, it had been conscience. He 
would destroy it.”45 With the same knife that he used to kill Basil, Dorian slashes the 
canvas, and dies. Or so we think – events in the room are not reported. The narration 
moves from describing Dorian “ripping the thing right up from top to bottom” directly 
to the next paragraph: “There was a cry heard, and a crash.”46 The sudden break in 
what we see is echoed by the sudden shift to passive tense. A cry and a crash were 
heard. When the servants who do the hearing in this sentence rush toward the room, 




heart. […] It was not till they had examined the ring that they recognized who it 
was.”47  
This scene indicates, I think, that Wilde wants to remind us that art—like the 
novel we are reading—does not help us see the real, by shifting our gaze away and 
into uncertainty. At the moment of death, our gaze is forcibly turned away from the 
dead body and the painting (to rest on the working class “subalterns,” in recall of 
Dorian’s parentage). Dorian and his portrait are not doubles precisely, or that at least, 
we will never know certainly what their relation was. It cannot be an “unjust mirror,” 
as Dorian calls it before slashing the painting. Mirrors are seen to reflect, not refract. It 
is also unclear how Dorian dies – while it is surmised that the old man on the floor is 
equivalent to the man in the painting, the aged, “true” Dorian, the body itself is not 
slashed but stabbed, with “a knife in his heart.”48 Because of these discrepancies, the 
two figures (one “real” Dorian, the other the “false” painting) are undoubtedly related. 
But just as Dorian has difficulty determining what the portrait is and means just before 
slashing it, resting on one conclusion and then another they are related in dynamic 
fashion, Dorian and the painted image are not a static one-to-one representation. They 
are paradoxically distinct snags in the notion of individuality. Dorian is not individual, 
nor static—the painting’s “magic” or charm renders the Dorians as not two 
individuals, or one representation of another, but as related versions. Wilde 
purposefully denies us the final knowledge of who may be the “original” and the 
“copy,” since this is not meant to be the question at all. This is suggested both right 
after the painting comes into being in the novel’s early chapters, and here again, when 




Dorian, and also Henry’s question of Sibyl, of when she is really Sibyl). The aesthetic-
affective relation, then, is not of the real to the represented, but something far more 
complex. Both the “real” and the represented Dorian were Dorian, because he—like 
Sibyl—demonstrates a form of individuality that slashes accepted forms of individual 
subjecthood. The original ending of Dorian Gray evinces this further. The final lines 
read: “Lying on the floor was a dead body, withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of 
visage with a knife in its heart.”49 What is often presumed to be the “real” Dorian—the 
body that remains—is not a “he” but an “it.” Wilde has presented an alternate 
subjecthood not premised on sociopolitical singularity, but the incantatory diversity of 
aesthetic experience. 
 By tracking these varied influences of “charmed” relations, what Wilde 
achieves in the novel becomes clear. The work postulates a sociality through modes of 
kinship conceived in aesthetics—through relations of form, bodies, and feeling—rather 
than in normatively-organized relations as perceived through biologically-driven links 
of persons (including heredity, familial structures, and sexuality). Such a 
“spiritualized” transformation echoes Dorian’s questions after Sibyl’s suicide, when 
he notices Basil’s portrait of him has changed to reflect a cruel smirk. “Might there not 
be some curious scientific reason for it all?”, he wonders, before considering: 
If thought could exercise its influence upon a living organism, might not 
thought exercise an influence upon dead and inorganic things? Nay, without 
thought or unconscious desire, might not things external to ourselves vibrate in 





Dorian’s musing on notions of the dead and living, of some “secret,” “strange,” or 
magical vibratory connections lend a sense of an illicit connective desire to charm’s 
ability as force of aesthetic-affective relation. Such a relation, Dorian seems to 
indicate, is without “thought” or consciousness, but is nonetheless a desire for 
connectivity that transgresses normalized boundaries of space, time, and matter.  
 
The Social Relation 
The kinds of invisible ties that Wilde’s aesthetic kinships propose through 
charm seem to be destabilizing. This is primarily because they risk amorality, as 
morality was linked to the rise of the individual subject as inherently able to move 
beyond basic Kantian desires to use logic and reason rather than aesthetic feeling to 
guide social relationalities. To fail to do so is to run the risk of becoming susceptible 
to Wilde’s cult of influence, or worse, becoming Wilde. That which is invisible or 
unknowable, unable to be logically determined, appeared in the nineteenth century as 
intrinsically primitive and base. French physician and early sociologist Gustave Le 
Bon lends context for Dorian’s proposed social relation. Le Bon notes in The Crowd: 
A Study of the Popular Mind (1895) that sociality is defined by a new entity of the age, 
the “psychological crowd.” This notion relies on three key processes that Le Bon sets 
forth: anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility. Le Bon’s work, in conjunction with 
Freud’s analyses of crowd mentalities, does significant work to destabilize notions of 
post-Enlightenment reason and rationality, and Le Bon attempts to account for this 




and so at odds with what is known about the individual, and the individual’s morals, 
ethics, and individual psychology?  
As Le Bon notes in his work’s preface, the realm of philosophic principle is 
not always the realm of the real: “The study of social phenomena cannot be separated 
from that of the peoples among whom they have come into existence. From the 
philosophic point of view these phenomena may have an absolute value; in practice 
they only have a relative value. It is necessary, in consequence, when studying a social 
phenomenon, to consider it successively under two very different aspects. It will then 
be seen that the teachings of pure reason are very often contrary to those of practical 
reason. […] In certain cases there is more truth in the unreal than in the real.”51 Le 
Bon goes so far as to say that because of the complexity of social forces, “It seems, 
too, that behind the visible facts are hidden at times thousands of invisible causes.” 
Crowds, it should be noted, are themselves ascribed to the “new age” of the nineteenth 
century, yet remain conflicting representations of modernity. Despite their brief 
flashes of revolutionary instincts, they are “instinctively hostile to changes and 
progress.”52 Le Bon spends his work’s early chapters explaining the peculiar nature of 
modern crowd scenes, which are, he notes, a threat to governmental and political 
power. “Little adapted to reasoning, crowds, on the contrary, are quick to act… The 
divine right of the masses is about to replace the divine right of kings.”53 Crowds are 
“barbarian,” and “powerful for destruction,”54 and are antithetical to the movement of 
civilization. Le Bon is clear to point out that the actions of crowds are not always so 
inferior, destructive, and revolutionary. They may be equally heroic as they are 




disingenuousness. Crowds “do not admit doubt or uncertainty, and always go to 
extremes—Their sentiments always excessive.”56 There is something primal or 
primitive in their workings: “Like a savage, it is not prepared to admit that anything 
can come between its desire and the realization of its desire… The notion of 
impossibility disappears for the individual in a crowd.”57 These responses are, 
naturally, able to indicate essences of racial divisions. “For instance,” Le Bon muses, 
“the difference between a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon crowd is striking.”58 More 
importantly, the anxiety held about crowds is less a disruption of political power or 
governmental overthrow than it is about regressivism, and primitivism, the dread of a 
return to the non-modern. Le Bon writes, “Crowds are everywhere distinguished by 
feminine characteristics.”59 Their excessive emotionality renders them akin to the 
excessive emotionality of “inferior forms,” which Le Bon lists as “women, savages, 
and children.”60  It is this contagion of lesser forms, of any stoppage to post-
Enlightenment progress and reason, that is the greatest concern for Le Bon, and for 
many other crowd theories. What this means, in effect, is an insistence on divisions 
and on individuality in the modern age, a movement that in the late nineteenth century 
propels the industry of personality and individuation in the decades to follow during 
the modernist period (see chapter four). 
Le Bon’s model of crowd mentality involves an individual who comes “under 
the influence of suggestion,” wherein an idea “enter[s] the brain” and “transform[s] 
itself into an act.”61 “A crowd,” Le Bon explains, “scarcely distinguishes between the 
subjective and the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in its mind,” despite 




suggestibility implies an exterior stimulus transforms an interior response, a notion 
that flies against William James’s non-expressivist model, though Le Bon’s 
explanation of this connection actually suggests a destabilizing of the boundary 
between the exterior and interior. The threat of the crowd is a threat of a new sociality 
and thereby a new individuality, in which the body’s boundaries are far more fluid 
than previously believed. This is in some ways an echo of American theories of 
transcendental consciousness, from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Margaret Fuller, some 
four decades earlier (and, which continues to emerge in contemporary theory as new 
materialism or posthumanism from figures including Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, and 
Donna Haraway). Charm, in fact, upholds the formality of affect in Wilde’s writing. 
Instead of being immediate indication of some interior “secret” that is withheld, charm 
is actually a formal exteriority that is produced by aesthetic experience and by the 
narration itself. Lord Henry, for one, our narration reports, “had the charm of being 
very dangerous.”63 Charm itself does not produce danger, the text suggests; danger 
preexists charm. 
While Le Bon attributes the crowd mentality’s invisible causes to “an 
immense, unconscious working,”64 which he finds one of the “secrets of their 
strength” as a “force still unknown,”65 we can see that such invisible forces have 
echoes in Wilde’s examination of the forces of affective workings when the domain of 
aesthetics is in view. Brinkema writes of affect, form, and bodies: “to assert that 
treating affect as a form ignores the body is to refuse to question what forms and 
bodies might mean to each other, what form might cause us to rethink about bodies, 




indeed, the body itself is a kind of form.”66 In other words, Brinkema insists that “we 
have not yet asked enough of form; that we do not know what forms are capable of; 
that in the strident pulling apart of form and affect, it hitherto has been undetermined 
what the body can do to form and even what form can do to a body.”67 I undertake an 
answer to this through Wilde’s affective-aesthetics of charm. Charm is a beginning to 
asking more of both form and bodies. It uniquely captures the ability of the body 
together with its most basic of biological or scientific realities (DNA, chromosomes, 
cellular regeneration) as fundamentally studies in ambiguous, transfixing, and alluring 
blanks. 
Affect’s ability to force, as social contagion, or as Le Bon’s invisible 
something behind the visible, is the center of charm. Charm renounces its roots in 
vocality (chant, song) in favor of visual sleight of hand, a visuality that seems to allow 
Cartesian triumphs of the visual as knowable but in fact enforces Le Bon’s and 
Freud’s notions of the peculiar, unstable responsivity between the visible and 
invisible, the body’s exterior and its interior. Indeed, Wilde dramatizes this very 
contention as his Picture of Dorian Gray insists on the visual reference to the painting 
of Dorian, when we glance at it and its deterioration, and relies heavily on imagery of 
eyes and vision as components of the artist’s works and the “catching” receptivity 
toward this work. It also insists that the painting’s visual appearance has direct relation 
to the painting’s hidden content. It is no coincidence that we never quite see Dorian 
“kill” the painting. We infer that he slashes the painting, and this magically transfers 
to occur on the body of Dorian himself instead of the painting. But we never truly 




following the exterior action around Dorian’s house, suddenly denied full access to 
continued narration of the scene we were just in. With Dorian’s double in his painting, 
the spell of form is broken with a cry that we do not see. 
 
Charm as Methodology 
A consequence of assessing charm’s denigration through the end of the 
nineteenth century to name an anxiety over new forms of aesthetically-driven sociality 
is that charm can now become its own mode of inquiry into marginalized or 
minoritized forces and figures. Because charm renders visible the structures or forms 
of social valuation, I’d like to close this chapter by demonstrating how Wilde’s 
affective-aesthetic formalism in charm can open methods to newly see these structures 
of value. To do so, I turn to concerns of Dorian Gray’s “darkness.”  
Wilde’s novel presents an aesthetic-affective transmission that results in an 
uncanny doubling. This bizarre transmission through charmed influence therefore 
exposes the structures on which normative kinship relies, and throws the requirements 
for normative transmission and identity formation into relief, namely, colonialist 
power and domination over “darkness.” The novel is structured on whiteness as its 
central axis, a whiteness that entails the operation of the doubles of “rose-white”68 
Dorian and the “dark” painting of Dorian. The premise of the novel asks us to believe 
in the painting’s “magic” ability to morph in some correspondence to a “reality” 
outside of the painting. This “outside,” meanwhile, that is “real,” is Dorian’s highly 
internalized set of moral principles and devolving ethical compass—itself already a 




representation. The division of one figure as free of sin, while the other becomes 
darkly menacing; its doubled aesthetic aims of pure aestheticism and its social tinge of 
corruption. Wilde’s preface, added several months before the publication of the second 
version of the novel, indicates via epigrams that paradoxes of darkness and light in 
aesthetic forms is central to aesthetic pursuits and textual enjoyment: “The nineteenth 
century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass. The 
nineteenth century dislike of Romanticism is the rage of Caliban not seeing his own 
face in the glass.”69 The notion is itself an obvious double of Dorian’s declaration that 
the painting is an “unjust mirror.” 
Inescapably, an additional undercurrent to Wilde’s dark aesthetics is colonialist 
racialization, a specific kind of “darkness” upon which white masculinity depends, as 
Wilde makes clear. As the perceived fantasy of white masculinity emerged due to 
global exchange and shifts in Britain’s empire, Wilde’s charm glosses racialized 
others as critical component of what modernity would be, while the white 
heteronormative futurity found such a proposal socially undesirable, and unviable. I 
find this racializedness embedded in Wilde’s “dark” aesthetics, the “dark magic” that 
Wilde declared would place him alongside the figure of Rais. This darkness, a literary 
Gothic or chiaroscuro, seeps into both Dorian Gray, and functions beyond mere 
aesthetic representation or “mirror” of a social or individual moral darkness and 
depravity.  
Wilde’s famous tale of art turned life has been subject of numerous studies 
tracing its lineage from Walter Pater’s use of darkness in aesthetics. These are highly 




“dark implications of Pater’s attitudes and formulations in a mythic Gothic narrative 
of destruction and self-destruction.”70 Dorian’s descent into amorality through 
hedonistic pursuit after artist Basil Hallward paints his portrait – doubles or 
reproduces him – is a “dark enlightenment” of a literary equivalent to chiaroscuro.71 
Riquelme points out the novel concerns “a dark and darkening recognition that 
transforms Dorian’s life by actualizing a potential that was already there in his family, 
a potential that is one truth about British society.”72 This is a mutually constitutive 
pairing. Riquelme’s emphasis on the painting itself as comment on and challenge to 
the realism and aestheticism of Pater also situates the reader’s experience in the 
aesthetic experience of the painting: “The collaborative act of creating the painting 
brings into being something apparently new, original, and masterful that turns out to 
be not only beautiful but also atavistic and terrifyingly at odds with the public values 
of the society that applauds its beautiful appearance… [an act that] parallels and 
engages with our own act of reading.”73  
What Riquelme indicates here is significant beyond an assessment of Wilde’s 
use of Pater’s aesthetic theory—that a “beautiful appearance” or form can have social 
consequence, and affects us as readers. Riquelme, like many others who have 
addressed Dorian Gray’s implications for late nineteenth-century aesthetics, muses 
freely on the “darkness” of the novel’s Gothic character, the darkness of its moral 
chiaroscuro. What such an interpretation misses is that this darkness is highly racially-
defined. To read the “dark magic” of the novel as racially coded is to grant new lease 
on Wilde’s play with familial lineage: white heteronormative individuality and 




merely participatory or constructive, but an act of contagious complicity. The Gothic 
“conjuring” that Dorian participates in is the racialized animation of normative 
identity; by refocusing on charm, the novel can be seen to initiate an embedded 
animation of racialized difference, the structures of which are readily apparent through 
affective-aesthetic form.   
We can see this first through Dorian Gray’s supposedly corrupt lineage as 
product of a forbidden marriage between lower and upper classes. This information 
arrives secondhand when Lord Henry investigates Dorian’s mysterious background 
early in the novel. Lord Henry seeks information about Dorian’s aristocratic family 
history lies from his wealthy uncle’s knowledge. A bachelor who himself appears 
curiously outside of heteronormative reproduction, and of no societally generative 
“use,” Henry’s uncle is a “genial if somewhat rough-mannered old bachelor, whom 
the outside world called selfish because it derived no particular benefit from him.”74 
The “truth” of Dorian Gray’s family lies in a vague reference in the novel’s third 
chapter. Lord Henry asks his uncle, Lord Fermor, about Dorian’s heritage. He 
discovers Dorian’s mother Margaret Devereaux had married “a penniless young 
fellow, a mere nobody, sir, a subaltern in a foot regiment, or something of that kind”75 
without financial resources, against her father’s will. Her father, Lord Kelso, then 
arranged the subaltern’s death in a duel, and Riquelme notes “Dorian’s decision to 
store the portrait in the room set up for him by his grandfather to keep him out of the 
way after his mother’s death suggests that the portrait’s meaning emerges in part from 
the family’s history.”76 Undeniably, the portrait does indeed compile its meaning as 




Dorian’s father is never given a name, instead, is given three descriptors by Lord 
Fermor that seem to repeat roughly the same information. He was “a young fellow,” a 
“mere nobody,” and a military “subaltern.” Yet, Dorian’s father described as a 
“fellow” actually monies him, given the etymology of “fellow” as literally one who 
lays down money in a joint enterprise. Such suggestion is in friction with his 
description as “penniless.” More inconsistencies arise, as well. The “mere” of the 
“mere nobody” suggests purity, clarity, and brilliance. And, as a subaltern, rank and 
class collide with the term’s later associations with racial and colonial exploitation. 
Finally, Fermor’s assertion that he can “remember the whole thing as if it happened 
yesterday,”77 providing details of the man’s arranged murder by Lord Kelso, as well as 
his detailed gossip in the pages that follow, are inconsistent with his dismissive line 
that the man was “something of that kind.” Corruption and disturbance are already at 
work in the heteronormative social bond, wracked by the burdens of that social bond – 
money, politics, war, and racial divisions. 
It is notable, too, that the conversation between Henry and his uncle turns 
promptly from Dorian’s rumored background to femininity and “charm.” Abruptly 
after the knowledge is disseminated, the “charming” nature of American girls is 
discussed – women who are, Henry insists, popular marriage prospects, as an 
American woman “behaves as if she was beautiful. Most American women do. It is 
the secret of their charm.”78 Just as whiteness relies upon colonialist racialization of 
dark “others” (colonial subjects), the proximity of such darkness with the subject of 
charming women suggests that women’s charm is embedded within this whiteness and 




beautiful, a beauty that is the “secret” of their charm. They are not unlike Dorian, then, 
who exists as inversion of their open secret of beauty. Dorian’s familial “darkness,” 
therefore, may not necessarily be moralistic. It is not sourced from the forbidden 
marriage of Dorian’s parents that seems to set Dorian up for his later hedonistic 
“darkness,” but rather, contains a myriad of other socially transformative threads. It is, 
in other words, codedly racialized, its own eugenics of sorts. As such, it also speaks to 
an alternative mode of individuality, if we may understand reproduction as copying or 
doubling.79 Again, this speaks to Sibyl’s “slash” or wound to individuality’s 
relationship to the affective-aesthetic, and Dorian’s own slash, made literal in his 
demise at the novel’s end. 
The critique in the Telegraph, which opened the start of this chapter, claims 
Wilde had been long trying “to establish a cult in our midst,” a cult of influence that 
would subvert the nation’s youth.80 Wilde and his charmed circle, in “linking a certain 
real sense of beauty with profligate tastes and profane mockery, have undoubtedly 
exercised a visible influence upon the generation cursed by their presence.”81 In other 
words, this critique (among many) effectively supports social order as aesthetic theory, 
echoing aesthetic theory’s insistence on the ideal relation of form and matter. Wilde’s 
mien was seen as threat of the put-on or formative artificial and excessive emotionality 
that jeopardizes civil order. Yet, this threat cannot be assessed as strictly the threat of 
“deviant” sexuality, as his sentence for gross indecency would suggest. Rather, it is 
the threat of an uncontrolled, formless influence that violates accepted notions of 
aesthetic relation and moves between or among persons and only registers as a 




particular modernism. Wilde’s sense of form relies on charm as uniquely modern 
aesthetic theory as influence. At once formless and taking on aesthetic forms, charm 
names the invisible patterns of influence that point to the social order’s tacit reliance 
on a disavowed aesthetics. Cognizant of this, Wilde in his literary works begins to re-
stitch sociality through explicit aesthetic kinds of kinship.  
What can we ultimately make of charm as minoritizing mode, one that is 
recovered on early modernism’s margins to become central (though still castigated) 
affective-aesthetic of modernity? For one, Wilde’s use of charm and the charm 
circulating around his persona at the time of his trials sets the map for queer theory 
and criticism, about one hundred years afterward. Cultural historians and other 
scholars have long perpetuated the notion that Wilde (and indeed, his image at his 
1895 trial) effectively constructed the figure of the marginalized queer subject in 
public imagination. Jeffrey Weeks’s influential notion from 1977 that Wilde “created 
a public image for the homosexual, and a terrifying moral tale of the dangers that 
trailed closely behind deviant behavior”82 rendered the modern homosexual figure as 
effeminate and non-normative. Other scholars contend with this notion, such as Joseph 
Bristow, arguing that the trial was far less a “sex trial” that established a Foucauldian 
category of modern sexuality than a curious patchwork of the nineteenth century legal 
system. Bristow’s work emphasizes that the trial hinged upon the “manipulative use of 
admissible evidence from undependable witnesses” (who were, in fact, paid by the 
prosecution to testify, and never were themselves subject to criminal proceedings 
despite their alleged participation in both blackmail and sexual acts)83 and now exists 




Other work in queer theory that hinges upon minoritization is less cultural than 
textual. Kevin Ohi, for example, theorizes a “queerness of style” in literary texts, 
specifically in Henry James’s works. It is an aesthetic form, composed of “a queerness 
that, not circumscribed by whatever sexualities or identities might be represented by 
the texts, makes for what is most challenging about recent queer accounts of culture: a 
radical antisociality that seeks to unyoke sexuality from the communities and 
identities—gay or straight—that would tame it.”84 In other words, Ohi’s sense of a 
queer style does not base itself on “received forms of meaning, representation, and 
identity.”85 Lee Edelman, Val Rohy, and others perceive queer transmission – of 
knowledge, sex, materiality, and so on – as necessarily already needing to be 
successful transmissions, Ohi proposes queer transmission lying in moments of 
interrupted transmissions. The very concept of “thwarted transmission” as 
thematization of queer transmission means that “far from exceptional events in the 
history of literature and far from mere regrettable accidents to which any artifact of 
human cognition is subject,” “imaginings of thwarted transmission figure the literary 
tradition as such.”86 Thwarted transmission “is both a locus of queer eroticism and a 
way of rethinking literary and cultural transmission.”87 Heather Love’s Feeling 
Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (2007) directly addresses notions of 
queerness as associated with loss, tragedy, shame, and other forms of negativity. 
Queerness holds an inherent contradiction as “both abject and exalted,” a 
“stigmatizing mark as well as a form of romantic exceptionalism.”88 Resultantly, Love 
reads a variety of late nineteenth and early twentieth century texts from figures include 




negotiation of the coming of modern homosexuality,” marking an “archive of feeling” 
that establishes an account of “the corporeal and psychic costs of homophobia.”89 In 
other words, Love proposes that these texts may offer a described experience of living 
with a “‘disqualified’ identity, which at times can simply mean living with injury—not 
fixing it.”90 To attend to modernity’s backward figures is to attend to the aesthetic 
strategies of modernity’s others. 
This means, effectively, that not only does Wilde establish a form of kinship 
through charm, one structured upon aesthetic relations, but also that charm gains 
traction as a distinctly modernist registration of value. Specifically, it attends to the 
value placed on particular kinds of lives. If Wilde and others had to be considered (or, 
to consider themselves) minoritized or marginalized, then modernity begins with a 
perceived social and aesthetic loss. Wilde’s and others’ projects had to be conceived 
as failures in order to preserve the forward-moving engines of modernity’s heightened 
individuality, an individuality that had room for only one kind of individual—a white, 
male, and heterosexual, a singular subjecthood—at the expense of other forms of 
individuality, and moreover, alternative forms of sociality, as Wilde posits. Charm’s 
insistence on influence and proximity speaks to white British masculinity’s difficulties 
with “others,” a difficulty that charm uniquely is able to name as registration of loss, a 
nostalgia for the (white male) grandeur of the previous era and a concern for the 
future, a concern that often lacks a critical vocabulary. Wilde provides this vocabulary 
through aestheticism. While a source of melancholia for some in the face of the new 
century, Wilde’s work suggests charm’s destabilization of social identity categories as 




with the Enlightenment’s ideals of social progress, a progress that aesthetics—when 
taken for art’s sake—jeopardizes.  
As this chapter’s foray into Gothic darkness and racialization begins to 
suggest, there are ethical stakes to charm’s presence in literary modernism. The next 
chapter asks these questions of charm within a particularly gendered context—how 
charm brings into being the feminine or feminized, gendered body in early twentieth 
century literature as mass culture gained momentum in commodifying the processes of 
individualization.
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DESIGNING WOMEN: MODERNIST MASS CULTURE AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE FEMALE BODY 
 
In the early 1920s, a New Jersey department store called Bamberger’s 
launched its own glossy American fashion magazine, published in-house and aimed at 
suburban women. Simply titled Charm, the magazine aimed to be more than a simple 
catalogue for the store’s items. It was forthrightly an eclectic lifestyle magazine–
writing and art from avant-garde figures Mina Loy and Jean Rhys graced its pages 
alongside articles on the professions from feminist journalist Brenda Ueland (a June 
1924 article asked, “Is It Possible for a Woman to Be a Wife and Mother and Still 
Make a Good Living?”). It also featured profiles of women artists by modernist little 
magazines editor Florence Gilliam (“Paris Women in the Arts” in March 1925), and 
Djuna Barnes provided satirical travel pieces for multiple issues on Americans abroad 
under the pseudonym Lydia Steptoe.1 Such varied subjects appearing alongside 
features on the latest fashion trends made Charm “the most ambitious effort of any 
American retail establishment to identify with its clientele through the publication of a 
general-interest magazine.”2 Charm effectively sold an image of modern femininity—
reflecting women’s evolving identities in the marketplace as modern, progressive 
workers interested in the political, artistic, and literary as well as homemakers 




Though Charm was ultimately short-lived, shutting down production by 1929,4 
the magazine is notable for its bold use of charm as catch-all for the modernist 
“woman” in its multifold aims, echoing the everyday allures of consumerist 
tastemaking as America and Britain adapted to sociopolitical shifts after WWI, 
including the push toward new roles (and wardrobes) for women. Dominant social 
discourses resultantly alternated between fetishizing and devaluing “femininity.” As 
Jane Garrity argues, this makes modernist women’s “presentation of the self… 
conditioned by an awareness of the body’s visibility, a visibility that is predicated 
upon a masculine aesthetic in which women are objectified.”5  
I begin this chapter with Charm to introduce the very notion of “charm” as part 
of white, middle- to upper-class women’s domain in the modernist era. Charm is used 
to refer to female attractiveness, a blank descriptor of a woman who presents as 
enticing or alluring in a generally non-erotic way.6 Both a physical object (such as a 
lucky token) and the state of a subject (to be charming, to be charmed), charm 
typically denotes a pleasant interest or delight in something. But more than a noun 
referencing an object or adjective referencing a person, “charm” also references 
language itself—it is a word or phrase with magical properties for healing, protection, 
or otherwise controlling one’s surroundings, dating from Medieval incantations and 
healing verses. It shifts uneasily through a range of grammatical contortions—one can 
“be charming” oneself and charm someone else, and one can also “be charmed” by 
someone or something else—the ability to manipulate, to make one’s surrounds 
malleable. Charm the word is as malleable and enigmatic as its denotation suggests. It 




manipulate the self, and its complex aesthetic and affective dance from subject to 
object and back again—that render charm a rich point of inquiry into women’s self-
making during the era. 
 The odd links between the making of the modern “woman” can be examined 
further with the visual aesthetic of Charm magazine’s covers. In its irrepressible urge 
for the “modern,” Charm managed to draw famous artists for its cover images, 
including Pablo Picasso in April 1928, and the New Yorker illustrator Constantin 
Alajalov for a March 1929 cover. A cover that ran a few years prior in August 1925, 
however, is most intriguing. The image is a rendering of a woman clad in a bathing 
suit, balancing a red ball midair, and standing in concentric circles of water (see fig. 
1).7 Designed by Peruvian caricaturist Julio Málaga Grenet, the image is boldly 
graphic, relying on minimalist lines and shapes with high-contrast colors, much in the 
style of Vogue as well as other department store magazines of the era, such as 
Wanamaker’s. The bold black, red, yellow, and grey horizontal stripes of the bathing 
suit on Charm’s starkly white-skinned cover girl oppose the color and shape of the 
radiating blue and white rings of water surrounding her. The image is suggestive in a 
few ways. Structurally, it is a study in contrasts – horizontal stripes blur into the 
circular waves of the water around the submerged woman; the woman’s opaque, 
delicate feet suggest ballet (an idea strengthened by her arms’ upward pose) though 
the ball she holds implies a less-dainty female athleticism. Thematically, the image 
indicates something else entirely.  
The woman’s delicate S-shape rising from the water and the red ball balanced 







Figure 1. Charm: the magazine of New Jersey home interests. August 1925. Newark, N.J.: L. 
Bamberger & Co. Publishing Company, 1924-32. 
 
colors of the image suggest circus advertisements common to the early twentieth 
century: yellows, blues, and reds. The woman is a trained spectacle, a performing 
animal. Her showmanship of a beguilingly delicate, yet athletic, femininity is 
bolstered by the ringed waves surrounding her torso. These concentric circles (along 
with a slightly lighter-toned bathing suit under the water line) visually replicate the 
tiers of a larger hoop-style skirt, itself an unmodern relic of the previous century. We 
are signaled toward an “underneath,” so to speak—underwater is a risqué peek under-
skirt. But such an erotic look loses its allure in plain sight. We see exactly what we 
expect to see on the surface, a surface that does not mask an underneath. Grenet, 




advertisements for soap and women’s hosiery in McCall’s magazine, manages an 
image that plays with puzzles of bodily transparency, surfaces, and depths. The 
caricature does not showcase a fashionable woman’s body made comic, but rather, our 
own ability to see bodies made estranged. The image is paradoxical, certainly 
representing Charm’s doubled motives as both fashion-forward commercial vehicle 
and savvy literary magazine, but likewise, the oddity of charm as bearer of such 
deceptions. 
This suggests to me that in making modern “women,” the modernist era’s mass 
market clashed with more fluid notions of femininity and with the potentiality of the 
body itself. Reading charm’s role in women’s writing during the era illuminates the 
problem of white woman as bodily form. Charm magazine’s bathing suit cover, with 
“woman” at its conceptual and visual center, dramatizes charm’s sleight of hand, its 
unapologetic conceit of deception that I find a rich puzzle of femininity’s visuality, 
embodiment, and desire during the early twentieth century. To “charm” the body, such 
as through the literalization of this process, charm school, entails a conditioning or 
hailing through social, discursive, and institutional regimes. The goal of these 
practices is to produce desirable female-identified or effeminate subjects whose bodies 
are susceptible, masked, and marketable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. These conditioned bodies tend to be unsuitable subjects for feminist theory, 
as they seem to only participate in Foucauldian regimes of biopower. Yet, I argue that 
charm denotes a superficiality or refusal of depth in female embodiment that 






Interrupting Bodies in Theory 
Women’s bodies in feminist theory have been construed variously, though 
most clearly, as sites of sexual difference. Such sexual difference is an arm of theories 
of subjectivity formation, as taken up by theorists such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène 
Cixous and Julia Kristeva. Examinations of the dichotomy of sexual difference, of 
man/woman, grew to critical examinations of its spillover into other formational logics 
of Western thought (phallogocentrism), including nature/ culture, subject/object, and 
surface/depth. By the 1990s, however, this type of focus on sexual difference became 
increasingly less scrutable as a lived body, even as these theories held an emphasis on 
corporeal aspects of womanhood including childbirth, sexual experience, 
menstruation, or lactation. Elizabeth Grosz, Dorothy Roberts, Jennifer Nash, and 
Susan Bordo intervened in the bodilessness of poststructuralism by returning a 
material “real” to questions of bodily habitation and sexual difference. Materiality, 
write the editors of Material Feminisms, Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, has been 
“volatile site” for feminist theory, “so volatile, in fact, that the guiding rule of 
procedure for most contemporary feminisms requires one to distance oneself as much 
as possible from the tainted realm of materiality by taking refuge within culture, 
discourse, and language.”8 There is, for example, a materialization to Grosz’s 
“volatile” body that overturns poststructuralism’s emphasis on the anti-dermal 
discursive and ideological. In contemporary theory, Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, 
and Sara Ahmed work through bodies as constitutive of larger ecologies, or as 




modes of difference. This includes such emphases as “gut feminism,” feminist new 
materialisms that renounce the primacy of the human body, and posthumanism or 
digital feminisms.  
Yet, few if any of these theoretical developments to feminist theories of the 
body attend to the smooth cultivation of surface. Even Anne Cheng’s study of the 
body in modernism, Second Skin, calls attention to the smoothness of modernist skin 
as primary characteristic: “The discourse of the ‘pure’ modern surface thus produces a 
nexus of metonymic meanings—purity, cleanliness, simplicity, anonymity, 
masculinity, civilization, technology, intellectual abstractism—that are set off against 
notions of excessive adornment, inarticulate sensuality, femininity, backwardness.”9 
This is the “dream of undistracted surface”10 in modernity, she notes. But even while 
locating smoothness as a primary objective for modernists (and therefore, not without 
its own paradoxes, as Adolf Loos’s architecture—with sleek exteriors belying lushly 
decorated interiors—demonstrates), smoothness remains intact. Josephine Baker’s 
“second skin” during her nude and semi-nude performances, likewise, is a worn 
nakedness, “like a sheath.”11 There is no interruption to the surface itself, only, a slip 
of one surface for another, what is under, what is over, and what is integrally 
connected. (Affect theory in many contemporary iterations often retains the same 
problem.) The problem of skin, then, of whether skin is container of the body, is a 
problem of modern aesthetics, she notes: “that is, the heuristic and critical problem of 
distinguishing decoration as surplus from what is ‘proper’ to the thing,”12 a notion that 




what is seen as extant about the body and particularly, the female body, interrupts this 
tacit acceptance of the body’s smoothness in theory. 
Charm denotes a superficiality or refusal of depth in female embodiment that 
interrupts, yet nonetheless acknowledges, the physiological marks inscribed upon 
socially written bodies.13 Such theories of the body can be found in the early 
experimental poetry of Gertrude Stein, and are refracted in the materials of mass 
culture including pamphlets and self-help books. This pushes Cheng’s notion of 
surface and ornamentation further, and likewise, brings together seemingly disparate 
threads of feminist theories of the body—that the body is at once discursive and 
fleshly material, human and posthuman cyborg. Stein’s avant-garde poetry and prose 
showcase a range of ironic explorations of women’s visual charm through fashion – 
from the erotic allure of ladies’ undergarments, to presenting a woman’s body as 
blazon of handkerchiefs or petticoats – and uses language to interrupt cognitive 
processes of aesthetic and lingual appreciation. I find that these charmed bodies are 
not what they seem by being exactly as they seem. There is both a seam and a 
seemingness to women’s bodies, a fissure or stitch that exposes their construction as 
based on the play of appearances (or that which seems) that uniquely emerges through 
modernist literary examination. Recalling the roots of “seem” from the Old Norse, 
“fitting” (soemr, soema), attention to charm’s seems/seams render the line between 
women’s fashion industry, of mannequins, commerciality, and clothes on the one hand 
and divisions of naturalness and unnaturalness, of how a body appears on the other. 
Examining this thread allows us to see how a body relates to language in modernity, 





Gertrude Stein and Mass Women’s Culture 
Charm in Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons (published first in 1914, then 
reissued in a larger printing in Eugene Jolas’s transition in 1928), is an aesthetic 
explicitly acknowledged as critical to her poetics. Writing as her partner, Alice, Stein 
reports in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933): “[Tender Buttons] was a very 
charming little book and Gertrude Stein was enormously pleased.”14 An arrangement 
of small poems, set in small type, and devoted to small objects, Tender Buttons is even 
physically inseparable from its own charm – in its first edition, the book was just 
seven inches tall and five inches wide.15 Tender Buttons takes as its poetic subjects 
those objects that echo its diminutive size. Divided into sections that suggest domestic 
spaces and things, “Objects,” “Food,” and “Rooms,” the collection takes on small 
parts of wholes such as windows in rooms, the red interior of a roast, umbrellas, 
glasses, or coats. It is undeniably an odd little book. Presumably, the poems are “set” 
in an ostensibly bourgeois domestic space, comprised of dresses, umbrellas, roast beef, 
books, and cocoa. While these objects tend both toward the feminine and masculine, 
they are largely neutral. Absent from all the poems are any human actants—no one is 
doing the domestic labor of cooking the roast beef, or shopping for the dresses, or 
reading the books. Because of this, Juliana Spahr writes, “It is tempting to say that 
Tender Buttons says something feminist, something queer, something opposed to 
those big modernist epics such as T.S. Eliot’s ‘The Waste Land’ or Ezra Pound’s 
Cantos.”16 But Tender Buttons incessantly confounds. Critics such as Marjorie Perloff 




“intensely intransigent and uncompromising linguistic surface,”17 and James Mellow 
describes Tender Buttons’s literary experimentation as Stein transforming the English 
language into a “‘foreign’ language of her own.”18 This language labors in a way that 
can in effect be described as incantatory. The poems bring something into being—they 
introduce forces and potentialities of materiality and language when not at “work.” In 
short, with their incantatory nature, replete with meter and rhythmic repetition, they 
charm. 
Critics have long pinpointed the literary quality of charm in the work 
explicitly. Gertrude Stein’s good friend and sometime-patron Mabel Dodge, for one, 
wrote in Arts and Decoration one of the first praises of Stein’s writing in America, 
celebrating Stein’s writing for its “charming” qualities (as we’ve seen in the 
introduction). What happens when Stein alters words as small as prepositions is the 
opening of an “excessive” or large element of aesthetic experience. As example, I 
quote “NOTHING ELEGANT” in full: 
A charm a single charm is doubtful. If the red is rose and there is a gate 
surrounding it, if inside is let in and there places change then certainly 
something is upright. It is earnest.19 
Here, Stein’s syntax presents a familiar logical sequence based on syllogism: if “the 
red is rose,” with a gate around it, and “if inside is let in,” then “certainly something is 
upright.” But in this simple logic problem, there is no logic. Red we can understand as 
“rose,” or a “rose red,” but how can this premise be based on the condition that a gate 
surround a color? Similarly, how can an “inside” be “let in,” if this presumes that 




more certainly, there is no logical “then.” And what is the referent for the “it” that “is 
earnest”? One’s reason does – and must – sleep, temporarily in reading poems like 
these. Stein’s work begins to explain how the “nothing” can be “something […] 
upright.”  
The “surface” quality of Stein’s difficult writing defies conventional attempts 
at understanding, and effectively interrupts cognitive expectation. The charm of 
Tender Buttons serves to problematize bodily response as juxtaposed with cognition in 
response to aesthetic works. In other words, Stein allows us to see what we are seeing 
(our desires) when we think we see the body. In the section, Rooms, Stein muses on 
desire, which she calls “craving,” as caught between cognition and seeming: “Why is 
there more craving than there is in a mountain. This does not seem strange to one, it 
does not seem strange to an echo and more surely is in there not being a habit.”20 
Desire or craving, Stein indicates, is a figure of mountainlike immensity. To grasp the 
vastness of one’s desire, the poem proposes that one must behave like an echo, a 
sonorous force that uses surfaces (valleys or mountainsides) to grasp depth. By finding 
the edges of the void, or what “seems,” an echo’s pattern can reveal the shape of the 
mountain’s terrain. The echo’s interplay between surface that indicates depth, of what 
seems and what is, renders the shape of one’s desire. As Stein’s “NOTHING 
ELEGANT” suggests, the seemingly empty nothing of desire, then, becomes the shape 
of “something.” This is, I find, is very like the shape of the body. 
Bodies as established through repeated habits are immediately commercially 
apparent if we examine the profusion of early twentieth-century charm schools and 




hailing through social, discursive, and institutional regimes. Tim Armstrong considers 
the body’s relationship to these regimes as a defining force in modernism. At the start 
of the nineteenth century, Armstrong says, the body was believed a whole unit, a 
“machine in which the self lived.”21 The end of the century, however, saw the body 
turn to pieces as “a more contingent mechanism, incorporating evolutionary survivals, 
and with … perceptual, neurological, and performative apparat[i].”22 This twentieth-
century conceptualization imagined the body in fragments, responding to the 
conditions in which it existed. Simultaneously, it was a body envisioned as unprepared 
for these conditions, ill-adapted to the multifarious demands of modern life. The 
lacking body necessitated compensatory technologies, practices, or other remedies to 
achieve “wholeness.” Capitalism took advantage of this fragmentation to sell the 
“fantasy of the complete body,” leading bodies to be seen as “projects” to be 
developed by the self, with correct habits cultivated, and proper care given.23 Here 
arises the goal of producing desirable female-identified or effeminate subjects whose 
bodies are susceptible, masked surfaces, but also, these bodies are ultimately 
interrupted by attempting smooth surfaces reliant on seeming, and therefore, seams. 
The aptly titled The Magic Key to Charm, by socialite Eileen Ascroft, 
promised American women of the 1920s and 1930s that, “No woman, however 
beautiful or clever she may be, can live her life to the full unless she learns the secret 
of charm. And every woman, no matter who she is, […] can be charming. Because 
charm lies already in her soul. She has only to learn how to set it free and express it to 
others.”24 Ascroft promises readers: “We are going to study together how to bring out 




practically from without.”26 This “best” is achieved in a three-pronged approach: 
“First, mentally, by directing your thoughts and actions into beautiful channels and 
filling your mind and brain so full of charming constructive thoughts that there will be 
no room for ugly, destructive ones. Secondly, by practical advice about how to use 
clothes and make-up to emphasize your personality. […] And thirdly we are going to 
study your attitude to others together and learn how to find friendship and love.”27 
Most important of all, however, “there is no mystery about charm,”28 since every 
woman already has it—or rather, the white bourgeois woman has it. Ascroft incants 
the realm of the white bourgeoisie through a Steinian range of domestic objects she 
references throughout. She recommends: “A vase of flowers, a delicately-scented 
talcum powder, your powder in a lovely colored bowl instead of its box, your perfume 
in a colored scent spray to match—all these little things bring charm into your 
surroundings.”29 The whiteness is made even more explicit in one of the early 
chapters, as she demands her readers erotically enjoy their whiteness: “Look at the 
beauty of that body God has given you. […] Look at the rhythmic curve of your 
shoulders, the exquisite soft whiteness of your breasts.”30 The self-help guide by 
Ascroft—one of many similar advice manuals and conduct books published at the turn 
of the twentieth century—is unintended confirmation of the slip of surfaces, charm’s 
mystery and mastery. Ascroft’s premise is already a logic of illogic: if every woman 
has charm, and there is no “mystery” about it, then it is not “secret,” but instead an 
open secret that paradoxically leaves its heart on its sleeve. Charm makes no deceit 
about its own mechanisms, and yet, mass culture perpetuates a refusal to envision 




Charm’s open deceit takes crafting and attention to detail—and as such, it 
carries the logic of formalist performance. Eugenie Brinkema’s theorization of the 
formal dimensions of emotion can help us here. Brinkema mentions a psychoanalytic 
session described by Freud’s contemporary, Pierre Janet. A “sick” girl comes to Janet 
and “wants to confide the secret of her turmoil,” yet, during the session, the girl finds 
she cannot do so as she begins to sob. “But does she sob because she cannot say 
anything?... Or does she sob precisely in order not to say anything?,”31 Janet asks. 
That the girl sobs “not as loud profession but in order to remain silent,” Brinkema 
observes, “[…] theorizes emotion as organized behavior, means aiming at an end. But 
what that emotion-behavior aims at is precisely deception, delay, and an evasion of 
difficulty.”32 In other words, what occurs in the scenario is already on the surface. It 
needs not be “read” for a depth of meaning—if it were, we may surmise that the girl’s 
sobs are because of the weight of her turmoil, or that her inability to speak is produced 
by her psychological turmoil. Emotions, however, could be “not windows into the 
soul; rather, they are ‘a particular subterfuge, a special trick, each one of them being a 
different means of eluding a difficulty.’”33 The truth of emotions is that they are 
masks.34 We may alter this phrasing to note a related conclusion: the truth of charm is 
that the seams are clear—charm reveals masks. It now becomes clear what Ascroft’s 
open “secret” is—that white bourgeois femininity is not innate but made, fashioned 
into a body desired to be seen as white, natural, and neutral. The open secret of charm 
is that it suggests that this white bourgeois femininity available to all women including 
women of color, and especially black women as part of the era’s concern for race 




stages the question—why is this mask desirable? As Stein concludes the poem from 
Rooms quoted above, the “why” is there: “Why is there so much useless suffering. 
Why is there.”35  
With an emphasis on thoughtless, habitual acts without centers, Stein’s use of 
charm is in line with the premise of Ascroft’s and other conduct manuals. Charm 
reveals its curious hold as her writing combats the expressivist relation of depth and 
surface by refusing readers’ cognition. The first iteration of “A BOX” (a later poem in 
Tender Buttons holds the same title) does precisely this. The poem reads: 
Out of kindness comes redness and out of rudeness comes rapid same question, 
out of an eye comes research, out of selection comes painful cattle. So then the 
order is that a white way of being round is something suggesting a pin and is it 
disappointing, it is not, it is so rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine 
substance strangely, it is so earnest to have a green point not to red but to point 
again.36 
There is an intriguing emphasis on superficiality here as Stein directs attention to 
surface readings and surface similarities: kindness, redness, and rudeness are visually 
similar in their suffixes, but carry disparate signifieds. Yet their juxtaposition asks us 
to see what may be “red” about “kind,” for example. We are “not to red [read]” but “to 
point again.” The “order” is “a white way of being.” 
Stein’s repetition through detail – and its superficiality – is evident in the many 
poems in Tender Buttons that take garments as their focus, an already surface-
dependent subject that insists upon coverage and “mere” exteriors. Specifically, her 




Ngai’s interest in the embodied feminization (and, thereby, racialization) of small, 
everyday affects or aesthetics.37 “A PETTICOAT” includes a line about a “rosy 
charm” in the garment that’s overtly feminized, textualized (“ink”), and eroticized: “A 
light white, a disgrace, an ink spot, a rosy charm.”38 Given four simple (and largely 
monosyllabic) characteristics that appear to be contradictory or, at the least, not 
necessarily given toward a compatible single image, the petticoat boasts the same 
“rosy charm” that echoes in “NOTHING ELEGANT.” Moreover, it ties negative 
emotionality (the “disgrace” of what seems to be the red of menstrual blood) with 
positive (the spot’s “rosy charm”) as the two objective observations (“a light white” 
and “an ink spot”) are given corresponding interpretations or meanings.  
While many critics have addressed the poem’s feminist appeal – it contests 
male fetishism, as the blood “ruins” the fantasy of the petticoat’s virginal innocence, 
for example39 – I emphasize the poem’s own reading of itself that dramatizes a 
nonreading of detail, the prick of white, naturalized bodies. The poem plays on 
demands of secrecy (about the disgrace of menstruation, or the taboo of addressing 
women’s undergarments at all) and disclosure; or, in other words, demands awareness 
of our own cognition through Salvador Dali’s “prick” of the particular. Aligning 
images of blood on white undergarments with ink on a white page not only anticipates 
écriture féminine theorized by Hélène Cixous and French third-wave theorists, but 
invites a myriad of other interpretations that request of the poem a depth and largesse 
of interpretive cognition that, perhaps, charm cheekily lures us toward as it tempts us 
toward its truth-bearing function. The poem’s reasoning, however, is continually 




evaluations modify the first and third observations? Do these four parts actually 
correspond in some pattern of logic, or are we seduced by difference through these 
paired doubles, and the repetition of Stein’s image of feminine bodily “rosiness” and 
“charm”? The poem also suggests alternative alignments—that the disgrace is not 
menstrual blood on white garments, but it is “inky” blackness, opposed to the rosy 
charm of whiteness. This reading runs anti-dichotomously, as ABBA, rather than 
ABAB. The suggestion of the female body here is then a body theorized in an 
alternative alignment to phallogocentric oppositions. Instead of a running list of 
privileged and deprivileged binaries (like nature/culture, body/mind, emotion/reason, 
and so on) it is within enclosure—the BB within AA. Such a realignment also orients 
itself with inversion, a gloss on queer or lesbian eroticism. In other words, the 
alignment has an immediacy that repeats, that “magicks” something in, within the 
mask of the privileged term. 
The charm of Stein’s works, as observed by Mabel Dodge, for example, 
ostensibly demotes what her poetic or aesthetic projects actually are, yet more 
characteristically denotes a very Steinian superficiality, a diminution, a bathetic 
anticlimax that asks us to question precisely what Gilles Deleuze diagnoses of the 
modern condition – we seek this game of difference, and delude ourselves into depth 
of thought about an “endlessly extractable” set of differences.40 Stein’s poetic state of 
charmedness incants us into experiencing our own modes of logic, and confronts us 





This formalist performance echoes modernist anxieties over bodies, faces, 
gender, and emptiness. Glamour, as we’ve learned, the ultimate ideal of modernist 
fashion and lifestyle, flirts with “the suspicion of nothing behind it all,” an absence 
that is “something […] seductive, powerful, and often simply gorgeous.”41 The 
biographer in Virginia Woolf’s Orlando (1928) avers, “Clothes are but a symbol of 
something hid deep beneath.”42 While Judith Brown, Jessica Burstein, and others have 
argued for such an absence of a “beneath” as a sustained modernist attraction to 
nihilism, coldness, detachment, and negativity, I find that this is not the case in Stein.43 
Rather, Stein’s work jeopardizes the easy idea of a surface and a depth. In Second 
Skin, Cheng argues that modernism’s fascination with surface and skin (animal prints, 
furs, architectural “skins,” and racialized black skin) must be considered under the 
assumption that visibility encodes upon what is seen how we are to see it. Cheng 
writes that the trouble of seeing is the trouble of differentiating subjectivity from 
objectivity, transparency and opacity. Modernism, Cheng finds, operates upon the 
complications that result when disavowals “repeatedly avow themselves,” patterns of 
avowed disavowals that “are embodied within the very figuration of the modern 
object.” When examining modernist objects, “[W]e are looking not at hidden depths or 
longings but the material traces of a desire that is written on the skin/surface again and 
again, like striated lines.”44  
 
Charmed Bodies as Women’s Labor 
Michel Foucault offers a history of bodies in The History of Sexuality (1978), 




around power. Bodies that register as bodies, which retain the “right to life,” as 
Foucault argues, are entwined with the relatively modern idea of “biopower.” Put 
simply, biopower is the subjugation of bodies and control of populations through 
networks of power relations that, by the seventeenth century – unlike previous 
centuries – were not sourced from a single sovereign, but through smaller strategies of 
power that are non-authoritarian, strategies that are forces of quotidian normalization, 
dominance, and subordination. The new distribution of power shifted from exercising 
juridical control over legal subjects— over whom the ultimate punishment was 
wielded, death—to individuated mastery of living beings or the right to life. Available 
forms of selfhood or individuality then were constituted by biopower, as that which 
“brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made 
knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.”45 Foucault explains:  
there is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by 
interiorizing to the point that he [sic] is his [sic] own overseer, each individual thus 
exercising this surveillance over, and against himself [sic].46 
Understanding biopower’s emphasis on one’s involuntary regulation of one’s 
existence and pleasures allows us to see charm as revealing itself in the social and 
ideological operations of the twentieth century. Such a conception of bodies and 
bodily control appears in line with twentieth-century concerns over bodily regulation, 
habit, and appearance. A booming self-help industry, enabled by the buying power of 
an eager middle class in America and Britain, counseled citizens on various methods 
of bodily habit that required bodies’ biology and physiology to be conditioned to 




will, and of course, the help of commodities. These methods were popularized in the 
early twentieth century as part of what Suzanne Raitt locates as a desire for efficiency, 
an efficiency that was “a kind of moral crusade and efficient itself [was] a form of 
ethical superiority.”47 Failure to do so indicated not only moral ineptitude, but an inner 
primitive, or in some cases, a vulnerability to the “African within” white men.48 
Bodily practices moved fluidly from business and industry to one’s own corpus in 
daily life. Taylorism, a theory of labor systems management created by Fred W. 
Taylor in 1911, advocated for workers’ jobs to be converted to individual, timed, 
essential motions to enhance worker productivity. Once provided the proper training, 
and incentives to reward efficient labor, workers’ productivity would soar to 
machinelike levels.49  
These practices were aimed largely at male workers, not at women. Though 
New Women—who could be of middle social classes—were frequently employed as 
nannies or caretakers, tutors and teachers, work in factory settings or that involved the 
kind of physical labor often associated with early twentieth century industry remained 
in the realm of lower-class women. Capitalism and capitalist labor had to reach 
moneyed women and alter notions of embodiment as docile subject formation through 
other means. Outward appearances of the body and especially the face skewed toward 
the plastic and the “put-on” in the early 1900s, and was part of a larger movement 
toward bodily habits, control, and self-betterment.  
In gendered parallel to Taylorist machinations of the body, the face and body – 
generally, both men’s and women’s, but far more often the latter – became the primary 




alterable and therefore subject to the pursuit of habitually controlled perfection. 
Through controlled alterations, common wisdom went, the body was eventually able 
to be “mastered.” The era’s crazes for body and facial exercises, we find they 
emphasize the ability to reconfigure an inferior woman’s body (and thus, recuperate an 
autonomous, disembodied self) through regular movements. Unlike similar gymnastic 
drills that required metaphysical attunement as celebrated by other practitioners 
including Delsart, German doctor Bess Mensendieck’s immensely popular functional 
movement exercises were solely based on the body.50 Mensendieck advocated a 
rationalized physical culture system inspired by avant-garde dance in Weimar 
Germany and interwar America.51 The resultant “relaxed, flexible, and individualized 
body” aligns itself with the “un-corseted and lounging avant-garde elite, the athletic 
New Woman.”52 Should one fail to properly enact bodily discipline, poet and avant-
gardist Mina Loy warns in her 1919 pamphlet, Auto-Facial-Construction, one would 
risk an interruption to beauty caused by a subpar muscle:  
One distorted muscle causes a fundamental disharmony in self-expression, for 
no matter how well gowned or groomed men or women may be, how 
exquisitely the complexion is cared for, or how beautiful the expression of the 
eyes, if the original form of the face (intrinsic symbol of personality) has been 
effaced in muscular transformation, they have lost the power to communicate 
their true personalities to others and all expression of sentiment is veiled in 
pathos.53 
While the female body is seen here to be malleable to accommodate shifting social 




as to the plasticity of femininity. The form of the face can be “effaced”—one has the 
ability to alter the expression of one’s “true” personality. In other words, one can 
falsify oneself. The body is no longer a solid, staid, knowable object, but a mutable, 
responsive entity prepared to alter itself depending on valuation of its exterior. 
The kind of embodiment Loy’s work recalls is not Foucauldian somatic control 
so much as the theories of Joan Riviere, psychoanalytic theorist who followed Freud 
and Melanie Klein’s work. Riviere suggests in “Womanliness as a Masquerade” 
(1929) that “womanliness” amongst successful professional or intellectual women is 
actually masked aggression. A woman’s exterior, then, suggests something other than 
the direct interior-to-exterior expressivity of Loy’s “true personality.” There is 
something to the act of perception and the feminine body here that charm exposes. 
When charm is the ultimate objective, charm reveals the labor implicit in the 
recognition of (and desire of) gendered bodies. The “seam” or interruption that charm 
renders to the smoothness of bodies in theory is that charm reveals the means of 
production, exposing its reliance on language or discourse and the material 
simultaneously. This is also part of the “catch.” Riviere finds that some women—
those who “while mainly heterosexual in their development, plainly display strong 
features of the other sex”—are visually demonstrating a deeper deception. The 
femininity of these women, Riviere explains, is actually a fraudulent one – it is not 
“genuine,” but a “mask” designed to avert anxiety or fear of retribution arising from 
rivalry with men in the public sphere, particularly, in public speech acts. 
“Womanliness” as a mask serves “both to hide the possession of masculinity and to 




deflection of imagined power. For Riviere, such feelings are shields not for sexuality 
(one’s homosexuality in a heterosexual realm, for instance, or an asexuality) but for 
anger. Seeing shields or masks is integral to seeing charm, as an awareness of charm’s 
seams or seeming is itself a component of charm’s social construction. A focus on 
charm allows women to see the body that ideology desires, and to newly perceive the 
ways the body is made by those desires. 
In Judith Butler’s discussion of Riviere’s work in Gender Trouble, Butler is 
quick to point out Riviere’s assumptions within such a theorization: “Clearly, Riviere 
begins with set notions about what it is to display characteristics of one’s sex, and how 
it is that those plain characteristics are understood to express or reflect an ostensible 
sexual orientation. This perception or observation not only assumes a correlation 
among characteristics, desires, and ‘orientation,’ but creates that unity through the 
perceptual act itself.”55 Notably, Riviere elides the difference between “womanliness” 
and its fashioned mask, arguing that there is no separation between surface and what is 
supposedly underneath: “The reader may now ask how I define womanliness or where 
I draw the line between genuine womanliness and the ‘masquerade.’ My suggestion is 
not, however, that there is any such difference; whether radical or superficial, they are 
the same thing.”56 If the mask is genuine and indicative of false womanhood, then 
womanhood is itself superficial. But, if she deems “womanliness” a “masquerade,” 
does “masquerade” not already imply that there indeed remains a depth? Or, in 
Butler’s formulation, “What is masked by masquerade?”57 While Butler uses this 
question to arrive at a critique of Lacanian divisions of gender and the construction of 




address what is the mask of the masquerade. Is the mask a superficial persona from 
which embodied “charm” emanates as mere play of surfaces and disguise? Or does 
this mask in itself bring something into being? 
 
Reading Charm, Reading Bodies in Modernism 
If modernism can be described as a venture both of texts and interpretation, 
then modernism’s bodies can be envisioned as like these texts and interpretations. 
Elizabeth Grosz explains of bodies as form and content, surface and depth: “The 
surface of the body, the skin, […] provides the ground for the articulation of orifices, 
erotogenic rims, cuts on the body’s surface, loci of exchange between the inside and 
the outside, points of conversion of the outside into the body, and of the inside out of 
the body.”58 Bodies as exhibiting an inside (content) and outside (form) which can be 
scrutinized, rationalized, and made sensible—modernist bodies seem to be exercises in 
interpretation. Charm, however, throws a wrench in this process. If criticism insists 
upon scrutiny, charm refuses scrutiny—indeed, charm dissolves under scrutiny. If the 
role of the reader or observer in modernism is to “familiarize the seemingly 
unfamiliar,”59 to make James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, or Wyndham Lewis’s Tarr 
“make sense,” then charm is the most anti-modern of modernist projects as it 
defamiliarizes the familiar—the body. It is therefore the most modern, if we are to 
trace what Slavoj Žižek writes of modernism: that “the pleasure of the modernist 
interpretation consists in the effect of recognition which ‘gentrifies’ the disquieting 




modernism, we must attentively read modernism’s interruptions to interpretation, and 
our desires for interpretation. 
As Clarissa observes in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925), in modernity, 
one can no longer say that one is “this” or “that,” a unique singularity. Charm is 
necessarily existent in an in-between, a dynamic interplay that cannot avoid how we 
are taught to see bodies as reliant on surface/depth, internal/external. To see charm is 
to see how female embodiment functions as a mode of calling into singularity, a 
distinction that is a perennial puzzle of our desire for surfaces. We ultimately “see” 
our own desires of seeing the body—and find an illusion of valuation made to please 
capitalist desires. Stein and the texts of mass body culture demonstrate how charm is a 
key component of this puzzle, a puzzle that renders a larger modernist network of 
modes of “embodiment” and thinking the body, particularly for women, in the early 
twentieth century. Charm uniquely tells us what other studies have been unable to 
fully address within modernism—how language alongside perceptual processes and 
commercial materialism come together to perpetuate the idea of a modernist female 
body. The body conditioned toward and as hailed by charm actually changes our grasp 
on contemporary debates in theories of the female body by emphasizing surfaces, 
visuality, and styled individuality. We will never know the body–and particularly, the 
body as gendered–until we grasp the ways in which we “magic in” a body that holds 
critical lure for us in each theorization. Suggesting the hanging of clothes or trying on 
fashions, Gertrude Stein puts this process of magicking another way in Rooms: “A 
whole center and a border make hanging a way of dressing.”61 Exposing its 




self-help texts reveals modernist bodies to be instructive masquerades, ways of 
dressing up desire into endless models.
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LOLLY WILLOWES AND CHARM AS REVOLUTIONARY FEMINIST 
THINKING 
“Feminism Will Give—Men More Fun, Women Greater Scope, Children Better Parents, Life More 
Charm.” –Edna Kenton, Delineator July 19141 
 
Written by British historian, musician, and writer Sylvia Townsend Warner, 
Lolly Willowes, Or, the Loving Huntsman (1926) has long been considered a work of 
whimsical fantasy with key connections to its social and historical moment. In 
conversation with both the years following the Great War and the early twentieth 
century women’s movement, Lolly Willowes follows Laura Willowes, disparagingly 
called the title name “Lolly” by her family, raised as the only daughter of three 
children in the “conservative” Willowes family. The family “kept to old-fashioned 
ways”2 (3) at their estate in rural Dorset, Lady Place, resting in physical and political 
comfort from generations of wealth (their domain includes beds and chairs that 
“insensibly persuaded them into respect for the good sense of their forebears”3 [10]). 
Laura’s childhood and early adolescence is peaceful, and Laura is her father Everard’s 
favorite. Everard dies as Laura reaches her late twenties, however, and as a single 
woman without independent means, Laura must give up life at Lady Place to move in 
with her brother Henry and sister-in-law, Caroline, in London. She lives with her 
family for decades in a dissatisfied life as “old Aunt Lolly, so useful and obliging and 
negligible”4 (150), until the age of forty-seven, when on a whim, she decides to use 
her meager savings to move to a rural village in the Chilterns called Great Mop. Once 




witches who enjoy the perverse pleasures of a solitary life. By the end of the novel, 
Laura meets Satan on a desolate hillside, and launches into a tirade on women’s 
limited position in society before peaceably accepting her new vocation. 
The fantasy element of the novel dominated much of the discourse surrounding 
Lolly Willowes upon its publication. For her part, Warner seems not to have entirely 
discouraged this, playing up interviewers’ speculation that she herself was a witch by 
flippantly suggesting that fellow modern witches should use vacuums for brooms. 
Later, Warner would disappoint Virginia Woolf when Warner declared to her that she 
knew so much about witches because Warner was one herself, during Woolf and 
Warner’s first (and what would be only) meeting.5 Yet, privately, Warner felt her 
novel was not quite understood. Writing to lifelong friend and fellow Dorset writer, 
David Garnett, she noted wistfully: “Other people who have seen Lolly have told me 
that it was charming, that it was distinguished, and my mother said it was almost as 
good as Galsworthy. And my heart sank lower and lower; I felt as though I had tried to 
make a sword, only to be told what a pretty pattern there was on the blade. But you 
have sent me a drop of blood.” A critical component of this misreading, in Warner’s 
words, is its charm – a description as off the mark as a comparison to John 
Galsworthy. As her biographer Clare Harman puts it, the novel’s focus on the 
“struggl[e] for privacy, not power, is still not a very common view of the feminist 
ideal and the retiring nature of the heroine, Lolly, perhaps persuaded readers that it 
was not a very serious one, either.”6  
Scholars in recent years have given the novel more serious attention, with more 




twentieth-century British society.7 Gillian Beer unites the two emphases on feminism 
and fantasy to note that Lolly Willowes is, for feminists, “total fantasy gratification.”8 
Warner’s novel, however, is more complex than either simple fantasy, or unified 
political treatise or allegory read in the way Beer suggests, as a portrait of a feminist 
utopia, particularly for single women.9 As Jacqueline Shin cautions, while an 
“assessment of the novel’s revolutionary potential is not inaccurate, … it flattens 
Warner’s sly, slippery, and perverse text by forcing it into the genre of the 
manifesto.”10 Noreen O’Connor likewise calls the novel “not easily organized into 
either traditional pre-war narrative forms or the alienated individuality we have come 
to expect from modernist works.”11 Such readings, in other words, ignore its narrative 
complexities and often fail to account for the significance of the fantasy elements as 
not feminism made whimsically coded but foregrounded and foundational to Warner’s 
feminist imagining. Charm, I argue in this chapter, helps us see how the unique 
feminist fantasy of Lolly Willowes operates as experimental exercise in sensation and 
belief, specifically through its cultivation of literary tone or, as I will call it here, its 
charmed atmosphere.  
 
Warner’s Revolutionary Feminism 
In the twentieth century’s early decades, Perry Anderson says, “the prospect of 
revolution was … more proximate and tangible than it had ever been.”12 Before 
turning to the novel, I’d like to set out context for the kind of feminism in which 
Warner’s novel is situated, and the role of charm within this revolutionary spirit. 




early twentieth century did—as a radically new, fittingly modern notion. Writing in 
the American women’s magazine The Delineator in 1914, Kenton deems feminism 
“something so new that it isn’t in the dictionaries yet.”13 A uniquely modern 
phenomenon, feminism’s relationship to modernism was a complex, paradoxical one. 
“Femininity” as a category seemed to be the “other” of modernism, carrying with it 
undesirable associations with Victorian gentility and sentimentality. Historian Lucy 
Delap writes:  
Over the first ten years of the twentieth century, feminism came to occupy a 
similar space to the idea of the ‘new woman’ of the 1890s, signifying a radical, 
subversive grouping closely associated with the avant-garde and radical 
movements that flourished before World War One. It connoted rupture, and 
was emblematic of the aggressively new century that was so widely understood 
as a millennial turning-point.14  
The feminist avant-garde or, as Edwardians often termed it, “vanguard,” this circle 
drew upon a much older thread of political radicalism dating from the mid-nineteenth 
century. It indicated “a discourse or social imaginary within feminism, rather than a 
movement.”15 Physical spaces that opened up to women in the early twentieth century 
were significant—such as the tea shops represented in Dorothy Richardson’s 
Pilgrimage (1915-38), or restaurants and clubs moved through by the aptly named 
Doris Kilman in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925). Yet, significant engines of 
feminist thought lay in “textual space,” meaning “the shared discourses circulating 
within feminist periodicals and essays, rather than any kind of tightly drawn circle or 




Delap puts it, “to be a feminist was very centrally a reading experience.”17 It is within 
this form of feminism, which is at once avant-garde and highly literary, that I trace 
Warner’s literary expression of feminism in Britain in the 1920s as distinct tonal 
atmosphere, fundamentally composed by charm. 
Charm was already embedded in discourses of feminism in the first decades of 
the twentieth century. It appeared to be a quality closely associated with femininity 
that modernity attempted to distance itself from, yet paradoxically, became avant-
garde emblem of the kind of radical shift in lived experience and aesthetic 
representation sought after by modernists. It also delineated separations within 
feminist groupings, as charm was never itself associated with the pervasive suffrage 
movement. Foundationally tied to aesthetic and affective forces, charm became a 
unique, slippery force of form that relied on the construction of atmosphere or tonality 
to bring support and promise to the movement. This kind of support was not enjoyed 
by the suffragists, despite the movement’s relative successes for legal and social 
reform. Suffragists, who decidedly lacked charm, were depicted as both unfeminine 
and, conversely, too feminine by the British mass media and vocal anti-suffrage 
groups. In a double bind, suffragists were skewered for their “masculine” desires to 
enter the political landscape assumed to be the realm of men, as well as criticized for 
their campaigns showing “the biologically determined flaws of their sex” such as 
hysteria or lack of intellectual capacity, “thus proving their inability to participate 
usefully in Parliamentary politics.”18 Charm smoothed the edges of such criticisms, 
and kept out of the headlines, favoring the promise of the literary as force of avant-




London commented, feminism was fresh and modern, a “charmingly feminine 
thing.”19 In its “lighter moods,” an anonymous Paris correspondent observes, 
feminism “is as graceful a gesture as it was in the days of the historic ‘salons,’” full of 
“fine feeling and dainty courage.”20 As this comment shows, charm is uniquely able to 
slip less attractive notions under detractors’ noses while ostensibly upholding the 
norms of femininity and gender roles. And, I argue, it is this “trojan horse” quality of 
tastefully normative blankness that drove feminism’s ability to imagine another form 
of social relations through the peculiar means of speculative or magical, charmed 
thinking. 
 
Lolly and Feminist Fantasy as Charmed Thinking 
The novel immediately draws attention to will and susceptibility through 
narrative technique. Lolly opens with a punning meditation on “will.” The novel’s first 
line declares Laura Willowes’s fate upon her father’s death – to “live in London with 
her elder brother and his family”21 (5). Laura’s sister-in-law, Caroline phones Laura 
immediately to declare, “‘Of course […] you will come to us’”22 (5). Laura’s response 
reads doubly: “‘But it will upset all your plans. It will give you so much trouble. Are 
you sure you really want me?’”23 (5). Laura’s equivocations indicate her actual will is 
not to live with Caroline. Yet, another will insists she do so—her father Everard’s 
physical will, left upon his death, which dispenses with both the family assets and 
Laura (who, for her part, “was ready to be disposed of as they should think best”24 
[10]). Symbolically, this also names the will of the patriarchy, that a single, odd 




Beyond these significations of will, the notion of will in the opening sentences of the 
novel introduces with it a sense of uncertain trajectory, conjuring a literary tone that 
itself jeopardizes our ability to read the novel conclusively. The narration’s sly 
slipperiness quickly seems to accrue its own “wills” and intents. 
As is characteristic of contemporaneous fantasy novels, Lolly Willowes relies 
upon the construction of an otherworldliness, a realm of possibility beyond the 
present. Warner’s novel is unique in that this otherworldliness – the kind of 
slipperiness indicated by the novel’s opening – is both alluringly magical and blankly 
quotidian. By this I do not mean to suggest that Warner elevates Laura’s domestic, 
rural everyday life to the transcendent or spiritual,25 nor do I mean to suggest that the 
novel’s fantasy renders an unreachable utopia. Rather, the novel’s ordinariness is a 
critical source of its very realist feminist thinking, created by the affective and 
aesthetic solicitation of response through tonality or atmosphere. Specifically, while 
ordinariness seems to connote a legibility, the quotidian fantasy realm of the novel 
actually crafts in its readers is one of confoundment, a cognitive dissonance or 
productive stupor produced when the novel evokes the naturalness of reason while 
compounding it with an immersive charmed delight in the feminist-inflected 
fantastical. This is where one’s “will” fails to correspond to one’s sensation or belief 
in the novel.  
Lolly Willowes practices sequences of sly deceits and sleights of hand, 
sequences that present a tonal atmosphere that is itself a form of avant-garde feminist 
thinking that can only be described as charming. The world of London and of Great 




London, Laura imagines the greengrocer’s mother bottling fruits: “the sliced pears in 
syrup, the glistening red plums, the greengages.”26 An image strikes her: “A solitary 
old woman picking fruit in a darkening orchard, rubbing her rough fingertips over the 
smooth-skinned plums,”27 and suddenly, “She forgot the winter air outside, the people 
going by on wet pavements. She forgot that she was in London, she forgot the whole 
of her London life. She seemed to be standing alone in a darkening orchard, her feet in 
the grass, her arms stretched up to the pattern of leaves and fruit.”28 The strength of 
Laura’s imagination becomes clear in moments such as these, as it appears to blur the 
boundaries between fantasy and reality. The blurring is rendered complete when Laura 
actually foresees her later encounter with Satan during this early moment in London. 
She is roused from her fantasy when the shop owner asks her what she wanted. “He 
wore a gardener’s apron,” the narration notes, “and his hands were brown and dry as if 
he had been handling earth.”29 Sure enough, in a perverse play on Eden, when we 
meet Satan later in the novel, he is “a slouching and prowling” gardener “carrying a 
flag basket and a pair of shears”30 as he emerges from a shed enclosure. 
Because of its quotidian, “realist” nature, the novel’s magical or fantasy 
elements twist the familiar adage that seeing is believing. Unknowingly, events 
transpire in the novel that sweep over the reader, who is immersed in the novel’s 
charm but attuned and susceptible. Events of the novel have to be believed to be seen. 
For example, while Laura believes acutely in her conversion, from a critical distance, 
it seems much less certain. While in the kitchen at her new home in Great Mop, Laura 
suddenly “felt something move by her foot. She glanced down and saw a small 




doubt. But so deadly, so complete was the certainty that it seemed to paralyze her 
powers of understanding… She continued to stare at the kitten, scarcely knowing what 
it was that she knew… She, Laura Willowes, in England, in the year 1922, had entered 
into a compact with the Devil.”32 This conversion occurs without much thought or 
agency from Laura herself. While she alleges she “scarcely [knew] what she knew,” 
she nonetheless retains a significant amount of conviction: “All knew, all could bear 
witness.”33  
Laura believes that she has become a witch, and the kitten is “her familiar 
spirit, [one] that already had greeted its mistress, and sucked her blood.”34 Yet, the 
scene could be read in a fundamentally less “magical” fashion—a stray kitten has 
found its way into her lodging, and in the sudden presence of a stranger, scratches at 
her. Warner’s narration emphasizes “doubt,” “knowing,” and “certainty” when Laura 
is not very intellectually sure of anything in particular in the novel. Laura “knew 
herself to be unpractical, unmethodical, lacking in initiative”35; her own “freckles on 
her nose mocked her with the receptivity of her skin compared to the dullness of her 
senses”36; and “She had no thoughts; her mind was swept as clean and empty as the 
heavens.”37 “‘I don’t think I do think,’”38 she later confesses.  
What the insistence on rational certainty in this conversion scene indicates is 
that there is something at work in the novel to which we as readers must be receptive 
or attuned. This presence requires our own complicity or belief to be influenced or 
subsumed by it – otherwise, we read a novel about a woman who we presume has 
constructed her own feminist fantasy realm inside of a realist narrative, in the style of 




thereby charms. It not only represents a magically-inflected feminist realm of 
possibility, but also enacts such a charm upon its readers through careful cultivation of 
tone. 
Warner herself helps to explain how her novel operates upon the reader 
through tone, especially as this tone suggests the supernatural through feeling of 
giving over one’s sense of reason or will. In early 1925, Warner corresponded for the 
first time with Harold Prentice, the man who would become both her close friend and 
longtime editor at Chatto & Windus. Upon reading her “story about a witch,” the work 
that would become Lolly Willowes, Prentice enthusiastically accepted the novel for 
publication. In a letter from March of that year, however, while discussing with 
Warner edits on the manuscript, Prentice asks if the ending – where the tale’s female 
protagonist delivers to Satan a lengthy tirade about women who, despite their “vivid 
imaginations,” are forced into “dull lives,” “so dependent upon others”39 – is meant to 
encourage the reader to sympathize with the devil, effectively asking whether Satan 
was a feminist ally. Warner answers, “I am very grateful for your analysis of your 
unease, especially for the two words ‘forensic’ and ‘humanistic.’ I think they give me 
the clue as to […] what is wrong.”40 She then elaborates on her vision for Satan:  
[T]here must be nothing humanistic in Satan’s sympathetic attitude. At the 
moment I have an idea for making him play the flute at some point in the 
conversation. 
 
I have always identified the Satan of the witch-cult with [P]an. (Warlocks seem 




significance: a power of evil). I believe I am right in saying that there has 
never been a religion founded on Pan. He has been acknowledged only: [sic] 
and under two aspects: the unaccountable terror that lies in wait in solitary 
places; and a simple out-door festivity. This mixture of fear and Bank Holiday 
on Hampstead Heath is very closely reproduced in the witch-cult.41 
Warner answers Prentice’s concerns by indicating that her Satan is not a religious evil. 
Instead, Warner notes anthropologically, he is associated with the pagan god Pan 
(whose name forms part of the word, panic, thereby associating Pan’s irrational 
frivolity with fear). He is outside of humanity, a “terror” and a “festivity,” a 
comingling of “fear” and “Bank Holiday.” Satan’s potential as a feminist, in other 
words, suggests Warner’s notion that feminist thought is itself a panic. The world as 
envisioned by the women’s movement was both a terror and a festivity, a challenge to 
the normative and a celebration of such a possibility. Satan is less important here than 
what he suggests, as manifestation of magical presence in the novel. This presence is 
caught between form and feeling, between the structure of the text and the reader’s 
cognitive and affective work. In this betweenness lies charm. The purpose, ultimately, 
of this play with readerly susceptibility, for a novel to do work upon its reader and 
confound one’s sense of reason or will, is to practice a feminist imagining. As Lolly 
Willowes demonstrates, charm slyly operates as a mystical, magical quality bearing an 
altered approach to new visions of the possible—specifically, as a fantasy rendered 
legible through the literary. 
 




To restate, as a complexly quotidian fantasy, Lolly Willowes narratively 
performs the magic it represents upon readers as it coaxes readers to unknowingly 
immerse themselves, to become susceptible to something through the use of charm. In 
so doing, the novel showcases modernist charm as literary operative, and attention to 
its effects makes charm’s literariness—its emphasis on words and formal structure—
more apparent.  
When I note Warner’s literary tone as establishing a charmed atmosphere, I 
mean to indicate that charm draws equally upon two separate notions. The first is the 
notion of literary tone, which itself creates an affective atmosphere or something that 
is somehow unshakably attached to an artwork. Sianne Ngai’s definition of literary 
tone as less an attitude as “adumbrated by the New Critics,” than a “hyper-relational 
concept of feeling that encompasses attitude: a literary text’s affective bearing, 
orientation, or ‘set toward’ its audience and world.”42 It is “an affective relay between 
subject and object in which feeling paradoxically produces a ‘beyondness’ rather than 
a nearness or immediacy.”43 As this “beyondness,” tone has a mysterious, distancing 
aura that rings of the fantastic or magical. Interpreting Walter Benjamin’s notion of 
aura, Theodor Adorno links tone to “the atmosphere of an artwork, that whereby the 
nexus of the artwork’s elements points beyond this nexus and allows each individual 
element to point beyond itself.”44 
This brings us to the second related notion of atmosphere, which Adorno 
suggests is an indexical, yet unspecified kind of tone. Stemming from the Greek 
atmos, meaning vapor, and sphaira (ball, sphere), atmosphere suggests a surrounding 




various terrestrial and celestial bodies or forces (electrical atmosphere, gaseous 
envelope surrounding planets).45 In relation to tone, it suggests a closed dimensional 
space of the encounter of an artwork in combination with the realm the artwork 
suggests. Referenced later by Ngai, Mikel Dufrenne describes the aesthetic encounter 
as having a singular “affective quality” or, to use Dufrenne’s term, “atmosphere.” For 
Dufrenne, the atmosphere initiated within an aesthetic encounter is part of the unity or 
sphere of the artwork together with its reception. This unity can then be read as 
ideology or worldview. While Dufrenne writes, “The unity of an atmosphere is thus 
the unity of a Weltanschauung; its coherence is the coherence of a characteristic or 
quality.”46 I would depart from Dufrenne to note that such a continuous, unified, and 
solid worldview risks totalizing the whole of aesthetic experience into an ideological 
metalanguage of infinite explanation. What I emphasize from this is that in Warner’s 
novel, and throughout my argument here, there is something absolutely unknowable, 
incomprehensible, mystically mysterious and unpredictable to this atmosphere that is 
nonetheless fundamental aspect of its “set toward” the world, and a critical component 
of this unknowable something is the observer or reader’s own ability to be susceptible 
to the artwork. Ngai begins to note something similar when she says that in “giv[ing] 
[artworks] their unity,” atmosphere suggests that “affective qualities are revealed or 
‘read’ by our own feelings (sentiments), but are not identical to them,”47 or, I would 
add, reducible or predictable as these feelings. To encounter the tone or enter the 
atmosphere of an artwork is therefore an interreliance of the artwork’s form and 




Dufrenne says reflective or constitutive of an ideological worldview, but rather, is 
under Warner’s charming hand the creation of a radical new. 
It is not happenstance, either, that tone and its connection to atmosphere is 
critical to Warner’s novel successfully charming its reader into the realm of the 
quotidian fantastical, which, as I emphasize throughout, renders a feminist “possible” 
or world of radical revolutionary potentiality. Modernists like Warner were keenly 
aware of the power of felt atmosphere, even and especially outside of aesthetic 
encounters. In Virginia Woolf’s late work Three Guineas (1938), she states plainly 
how one type of atmosphere—the ideology of patriarchy—affects its inhabitants. She 
initially deems it the “odor” of the honorific, “Miss”: “‘Miss’ transmits sex; and sex 
may carry with it an aroma. ‘Miss’ may carry with it the swish of petticoats, the 
savour of scent or other odour perceptible to the nose on the further side of the 
partition and obnoxious to it.”48 Woolf goes on to name the qualities of this “Miss-
ness” as the perceived danger of feminine charm, a danger that explains why women 
do not hold professions or public offices: “What charms and consoles in the private 
house may distract and exacerbate in the public office.”49 She then revises her 
phrasing to indicate that what “Miss” connotes is part of an atmosphere:  
Atmosphere plainly is a very mighty power. Atmosphere not only changes the 
sizes and shapes of things; it affects solid bodies, like salaries, which might 
have been thought impervious to atmosphere. An epic poem might be written 
about atmosphere, or a novel in ten or fifteen volumes. But since this is only a 
letter, and you are pressed for time, let us confine ourselves to the plain 




of the most impalpable, of the enemies with which the daughters of educated 
men have to fight.50  
This passage suggests Woolf’s knowledge of atmosphere as a political force that 
pervades the private and public sphere, one that is falsely presumed to be neutral. 
Timothy Wientzen suggests that Woolf and other modernists are responding to the 
notion of reflex (part of the era’s transatlantic craze for bodily conditioning such as 
Fletcherism, or Taylorist workplace practices, described elsewhere in this project) as 
point of contention between individual bodies or psyches and politics. He explains that 
these crazes “raised questions regarding consent, individuality, and community in a 
mass age. Indeed, because the science of reflex seemed to trouble the traditionally 
democratic emphasis laid upon individual agency, anxieties about reflex found 
especially fertile ground in modernist writing about fascism.”51 In what would later be 
called “imagined communities,” in Benedict Anderson’s terminology, this kind of 
atmosphere reliant upon a population to give over agency toward a larger shared 
imaginary of “nation” is, to Woolf, potentially dangerous and subsuming. 
Atmosphere in Three Guineas, then, is an ambivalent force. It is able to form 
persons into rational agents and create cohesive modern collective life, and serve as 
toxic ideological tool for enforcing collective decision-making and docility. What 
Woolf deems the “disastrous unanimity”52 on the wartime homefront and that is 
essential component of fascist rule is the key to Warner’s vision of a new possible. 
Rather than the suppression of difference or individuality, Warner’s vision is very like 
a thread of the feminist avant-garde that believed not in a utopian collective sameness, 






Warner’s novel, published a decade prior to Woolf’s Three Guineas, shows 
great interest in atmosphere. Not only is it formulated through the novel’s tone, but it 
is also represented by Laura herself. When Laura becomes of marrying age, the 
narration ironically laments her lack of charm, which turns away potential suitors: 
“Abroad, and in company, she was not animated,” and at formal parties, “she found 
there little reason for animation.”53 For her part: “Being without coquetry [Laura] did 
not feel herself bound to feign a degree of entertainment which she had not 
experienced, and the same deficiency made her insensible to the duty of every 
marriageable young woman to be charming, whether her charm be directed towards 
one special object, or, in default of that, universally distributed through a disinterested 
love of humanity.”54 Laura insists that her failure to exhibit charm is her failure of 
marriageable duty. Yet, of course, this lack is perverse—she does wield charm as the 
novel goes on, in its originally magical, nonnormative form. She is already sensitive to 
atmospheric attunement, or invisible forces that affect her just as much as she later is 
able to affect her surrounds. Before she leaves London for Great Mop, Laura feels an 
intensity, the presence of what the narration can only deem an indistinct “it” within the 
natural world. After the family returns to London one autumn after spending a summer 
in the country, forty-something Laura feels an ambiguous “disquiet,”55 an unease that 
is irrelevant but integral: “had no relevance to her life. It arose out of the ground with 
the smell of dead leaves.”56 Laura can only describe the feeling as a pronoun: “[S]he 




Warner, and for the novel, witchcraft and Pan/Satan/the title “Huntsman” is less a 
solid idea or personage than something that lives in language as an “It”-ness, a 
vaporous, contagious atmos. As such, Laura presents charm as literary tonality that 
must be winkingly “caught” through affective openness and formal construction. 
This winking, hidden feeling, felt by Laura as the magic of Satan’s realm of 
witchcraft, but also by us as readers as we feel the narration slip slyly around us. And 
this invisible atmosphere of something, an “it-ness” as the novel puts it, can be read 
multiply if we insist on reading what Ngai deems the “affective relay” of the novel’s 
charmed atmosphere as ideological or sociohistorical representation of the invisible 
impact of or remnants of the first World War lurking at the novel’s edges, or of the 
burgeoning feminist movement that moved invisibly to change the fabric of British 
society and politics. I find that it is both of these things, but something more, too—as 
an openness to speculation or imagining, charm is a feminist exploration of how 
radically affective-aesthetic experience can restructure the possible.  
 
Charmed Thinking 
Charmed thinking is practiced by Laura roughly halfway through the novel. 
After Satan disappears, when she muses on his character as “truly integral, a perpetual 
flowering of power and cunning from an undivided will—[it] was enough to constitute 
the charm and majesty of the Devil.”58 His mind, she reflects, “brooded immovably 
over the landscape and over the natures of men, and unforgetting and unchoosing 
mind,”59 and this becomes her revelation – it is not her witchcraft, her subservient 




out of the realm of heteronormative society, but her realization that she does not have 
to “reflect” at all to be a subject.  
She undergoes a changed engagement with the world, a banal shock of 
epistemological change, that is curiously not her conversion to witchcraft, believed to 
occur when her familiar, Vinegar, scratches her in her cottage. This change is actually 
an encounter with a memory that even she cannot recall. Laura herself undergoes this 
change in the Chilterns, a change that continues to tie her to witchcraft as well as a 
feminist worldview. After the first few months of her new life at Great Mop, Laura 
intends to find a field of blooming cowslips, as “she had promised them to herself”60 
when she first arrived. While neither Laura nor the narration says so, Laura’s interest 
in medicinal and edible plantlife such as cowslips actually begins at Lady Place.  
The magic of quotidian, unmarked recall of a previous memory is part of 
charmed thinking—the blissful, naïve encounter with something that is very like an 
engagement with the state of magical thinking associated in Freudian and Kleinian 
psychoanalytic theory with infantile omnipotence. When the infant realizes its 
terrifying needs are at the destruction of others (the parent), she is comforted by the 
fact that this omnipotence is in check with limits of reality, according to Klein. For 
Freud, this process of confrontation with the limits of the self and the external realm is 
essential for forming civilization, as civilization cannot coexist with the individual’s 
“uncorrected sense of omnipotence,” making the primary task of maturation the 
internalization of social prohibition. As Eve Sedgwick writes, following this process: 
It is not mainly ‘civilization’ that needs the individual to be different from the 




as her instinctive impulses conflict with one another even more drastically than 
they conflict with the claims of her environment. Instead of the 
undifferentiatedly blind, pleasure-seeking drives of the Freudian infant, which 
encounter no check but the originally external ones of prohibition of lack, the 
Kleinian infant experiences a greed whose aggressive and envious component 
is already perceived as posing a terrible threat both to her desired objects and 
to herself. The resulting primary anxiety is an affect so toxic that it probably 
ought to be called, not anxiety, but dread. It is against this endogenous dread 
that the primary defense mechanisms are first mobilized—the splitting, the 
omnipotence, the violent projection and introjection.61  
Laura completes the maturation process Freud’s notion of civilization requires, only to 
realize that the intensity of its prohibitions destroyed her. Moving toward reparation, 
she shifts from this reality of civilization back into the powerful potential of magical 
thinking. For Laura, this entire process begins and concludes with botany. “[S]weet-
gale, water purslane, cowslips, and the roots of succory”62 composed a variety of 
“washes and decoctions” that Laura composed for her family, including her father, 
who consumed her herbal salads “at first in hope and trust, and afterwards with 
flattering appetite.”63 Herbs and wild plants are significant to Laura’s formative sense 
of herself in Part I of the novel as a young woman at Lady Place. She is able to use 
these plants as a mode of controlling or influencing the world around her, as they had 
been used for centuries in healing and ritual. Once, she is said to be examining 
philosopher John Aubrey’s Miscellany (1696) during a family discussion about a 




Laura’s first attempt at mugwort tea made her brothers Henry and James ill. The 
fleeting mentions of herbal remedies and foraged plants here appear unremarkable, 
since mugwort and similar plants are commonly used for brewing and rustic 
winemaking, the Willowes family profession. Yet, by the time the fantastical enters 
the novel in Parts II and III, this brief foray into plants makes Laura appear to have 
been training for the kinds of potions a witch would be expected to create. Laura’s 
examination of Aubrey’s Miscellany also gains significance. The Miscellany is best 
known not as a brewer’s handbook, but as a folkloric document of “hermetick” or 
supernatural and occultist practices. That this text is mentioned early in Lolly Willowes 
seems a clear nudge toward the novel’s eventual direction as fantasy, further allowing 
the “realist” aspects of the novel to bleed indistinctly and unremarked upon into the 
fantasy elements.64  
Laura never recalls the importance of her brewing past in later years, nor does 
the narration remind us. In Part II, she walks into a meadow near her cottage at Great 
Mop. There, she finds “it was bloomed over with cowslips, powdering the grass in 
variable plenty, here scattered, there clustered, innumerable as the stars in the Milky 
Way.”65 Struck by their unexpected blooming, she transforms: 
She knelt down among them and laid her face close to their fragrance. The 
weight of all her unhappy years seemed for a moment to weigh her bosom 
down to the earth; she trembled, understanding for the first time how 
miserable she had been; and in another moment she was released. It was all 




down her face. With every breath she drew, the scent of the cowslips flowed 
in and absolved her.66 
In this communion with cowslips, Laura changes. She is no longer preoccupied with 
perceptions of her, including her family’s disapproval of her move to Great Mop, or 
their continued, meddling attempts at controlling her happiness there during their 
visits. Yet, she also did not forgive them: “She had not, in any case, a forgiving nature; 
and the injury they had done to her” of demeaning her, limiting her, and rendering her 
the subservient Aunt Lolly “was not done by them.”67 Laura connects her family to a 
larger framework of systemic inequity and marginalization wrought by British 
patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. If she were to start forgiving, Laura muses, 
“she must needs forgive Society, the Law, the Church, the History of Europe, the Old 
Testament, great-great-aunt Salome and her prayerbook, the Bank of England, 
Prostitution, the Architect of Apsley Terrace, and half a dozen other useful props of 
civilization.”68  
This moment shifts Laura’s supposed blankness and forgetfulness into an 
epistemic change, rendered by her new encounters with the world in Great Mop. “All 
she could do,” she concludes, “was to go on forgetting,”69 since forgiveness was 
impossible. This charmed atmosphere of forgetting is the forgetting of the present state 
of the realm, instead electing to imaginatively construct an alternative that “forgets” 
the ills and harms of the real realm of Britain. This charmed state is literally brought 
on by cowslips, a plant that brews Laura into an alternative (reparative) position. At 




The novel renders such thinking possible not only through Laura’s modeling of 
it, but through the work of the novel’s formal structure itself. As this moment with 
Laura dramatizes, the novel invests in magical thinking by planting sleights of hand 
and wry winks that must be “caught” to be understood. Magical thinking is shown in 
the novel to ambiguously create or bring about events. At Great Mop, Laura’s nephew 
Titus grows tormented by a series of misfortunes while staying with her. Titus reports 
the first occurrence to Laura: the milk set out “for his nightly Ovaltine” has suddenly 
curdled “into a sort of unholy junket.”70 He attributes the substantive change to 
“popular education, and the spread of science among dairy-farmers; in other words, 
Mr. Dodbury had overdone the preservative.71 Laura dismisses his assessment: “I 
don’t think it’s science,’ said Laura. ‘More likely to be the weather. It was very sultry 
this afternoon.’”72 The milk’s changeover is an “unholy” transformation that makes 
the ordinary (milk curdling, a common practice used to make cheeses or pudding) into 
something extraordinarily imbued with meaning. Its shift from expected substance to 
other substance occurs solely via weather or atmosphere. While Titus, being a man, 
attempts to explain the change through science gone wrong in the hands of simpleton 
farmers, Laura’s statement asserts the powerful influence of the atmosphere, the 
invisibly affective. Later that night, she attributes the milk’s spoilage to her own 
doing: “[S]he was a witch, the inheritrix of aged magic, spells rubbed smooth with 
long handling, and the mistress of strange powers that got into Titus’s milk-jug.”73 She 





Narrative sleights-of-text grow increasingly self-referential and increasingly 
layered. We learn, for example, that Laura’s imaginative ability to control her 
surroundings is also very like the ability for social expectations—themselves an 
imagined control, of sorts—to inflict real damage. Laura’s devoted father, for instance, 
in viewing Laura as his beloved daughter, thereby casts Laura in the role of young 
woman who has little means or power of her own. She is, in effect, both figuratively 
and literally wrought as a pet animal, as she herself is susceptible to being controlled 
rather than herself having control. “A stuffed ermine which [Everard] had known as a 
boy,” we learn in Part I, was Everard’s “ideal of an enchanted princess, so pure and 
sleek was it, and so artfully poised the small neat head on the long throat.”74 
Subsequently, both he and Laura’s mother begin calling Laura his “weasel” or “minx.” 
The imagination and the realities of the sociopolitical realm therefore coalesce. One 
afternoon, Everard returns home from killing a female fox during a hunting party, only 
to report the fox made him think of his daughter, his own “pretty young vixen.”75 This 
fleeting set of linked images is significant in a few ways. Not only does this hunting 
party coyly link Laura’s father with the title’s “loving huntsman,” meaning that the 
ostensibly loving father Everard is able to kill a figure of his daughter, it also links the 
imagined with the real. Everard’s childish fantasy of an “enchanted princess” is 
imbued with a sense of women as pet animals. This fantasy, however, is a very 
uncanny echo of the reality of sociopolitical in the era. Finally, the stuffed animal the 
young Everard holds as his ideal of femininity is not alive, but begs the kind of 




up in the realist realm by Laura, whose magical thinking does transformative rather 
than reifying work of imagining a feminist realm.  
Everard’s odd ability to kill the figure of his daughter during the hunting party 
is also even more dastardly suggestive of Everard representing a suffocating British 
social structure than it seems. Everard, upon Laura’s birth, constructs for her a pretty 
noose. After once “going up to London[…], he returned with a little string of pearls, 
small and evenly matched, which exactly fitted the baby’s neck. Year by year, he 
explained, the necklace could be extended until it encircled the neck of a grown-up 
young woman at her first ball.”76 She recalls in the first pages of the novel a moment 
when, as a child, “she had stained her pale cheeks” with crushed red geranium, and 
“had bent over the greenhouse tank to see what she looked like. But the greenhouse 
tank showed only a shadowy Laura, very dark and smooth like the lady in the old holy 
painting that hung in the dining room and was called the Leonardo.”77  Laura appears 
to herself as bloodless, having no blush of life on her cheeks, and is confronted with 
an alternate, dark self reflected back at her, one that is inconsistent with the Laura she 
believed herself to be. Jacqueline Shin identifies the painting Laura recalls here as 
likely Leonardo da Vinci’s fifteenth-century Lady with an Ermine.78 Lauded as one of 
the first paintings of psychological depth in portraiture, the painting shows a figure 
reminiscent of Laura herself – she is a young woman with a calm but determined 
expression, wearing simple clothing and holding a keenly alert ermine, the very 
animal Everard Willowes associates with his daughter, and which is embedded in 
Laura’s name itself as Laura Erminia Willowes. The portrait subject, too, wears a 




not of white pearls, but of round, black beads that closely encircle her neck. The beads 
could be of black amber, semi-precious stone such as agate or onyx, or even of scented 
paste – the opposite of Laura’s precious white pearls.79 And most importantly, the 
Leonardo is a copy of a Leonardo. Even the lady in the portrait, then, is devoid of 
aesthetic “life,” or what Walter Benjamin theorizes as the “aura” of an originary work 
of art – perhaps an aid for us to discern added resonances to Lolly’s preferred name, 
Laura, or, l’aura. Laura is already not quite what she sees in her reflection, but also, 
not even “like the lady in the old holy painting” that she thinks her reflection recalls. 
This layered memory is a slippery one, leaving us unsure which Laura is the original 
(if the original even matters) and the slip of the aesthetic and affective to create an 
interplay of forms. 
If we pair this memory of the reflecting pool and the novel’s conclusion, we 
may see more clearly how Warner’s novel represents the magic of feminist thinking 
made possible through immersion into a charmed atmosphere. Laura encounters the 
Devil one final time, and gives a lengthy speech on the ways women have been 
mistreated for centuries, as he “smil[es] at her as if she were a pet lamb,”80 echoing 
Everard’s penchant for Laura as his pet. Laura suddenly hears Satan say, “Dead!”81 
For a moment, the narration is unclear as to whether Satan has just commanded Laura 
to die. For Laura, the “word dropped into her mind like a pebble thrown into a pond. 
She had heard it so often, and now she heard it once more. The same waves of thought 
circled outwards, waves of startled thought spreading out on all sides, rocking the 
shadows of familiar things, blurring the steadfast pictures of trees and clouds, circling 




until the pool was still again.”82 The early “reflecting pool” becomes middle-aged 
Laura’s processing mechanism – not a rational patterned thought, but a pool of 
pensiveness where Laura is at a remove from a “real.” What is disturbed in the pond is 
not what is beneath the water, where the pebble sinks, but the reflection on the pond’s 
surface, a relationality or ability to perceive that shifts. Laura, however, is ultimately 
not dead in this scene, and the answer to the question Laura has not asked remains. 
She rouses herself from her reverie of the resonant liquid image to note Satan is 
gathering himself to go: “‘Is it time?’ asked Laura. He nodded, and smiled.”83 
It remains unclear what the lingering command “Dead!” is meant to do in the 
scene, and how that alters the ending of the novel. For one, Warner’s editor at Chatto 
& Windus, Harold Prentice, remained uncertain how to read the exchange. Warner 
reassures: “Indeed Lolly didn’t die. She is at this moment alive and much looking 
forward to a ripe old age vis-à-vis with Satan. Immortals make the best companions 
then. Think how reassuring to have a friend who won’t die or go deaf or marry the 
cook…”84 It is fitting, too, that Laura herself is immortal. There simply is no history, 
and no teleology. It is not a futurist utopian vision of what is to come through suffrage 
and a variety of other sociopolitical and legal changes to the rights of women. These 
changes, in the end, are still duties to the state that has yet to fully acknowledge 
women as able to be liberated, equal, or even “forgetting and unchoosing,” as Satan 
may be. Instead, it is a vision of the possible made so by magical thinking. 
 




 Lest such a feminist imaginary of a transformed world in which all participants 
are united for a single communal cause seem unlikely or impossible, I would point out 
that this project once occurred during Britain’s war efforts in World War I. Wartime 
atmosphere on the homefront (as well as in the trenches) relied immeasurably on a 
unified communality, a sense of atmosphere built upon felt belonging and structured 
purpose that comprised exactly the kind of social revolution advocated by the feminist 
avant-garde.  
Most predominant and also most invisible at the time of Lolly Willowes was 
the shadow of the first World War. As novels such as Mrs. Dalloway (1925) detail, 
England busied itself with a sense of normalcy after the war, often forgetting the 
remnants of war that mingled amidst them. The war has a similarly invisible, yet 
pervasive force in Warner’s novel. When the war begins in 1914, Laura is left 
wrapping parcels without “such excitements”85 as deaths (suffered by her nephew-in-
law) or lorry-driving (a pleasure afforded her niece, Fancy). Yet, the war seems to 
alter her. While her brother, Henry, and sister-in-law Caroline “had done with the 
war,” Laura “had only shelved it, and that by an accident of consciousness.”86 
Reflecting on niece Fancy’s new husband and children after the war, she thinks, “Here 
is a new generation to call her Aunt Lolly and find her as indispensable as did the 
last.”87 Nothing, indeed, has changed. And yet, Laura irrevocably has. It is perhaps the 
growing oppression of such familiar “old times,” as Caroline deems them, that 
suffocates Laura, leading her to abandon her family for solitary life in a rural town to 




Also critical to grasping how the atmosphere became central concern of 
modernism is its manipulation during war through atmospheric terrorism (chemical 
agents, such as chlorine gas, first used in Ypres, Belgium) confirms that terrorism as 
an act is “not an isolated, one-sided attack; it denotes the willingness and readiness of 
partners in conflict to operate in an expanded zone of warfare.”88 While those living 
prior to the twentieth century could live unquestioning of their entry into a 
surrounding atmosphere (stepping outside, for example), writes Peter Sloterdijk in 
Terror from the Air (2002), anyone “who lives after this caesura and moves within a 
culture zone in step with modernity is already bound, whether in rudimentary or 
elaborated forms, to a formal concern for climate and atmospheric design.”89  
Warner had seen firsthand this possibility of atmosphere, as modeled by the 
demands of the wartime homefront. In 1914, at the age of twenty-one, Warner was 
with her father, an assistant master at the Harrow School, and his Harrow colleagues 
when she heard the news from Europe that Germany had declared war on Russia. 
Warner recalled in her diary that she listened to her father digesting the news: 
[Geoffrey Sturt] sat, his eyes burning, saying we must fight or France would be 
lost … while my father and Philip Wood, almost as theoretical in knowledge of 
war as he, sat by, grievedly consenting to the burden of the young men.90  
In the war’s first few months, Warner volunteered with an organization called War 
Help, which originally aimed to coordinate fundraising for the Red Cross before it 
became a housing assistance program, finding temporary lodging for Belgian refugees 
who had fled to England. By 1915, Warner made further commitments to the war 




the leisured class in munition-making to relieve the regular hands,” Warner worked 
eight-hour shifts as a shell machinist with other “lady-workers” in a factory in Erith.91 
The group was deemed “the Miaows” by the factory’s regular workers, and the work 
itself—base-facing, or paring down a steel shell-case to the correct length, as 
measured by gauges and scales—was numbing to Warner, but also imbued with a 
sense of powerful communality. She described her factory experience in an article for 
Blackwood’s: 
Through the open doors of the workshop came noise and light and warmth: it 
looked as gay as a ballroom. Once inside it, the place wrapped me round like a 
familiar garment. […] All the driving belts in the motion dazzle the eyes like a 
mist, and looking across row after row of machines, the other side of the shop 
seemed a mile away. Last of all one notices the workers, inconspicuous, 
inconsiderable – mere human beings among these infallible Titans of iron and 
belting.92 
While the Blackwood’s editors emphasized to Warner that she “humanize” the 
experience, thereby surely altering her original intentions with the article, the work is 
striking nonetheless. The sensation of vision, sound, and feeling comes first in 
Warner’s description, the affective components of the factory experience. Then, the 
structure – the machine placement, the floor layout. Finally, Warner notes the workers, 
who tellingly are the last to be noticed, as they are each subsumed by the larger whole 
of the workplace. Warner’s work was difficult, and took her fifteen minutes per shell. 
After a period of time, “it begins to flatten one into the essential dough: every shell 




experiences demonstrate the ability for individuality to be lost within a larger 
atmosphere of nationalism and work. The divide between one Miaow and another 
becomes nonexistent as they all blur and reduce into a single, essential “dough-like” 
form. 
Warner’s early socialist and communist leanings are already evident here as 
she notes the impact of such work on the least fortunate—the “regulars,” who Warner 
sympathetically described as “bone-weary, working the long hours of necessity, living 
in the vitiated air of the shop, where the noise eats them like a secret poison.”94 If such 
a painful, exploitative, and numbing experience could be willfully participated in by 
Britain’s working class and upper classes alike, Warner may have thought, then the 
real prospect of another sort of unity aimed at eliminating social stratification and 
inequity under the guidance of a single imaginary, the feminist avant-garde, is also 
possible. Specifically, it was made possible by the integral role of language and the 
literary. 
 
Doing Things with Words 
While a cultural phenomenon such as feminine “charm” appears foreign or 
mystical, consider in literary studies the significance granted to the powers of 
language – consider the work of J.L. Austin, for example, on performative utterances 
in How to Do Things with Words (1962). Such utterances are those that do not 
describe or report, “constate anything at all,” “are not ‘true or false,’” and finally, are 
those that for which the “uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an 




something.”95 Once we realize such utterances or sentences as doing and not “merely” 
saying, “there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is 
performing an act.”96 What is useful from Austin is less the ability to do with 
language, than the force that is behind specific kinds of language – a poetics, of a sort. 
When we consider the ways in which we read texts, we “divine” – a mystic encounter 
of knowledge seeking, now secularized into hermeneutics. Divination or divinatio is 
“a power traditionally required by those who wish to distinguish between variant 
readings, and to purge corrupt texts,” notes Frank Kermode, while the “freedom to 
divine [as somewhat inspired guesswork] has been restricted since the Renaissance, 
and especially since the early eighteenth century, by the advance of what might be 
called science.”97  
Friedrich Schleiermacher, considered a founder of modern hermeneutics or the 
“science of understanding texts,”98 used divinatio as a term for the “moment of 
intuition which was necessary to his theory, and also, probably, to any commonsense 
view of what it is we accomplish when we interpret a text.”99 I quote at length 
Kermode’s description of this reading process: 
We understand a whole by means of its parts, and the parts by means of the 
whole. But this ‘circle’ seems to imply that we can understand nothing—the 
whole is made up of parts we cannot understand until it exists, and we cannot 
see the whole without understanding the parts. Something, therefore, must 
happen, some intuition by which we break out of this situation—a leap, a 
divination, he called it, whereby we are enabled to understand both part and 




books, which may frustrate such responses, or at least suggest a need for going 
beyond them. And it is quite usual to attach more value to such complex 
works, and to feel that our relating of part to part and parts to whole is the only 
means by which anything like the sense of the whole can be achieved. In other 
words, our power of divination is necessary to the whole operation—without it 
there will be no sense, or not enough.100 
Many may see Kermode’s “divination” as outmoded theory. However, it links two 
notions critical to my reading of Warner’s Lolly Willowes—first, the work of form (his 
description of reading as involving relations of the “part to the whole” is clearly based 
in formalist close reading), and second, the work of affect (divination’s interpretive 
leap, a mechanism of or supplement to cognition). In other words, Kermode indicates 
that form as well as something more than form is at work when we read, or have an 
aesthetic response. This means that there is a gap to be filled, or an unknown that must 
materialize, when one encounters a text. This gap or blank is the space of what I call a 
charmed cognitive atmosphere. It is the text’s ability to make its reader believe 
through the process of textual encounter with literary tone. Charm, in short, incants or 
brings into being a kind of intermedial possibility of thought and being—a charmed 
atmosphere. Lolly Willowes demonstrates such possibility as an explicit fantasy of 
social equity. Charm reminds us of language’s mediated betweenness, where readings 
are not declarative but exploratory. The space between form and feeling, like Ngai’s 
notion of tone as orientation, or what I call a charmed atmosphere exists in Lolly 





What charm also does is reinsert the primacy of something other than 
poststructuralism’s hermeneutics of suspicion, which rewards skepticism and disbelief 
in insisting that texts fundamentally operate by “hiding” a truth of meaning. Charm is 
an encounter, and a transformed engagement with the world that relies on play, 
encourages sensory receptivity, and resists ready formulation. But if in case we may 
be tempted to consider charm as a new ethical code that can be practiced to better our 
selves, like a Foucauldian askesis, we must recall that charm resists such coding 
entirely. In fact, charm dissipates, betrays, dissolves, and often disgusts when it is 
something “put on” or practiced deliberately - it lays bare the means of its own 
production. In charm, there exists a perverse form of freedom and play, the very 
notions that Satan promises to Laura in Warner’s novel—the constraint of a form 
exists in such a way that rather than suppressing freedoms or oppressing individuals 
(such as women in Britain’s twentieth-century patriarchal, colonialist, and capitalist 
society), it provides room for expression and possibility by ensuring livelihood, well-
being, and artistry.101 Just as a society that provides its citizens with healthcare thereby 
does not constrain its citizens but liberates them by freeing them of concern for the 
literal costs of their lives, Laura’s belief in her dominion by the “loving huntsman” 
Satan as surrender to influencing as equally as she herself is influenced provides her 
with greater capacity to live, and models the brief potential of charmed thinking in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. In sum, Lolly Willowes utilizes the construction 
of a charmed atmosphere, created by Warner’s distinctly crafted literary tone, to 




sociopolitical, and secular sense. It is, as Warner’s own Communist leftist leanings 
would later detail, a realist promise of a transformed, equitable world. 
In sum, I argue that Warner’s novel draws upon charm to create a feminist-
inflected reimagined world that is both historically-driven and literarily-minded. Lolly 
Willlowes does not simply offer literature as social critique; rather, it substantially 
participates in the significant influence of print literature and reading culture that 
bolstered the avant-garde feminist movement in Britain. Reading the novel this way 
furthers what Warner would later go on to formally advocate as a Communist leftist, 
in that it permits Warner to imagine “hope for progressive change without seeming 
utopian,”102 as Maren Tova Linett writes of Warner’s later novel Summer Will Show. 
As she does in Summer Will Show, Warner presents a complex, slippery, and non-
straightforward portrait of a realistic and not romantic aesthetically-driven political 
project. Emancipation, Lucy Delap notes, “was located both internally, concerning 
self-realization, and in society, in industrial and political reform.”103 Yet with such a 
dual project, with an individualist core, built upon “anxieties about bureaucracy and 
collectivization, in both British and American Edwardian society. A celebration of the 
individual planted against ‘the machine’ can be traced in many spheres… The 
machine, political or industrial, was a pervasive fear, responding to an increasingly 
bureaucratic and executive-dominated state that seemed to be working against the 
‘new individualism.’”104 
This is the type of anxiousness that Woolf voices in her concern about the 
flattening of individuality through atmosphere on the nationalist homefront. Such 




collectivism a more positive potential for a transformed social and political realm. 
While the late nineteenth-century move in the economic market to form individual 
businesses or firms into vast trusts and corporations was worrying, the move toward 
national union and labor organizations, such as the formation of the American 
Federation of Labor in 1886, or the Industrial Workers of the World in 1905, seemed 
positive. Likewise, the intensity of interest in preserving individualism seemed not to 
be aimed at egalitarian opportunity, a prevailing sentiment in the United States, which 
associated individualism with a “hostility to aristocratic, arbitrary, or hierarchical 
privilege.”105 Rather, individualism of this libertarian sort held no interest in actual 
egalitarian outcomes, and often upheld what it was considered to overturn—namely, 
material and social privilege determined on the basis of class, race or ethnicity, and 
gender. Such individualism was not concerned with changing the constraints that 
would prevent otherwise equal individuals to compete fairly in a capitalist 
marketplace. Because this was the form of individualism that was most pervasive, 
many avant-garde feminists often envisioned a world that was closer to the collective, 
while still preserving the kinds of individuality that rendered a richly diverse society 
aimed at personal fulfillment and collective equity. 
As the following chapter will explain, however, this potential would ultimately be 
short-lived. By the late 1920s, British and American capitalism, collapsing 
colonialism, and progress in the women’s suffrage movement that coalesced in a 
presumed threat to modernist white masculinity, effectively curtailing the paradox of 
charm’s believability as fantasy. As the works of Edith Wharton and F. Scott 




commoditized realist quality, a magnetic appeal claimed by white masculinity as 
marker of access to and control over capital.
                                                 
1 Edna Kenton, “Feminism Will Give,” The Delineator, 17. 
2 Sylvia Townsend Warner, Lolly Willowes, 3. 
3 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 10. 
4 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 150. 
5 Clare Harman, Sylvia Townsend Warner: A Biography, 65, 66. 
6 Ibid., 65. 
7 Gay Wachman finds “Lolly Willowes celebrates the perverse in salutary opposition to the 
‘normal’” (78), while Jane Garrity reads the novel as a text in which Laura demonstrates a coded 
lesbianism, “a kind of conspiratorial inscription”7  that is “detectable only through deflection” (150). 
Jennifer Poulos Nesbitt focuses on the novel’s emphasis on patriarchal systems of land ownership, 
arguing that “Warner’s novel is a commentary on the semiotics and politics of landscape as a 
structuring agent in subjectivity” (450), while more recently, James Harker also examines subjectivity 
formation in the novel to find in Lolly an alternate form of subjectivity, what he calls a “cognitive 
minimalism.” Lolly’s generally passive blankness, Harker argues, stylistically departs from canonical 
modernist novels’ emphasis on deep psychological interiority in their protagonists, and ultimately 
makes a statement on the denial of subject position to single women. See Gay Wachman, Lesbian 
Empire: Radical Crosswriting in the Twenties (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001); 
Jane Garrity, Step-daughters of England: British Women Modernists and the National Imaginary 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003); Jennifer Poulos Nesbitt, “Footsteps of 
Red Ink: Body and Landscape in Lolly Willowes,” Twentieth Century Literature 49, no. 4 (2003): 449-
470; and James Harker, “‘Laura was not thinking’: Cognitive Minimalism in Sylvia Townsend 
Warner’s Lolly Willowes,” Studies in the Novel 46, no. 1 (2014): 44-62. 
8 Gillian Beer, “Sylvia Townsend Warner: The Centrifugal Kick,” 76. 
9 For Warner’s part, she may not necessarily have opposed allegory. She commends one to her 
new editor Ben Huebsch at Viking Press in 1927 – her good friend T.F. Powys’s fantastic spiritual 
allegory Mr. Weston’s Good Wine. “As you can see,” she writes Huebsch, “the story contains elements 
that might be difficult to carry off in a novel, and Mr Knopf, who has previously been Mr Powys’s 
American publisher, has refused to take this book, on the grounds that it is improper and blasphemous, 
and would render him liable to prosecution” (12). Mr. Knopf, she explains, “is not a very spiritually-
minded man, and has failed to observe that this is not a novel, but an allegory, like The Pilgrim’s 
Progress” (12). Warner’s later historical novels, including After the Death of Don Juan and The Flint 
Anchor, refuse neat historical or political parallel to the threats of Communism in the 1930s or the 
impending war. Speaking again of Powys’s book (though also, in sly commentary on her own), she 
notes, “in my opinion a story containing such unusual incidents as the devil going about like a roaring 
lion, and a virgin carried to heaven by an angel is not very likely to be taken as a novel of real life, or 
judged by the standards of propriety which we apply to realistic fiction” (13). Warner, “To Ben 
Huebsch 5:viii:1927,” Sylvia Townsend Warner Letters, ed. William Maxwell (New York: Viking 
Press, 1983), 12-13. 
10 Jacqueline Shin, “Lolly Willowes and the Arts of Dispossession,” 710. 
11 Noreen O’Connor, “From Alienation to Community,” in Communal Modernisms, 130. 
12 Perry Anderson, “Modernity and Revolution,” qtd. in O’Connor, ibid., 130. 
13 Edna Kenton, “Feminism Will Give,” 17. 
14 Lucy Delap, The Feminist Avant-garde, 2. 
15 Delap, 4. As Delap points out, in part, this radicalism was a critique of both capitalism’s rise 
in political influence as well as the increasing sense of autonomy over communal interdependence. 
Indeed, writer Dora Marsden predicted that capitalism would soon render politicians “powerless to 
effect anything more than the slow-paced ‘reform,’ of which the sole aim is to make ‘men and masters’ 
settle down in a comfortable but unholy alliance… Every modern State is in pawn, in debt up to the 
eyes with capitalists. The capitalists own the States” (qtd. in Delap 228). Because of this, vanguard 




                                                                                                                                            
groups advocated for a reformed society based in craft, ruralism, and interdependency. However, many 
feminists preferred to preserve individualism and autonomy in labor, political, and personal concerns, 
thereby rendering a society in which individualism and collectivism could coexist. 
16 Delap, ibid. 
17 Delap, ibid. 
18 Julie Bush, Women Against the Vote, 228. 
19 “The Lighter Side of French Feminism,” The Times 17 July 1914, 11. Earlier, a similar 
sentiment was voiced in “The Feminist Movement in France,” The Times, 3 June 1908, extolling the 
virtues of French feminismé’s “restraint” (14). 
20 “The Lighter Side,” ibid. 
21 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 5. 
22 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 5. 
23 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 5. 
24 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 10. 
25 Elevating the everyday banalities of life to the extraordinary in the early twentieth century 
was a distinct modernist project, however. Representative writers and thinkers of this kind of 
modernism include writers Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, and Wallace Stevens, as well as 
philosophers Henri Lefebvre and Henri Bergson. See Liesl Olson’s Modernism and the Ordinary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) for a full treatment of the subject. 
26 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 79. 
27 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 79. 
28 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 79-80. 
29 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 81. 
30 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 206. 
31 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 154. 
32 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 155. 
33 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 156. 
34 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 156. 
35 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 49. 
36 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 61. 
37 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 102. 
38 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 216. 
39 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 211. 
40 Sylvia Townsend Warner, Letter to Harold Prentice, 10 March 1925. Chatto & Windus 
Archive Holdings (University of Reading, Reading, UK). I am grateful to Random House for granting 
permissions to read and quote from this archive material. 
41 Warner, Letter, ibid. 
42 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 43. Italics in 
original. 
43 Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 43. 
44 Thedor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 274. Qtd. in Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 87. 
45 The term also suggests a related idea, mood. Martin Heidegger’s ontology in Being and Time 
proposes an attunement (Befindlichkeit) and mood (Stimmung) that accounts for the way in which one 
finds oneself in the world. Through mood, the world becomes present to us, and it is through mood that 
things, events, and other people may matter to us. Mood, however, is distinct from atmosphere because 
mood can be neutral. Atmosphere, by the start of the twentieth century, cannot be, due to the new 
meaning of the self within one’s surroundings at the turn of the century. This shift can be perceived in 
the era’s concern for crowd mentality (Freud, Simmel, Le Bon), management of groups (Taylor, mass 
media technologies that make use of airwaves), and atmospheric warfare. Mood and Heideggerian 
phenomenology also make critical claim for metaphysical philosophy to which Warner’s text and 
literary tonality do not adhere. This is especially true as a premise of my argument is that charmed 
atmospheres operate on crafted control that leads to shifts in epistemology (rather than ontology), and 
thus, theories of mood are not of great applicability within my analysis here. 
46 Mikel Dufrenne, Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, 177. 




                                                                                                                                            
48 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas, 62. 
49 Woolf, Three Guineas, 62. 
50 Woolf, Three Guineas, 64. 
51 Timothy Wientzen, “An Epic of Atmosphere,” 59. 
52 Woolf, Three Guineas, 71-72. 
53 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 26. 
54 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 26. 
55 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 72. 
56 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 72. 
57 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 72. 
58 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 220. 
59 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 221. 
60 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 135. 
61 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “The Difference Affect Makes,” in The Weather in Proust, 132. 
62 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 31. 
63 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 31. 
64 Their connection to Aubrey’s Miscellany, however, is that mugwort is used in the so-called 
“Nine Herbs Charm,” a charm alleged to be used in the tenth century to heal wounds. The Miscellany is 
a document of supernatural occurrences and various stories of the occult Aubrey collected during 
archaeological research. But what is interesting is that this is not even the point of Laura looking at it. 
She is looking for something more pedantic than spiritual: Aubrey quotes from Pliny the Elder about 
Artemis, who “had revealed the virtues of mugwort to the dreaming Pericles.” Among mugwort’s 
primary “virtues” is to ease childbirth and stimulate menstruation. Artemis’s name is the source of 
common mugwort’s Latin name, Artemisia Vulgaris. 
65 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 135. 
66 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 135. 
67 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
68 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
69 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
70 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
71 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
72 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 136. 
73 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 166. 
74 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 15. 
75 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 16. 
76 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 14, 15. 
77 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 7. 
78 Jacqueline Shin takes up this reference, noting da Vinci’s painting was famously described 
by Walter Pater as “Lady Lisa.” Shin quotes David Bull in explaining its dynamic profile pose (the 
subject holds a white ermine and looks to the right of the viewer to some third party, while her body is 
angled toward the viewer’s left), while making an observation of her own on the painting’s importance 
to Lolly Willowes. I quote at length: “The ermine in the painting has been read iconographically in three 
ways: as standing in for Cecelia Gallerani [a somewhat revolutionary woman who served as da Vinci’s 
alleged inspiration] herself, with the ermine’s designation in Greek, galee, a ‘pun on the sitter’s family 
name’; as marker of purity because the animal ‘was believed too fastidious to soil itself’; and as a figure 
for Duke Ludovico [Cecelia’s lover], whose heraldic emblem was an ermine. The animal is essentially 
linked with Laura Willowes in that her full name—in fairy tale fashion connected to the story of her 
birth and coming-of-age-is Laura Erminia Willowes” (emphasis Shin’s). Ibid., 713-15. 
79 David Bull, “Dress and Coiffure.” 
80 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 218. 
81 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 219. 
82 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 219. 
83 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 219. 
84 Warner, Letter, ibid. 




                                                                                                                                            
86 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 66. 
87 Warner, Lolly Willowes, 67. 
88 Peter Sloterdijk, Terror from the Air, translated by Amy Patton and Steve Corcoran 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002), 26. Moreover, such terror practices begin in peacetime 
technologies including the German advances in vermin poisoning with Zyklon A and Zyklon B, as well 
as methods of execution (including those in Britain and America, such as the legal use of gas chambers 
for prisoner executions in Nevada as early as 1924). “It suffices,” Sloterdijk concludes, to say that 
“there was a theater, or processor” for the fusion of gas chambers already in use for the execution of 
patients at mental hospitals in Germany, the burgeoning German pest control industry, and SS-
intelligensia to create the “practical realization” of a metaphoric operation—the extermination of the 
Jewish population (43-44). The same year, Joseph Goebbels, the Reich’s propaganda minister, wrote in 
his diary: “The Jews are the lice of civilized humanity” (qtd. in Sloterdijk 44-45). Sloterdijk 
characterizes Goebbels’s writing as a communication with himself “as though he were agitating a 
crowd,” like a hypnotics (45). 
89 Sloterdijk, 50. 
90 Warner qtd. in Clare Harman, Sylvia Townsend Warner: A Biography, 27. 
91 Warner qtd. in Harman, 30, 31. 
92 Warner, Blackwood’s, 198, qtd. in Harman ibid., 31. 
93 Warner, Blackwood’s, 202, qtd. in Harman ibid., 31. 
94 Warner, ibid. 
95 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 5-6. 
96 Austin, 139. 
97 Frank Kermode, “Divination,” The Ordering Mirror, 21. Kermode later eases his criticism 
of scientific discourse: “it would be wrong to think of science as the enemy of divination. All it does is 
define its limits” (22). 
98 Kermode, 23. 
99 Kermode, 23. 
100 Kermode, 23. 
101 Warner was a self-proclaimed Communist leftist who campaigned for the cause across 
Europe, along with her partner Valentine Ackland. 
102 Maren Tova Linett, Modernism, Feminism, and Jewishness, 98. 
103 Delap, 19. 
104 Delap, 20. 






‘AFFORDING TO FORGET’: AMERICAN CHARM, CAPITALISM, AND 
IDENTITY 
When a girl feels that she’s perfectly groomed and dressed, she can forget that part of her. That’s 
charm. The more parts of yourself you can afford to forget the more charm you have…  
– F. Scott Fitzgerald, “Bernice Bobs Her Hair” (1920) 
 
As previous chapters have argued, charm in modernism is a language and 
practice tied to fantasy, which are forces of form as structural, desirable “blanks.” 
These blanks become legible value systems in modernist literature and culture, thereby 
enabling new readings of critical modernist concerns. Part of these value systems 
includes values placed on social cohesion or perpetuity, individual social identity, and 
aesthetic values of vagueness or “fogginess.” Charm voices these fantasies of value by 
presenting itself as a logic-less logic of attraction and revulsion, desire and discomfort, 
power and disempowerment. In this chapter, I examine how “charm” survived from its 
philological roots in the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century as distinctly 
alluring quality, to then not dissipate or hide itself, but resurge in an era of avant-garde 
aesthetic experimentation and sociopolitical upheaval, eventually transforming the 
idea of the feminine into the stuff of impossible imagination.1 By focusing on critical 
history and material culture as well as my central literature, I show how charm makes 
legible the mutually constitutive fictions of theoretical difference (gender and race or 
ethnicity) and material actualities of capital. 
I bring modernist concern for charm as structural bearer of values to the most 
literal of values—capital. This theoretical axis, as engaged within the works of 




and domination within twentieth-century American capitalism are reliant on languages 
of deception, duplicity, competition, and coercion—the language of charm. Charm’s 
veiled threat of the feminine or foreign, its trigger of both desire and distaste, is linked 
to personality and capital in American modernism in ways distinct from the focus on 
largely British modernism in each of the prior chapters. While similar, American 
“charm” sets itself apart from British senses of the term during the same era by 
pointing less obliquely toward systems of emasculated value. British “charm,” while 
also contending with gender, racial and ethnic uncertainties, and “foreignness” amidst 
nationalist feeling (distinctly, “charm” as a catch-all for that which was French during 
the early twentieth century vogue for Francophilia is particularly pervasive), tends to 
read a perceived loss of white, traditional Englishness on the female or feminized 
(queer, “othered”) body.2 Charm in Britain invariably is tied to class conflict and, in 
turn, the boundaries of one’s own station. American charm, I argue, can only read this 
loss through capital as mode of class climbing. The urgency of shifting toward the 
transatlantic here is apparent when we consider charm’s legacy within capitalist 
American systems, and the legacy of capitalism within American social and political 
systems since the early twentieth century. 
I locate literary engagements with charm through Wharton’s and Fitzgerald’s 
explicit use of the term as part of a methodology of narrative deceit that becomes a 
fictional form of social ascendancy through the acquisition of (or proximity to) capital 
by effectively “faking it.” Faking it, while assumed to be an undesirable method of 
socioeconomic climbing, is actually an accepted method through which to achieve 




it,” charm retains a knowing unknowingness—the pretense that one does not know 
what one does, while recognizing the obvious overtness of these actions. As William 
James notes in a lecture collected in On Vital Reserves: The Energies of Men (1911), 
“From our acts and from our attitudes ceaseless inpouring currents of sensation come, 
which help to determine from moment to moment what our inner states shall be: that is 
a fundamental law of psychology.”3 Feeling itself is uncontrollable, James suggests, 
but because it indirectly follows action, regulating one’s actions may control one’s 
feelings. If one feels despondent, he therefore advises, “to sit up cheerfully, to look 
round cheerfully, and to act and speak as if cheerfulness were already there. […] So to 
feel brave, act as if we were brace, use all our will to that end, and a courage-fit will 
very likely replace the fit of fear.”4 Such predisposition to the conditioning of the body 
as method to the personality is distinctly American to James. He goes on to describe 
reading a story in a weekly paper in which the author, “after describing the beauty and 
interest of the heroine’s personality, the author summed up her charms by saying that 
to all who looked upon her an impression as of ‘bottled lightning’ was irresistibly 
conveyed… Bottled lightning, in truth, is one of our American ideals.”5 
American charm in literary representation, then, is inextricable from 
determinants of social identity including race and ethnicity, gender, and class, and is a 
charm that has been saturated by the slickness of modernist mass culture. Charm 
conceived as an alluring blank provides a continually mutable meta-model of the 
mechanisms that create and maintain sociality and difference (and thereby, perpetuate 
inequality and disrupt sociality) through categories of gender, race, ethnicity, and 




Charm holds links to two related trends within the booming American 
modernist mass marketplace. First, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as 
workers’ unions were growing in power and uncertainties of unregulated competition 
circulated, employers took a new tactic—concentration. To cope with competition, 
corporations had one of two choices, to either buy the competition or merge with it. In 
either scenario, the corporate units were forced to become larger, resulting in an 
increased need for managers. American companies’ prowess at growing managerial 
capacities by the early twentieth century led Alfred Chandler to argue that the 
supremacy of American corporations was due to the “organizational capacities” of 
American management.6 Capitalism in the twentieth century, in other words, became 
increasingly “managed.”  
Secondly and relatedly, this notion of “management” then seeped into 
something that itself could be sold to the public. Although advice books on etiquette, 
household management, and other care duties setting forth methods to manage one’s 
home or social habits were common in the nineteenth century, by the early twentieth, 
an entire industry developed based on the management and maintenance not of a 
household or business, but of something else—oneself. Called the cultivation of 
“personality,” even T.S. Eliot acknowledged the modern demand on the individual 
when he called for art that eliminated such personality in “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” (1919). The poet’s success is entirely based on depersonalization, Eliot’s essay 
reasons, to ensure one’s relation “to the sense of tradition.”7 But the “continual 
extinction of personality,” the “escape from personality,”8 requires first knowledge of 




and even more privileged to know that he does: “[O]f course, only those who have 
personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things.”9  
Rochelle Rives explains that during the era, “the idea of having a personality 
requires the ability to stand out among others,” and thereby reflects a “spatial, 
sociological notion of personal authority.”10 The concept of “personality as related to 
charm or charisma,” Rives continues, “reinforces the meaning of the term as a 
function of one’s spatial authority and, further, one’s ability to influence others 
through effervescence and magnetism.”11 To conduct oneself as agential subject was 
self-possession, the ability to own oneself. Identity, therefore, was bound to both 
social notions of gender and a capitalist mass market, which located failures in 
individuals and provided the goods (makeup, fashion, self-help manuals, physical 
regimens, and more) to “fix” them. Those who could and could not own themselves in 
such self-possession, and demonstrate the agency of acquiring a self, resultantly drove 
further divisions separating Americans by race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, and 
socioeconomic status.  
This point allows us to continue to emphasize charm as within discourses of 
self-making techniques in the modernist era. However, to return to the language of an 
earlier chapter, charm interrupts this reading of modernist identity projects and 
capitalism. While other habits and consumer goods aimed to bring out the 
“authenticity” of the user or consumer, charm was always already false and 
falsifiable. The ability to cultivate one’s own allure is itself alluring, in other words, 
and yet ultimately detestable because, as this chapter aims to make clear, it lays bare 




marketing, as Rives notes, and yet remains at odds with it, since charm’s ready 
evocation of capital makes too apparent the capitalist fuel that drives the modernist 
self-help project. Charm is a thing that is both known and must be “forgotten” for it to 
function in the same way that capitalism’s particular ability to divide and exploit is 
both known, and must be forgotten.  
 
Wharton and the Charm Offensive 
Though she had ascended to literary popularity with such critically-respected 
novels as House of Mirth (1905) and Ethan Frome (1911) and cemented her literary 
achievements as the first woman to win the Pulitzer Prize, for The Age of Innocence 
(1920), Wharton’s late career stagnated. Wharton’s works seemed, in “the eyes of the 
younger generation” to be “quaintly behind the times, but for survivors of the pre-War 
garden age she still has a nostalgic charm,”12 Time noted in 1936. Such anachronism 
lessened her appeal, an anachronism in which Wharton explicitly placed herself, 
separating herself from modernism’s rapidly shifting literary and social norms. The 
Age of Innocence, though published at the height of what many now consider the 
modernist era, eschews the common modernist literary hallmarks of its time—
innovation, experiment, a sense of “the new.” When Virginia Woolf dismissed 
Wharton as a writer who—because of her extended time abroad, did not exhibit a fully 
“American” literary voice—in an essay for the August 1925 Saturday Review Wharton 
wrote to a friend to insist that her novel was indeed “old-fashioned” because she “was 
not trying to follow the new methods.” Isobel Archer, she says, “belongs to the day 




“exhibitionism” of Woolf. Part of Wharton’s distaste for the modern was tied to the 
modern mass market. While her contemporaries and younger modernists published 
widely with popular magazines and for the Hollywood screen, Wharton balked, 
maintaining an intense dislike for such lowbrow vehicles. Wharton was further 
displeased with the literary industry in America, itself, for being run so heavily by 
men—a criticism she would have shared with Woolf. After WWI, Wharton found 
herself “at the mercy of a newly energized mass market that might have catered to 
women but was still almost exclusively powered by men,”13 notes Parley Ann Boswell 
in Edith Wharton on Film. Feminine labor—in other words, women’s writing—was 
often subject to male arbiters of taste and male “guardians” in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The struggle of authority and control played out numerous 
times between female writers and male literary gatekeepers. Djuna Barnes and T.S. 
Eliot’s working relationship and Jean Rhys’s tumultuous mentorship (and romantic 
relationship) with Ford Madox Ford exemplify this. Thus, as Wharton perceived, in 
order to hold ground with high modernists, many women writers had to effectively 
“brave association with the promiscuity and commerce of prostitution”14 by publishing 
under the guidance of male gate-keepers. Hence, the condemnation of sexualized 
literary hawking, from Joyce’s “pornography” to Woolf’s “exhibitionism.”  
Charm perhaps unsurprisingly emerges at this intersection of knowing 
pretense—knowing the difficult stakes of publishing as a female writer amidst a 
literary marketplace that requires a prostitutional self-promotion and demand on 
output. By the early 1930s, Wharton finally caved to pressures. “I have held out firmly 




the William Randolph Hearst enterprise’s attempts to lure her to write for their 
publications. “I think you told me some time ago that in the case of the Cosmopolitan 
Hearst did not intervene personally… I shall have to give them one of the stories.”15 
One of “the stories” she refers to is a story that responds directly to the pressures of 
mass culture. Titled “Charm Incorporated,” the story went on to be published in 1934 
and earned Wharton both five thousand dollars and little critical acclaim. Wharton’s 
discontent with the mass market and modernism’s pressures (particularly on women) 
found footing in the story, a story that—while even Wharton scholar Parley Ann 
Boswell calls “an unremarkable story in many ways”16—is actually a nuanced 
examination of a particularly remarkable and ultimately, marketable force, charm.   
Investment banker Jim Targatt uses “charm” as guerilla tactic in order to 
restore a peaceful life at home, and to thrive in New York society. He masters the 
tactic when he notices his Russian wife, Nadeja Kouradjine, possesses charm in 
spades and uses it to her own advantage. Without telling his wife of his plan, Targatt 
manipulates the rotating group of live-in family members-in-law (who, as they rapidly 
grow in number, present a personal and a financial burden for Targatt) by craftily 
marrying off various Kouradjines to marry wealthy men on Wall Street, or pairing 
Kourdajines with his business associates as assistants and secretaries. He eventually 
manages to achieve not only solitude, but also staggering wealth and status through his 
widening social network. Targatt’s success sours, however, when he learns that his 
achievements have actually been due to his wife Nadeja, who has long been at work 
behind the scenes to ensure the success of Targatt’s plans while allowing Targatt to 




final blow to Targatt’s pride when an admiring Dutch artist attempts to seduce Nadeja. 
Nadeja offers Targatt a bargain: Targatt must have children with her, or else she will 
carry out the affair. Wharton leaves the conclusion ambiguous, as Targatt—who has 
finally found fulfillment both in his wealth and his solitude—finds both options 
equally disastrous.  
To paraphrase Jean-Baptiste Clemence from Albert Camus’s The Fall (1956), 
charm is apparently the ability to get what you want without ever needing to ask, the 
story seems to claim. Early in the story, Targatt learns how to never ask. He watches 
his in-laws closely for what he considers a strange, foreign allure – an allure that has 
secured his brother-in-law Boris a film-star wife, Halma Hoboe.17 Wharton’s story 
therefore suggests charm is both foreign and volatile: the Kouradjines seem to have a 
“gift like a tenor voice,” Targatt muses, “It was—what? Charm?”18 Horrified at the 
thought of “charm,” Targatt finds the word “made his flesh creep with memories of 
weary picnics and wearier dinners where, with pink food in fluted papers, the 
discussion of ‘What is Charm?’ had formed the staple diet. ‘I’d run a mile from a 
woman with charm; and so would most men,’”19 he thinks. Immediately, charm is 
both effective—a “gift” even—and distasteful, associated with consumption of sickly 
feminine domesticity. Targatt has a bodily reaction of disgust to the notion, which he 
associates with social occasions like picnics and dinners and food dyed unnatural 
shades. He is certain that he detests charm, but because he can identify it, he is thereby 
immune. Yet, awareness eventually dawns that he himself has been victim: he has 
fallen for Nadeja’s charms, charms that were useful in luring him into a marriage that 




the story, however, that the match was a commercial transaction, a result of the 
Kourdajines’s socioeconomic ambitions. In a short epiphany, Targatt realizes that with 
no particular beauty, intelligence, or domestic skills, Nadeja had somehow managed to 
manipulate him to marry her, and subsequently to do her bidding. During their 
marriage thus far, Nadeja had ensured that her emotions came across as “so 
exquisitely modulated” that they would “f[a]ll on Targatt like the gentle dew from 
heaven, merely fostering in him a new growth of tenderness.”20 
Jim finally realizes his situation early in the story. He fully grasps the family’s 
goals when Nadeja’s sister Katinka insists on living unmarried with Targatt’s superior, 
Mr. Bellamy, sure that such an arrangement will lead to marriage (it does). With his 
“conventional world … in fragments at his feet,”21 Targatt realizes, “Who knew better 
than he did that if you once had the Kouradjine habit you couldn’t be cured of it?”22 
So presented with “his idea,”23 one that “he did not choose to communicate to any one 
at present,”24 Targatt begins his own manipulations. Beginning a series of lavish social 
events, always with “one or two charming young Kouradjines present,”25 Targatt 
deploys charm to get his in-laws out of his life without explicitly telling them so, or 
even that he desired for them to leave. Though “Wall Street was growing more and 
more unsettled”26 and increasing numbers of Kouradjines pour into the Targatt 
household with no marriage or job prospects, Targatt nonetheless remains calm. “It 
must not be supposed,” Wharton’s narration makes clear, “that this rise in the fortunes 
of the Kouradjines was of any direct benefit to Targatt. He had never expected that, or 




Kouradjines; and it was the prospect of these that governed his conduct… And slowly 
but surely he was beginning to reap his reward.”27  
Charm is linked through this narration to Wall Street and financial reward. 
Targatt’s “idea” effectively means he takes the Kouradjines as competition—
competition that he himself “incorporates” as his own business model. Marx notes in 
Capital that such practices are the laws of capitalism. Capitalists are forced to obey the 
“immanent laws” of competition, meaning, as David Harvey puts it, “No matter 
whether they are good- or bad-hearted, capitalists are forced by competition to engage 
in the same labor practices as their competitors.”28 Thus, as soon as Targatt engages in 
the same charming practice as his competitors, he profits. Because of his recent 
marriage to a Kouradjine, Targatt’s superior, Mr. Bellamy, allows Targatt in on a 
lucrative deal “usually reserved for the already wealthy.”29 The successes continue: 
the new wife of another Kouradjine, a wealthy owner of a toothpaste company, offers 
Targatt the chance to “buy a big block of Dazzle Tooth-Paste shares on exceptional 
terms.”30 Buying in to Dazzle Tooth-Paste is a literal exposure of Targatt’s entry into 
controlling the means of production (and already coded notions of eugenics, class-
based cleanliness, and Hollywood celebrity). Most productively, through Boris’s new 
young wife (post-divorce from Halma Hoboe), Targatt meets and dines with the great 
Mr. Guggins of Guggins industries, who leaves Targatt with extensive knowledge “to 
make some very useful reinvestments,” while Mrs. Guggins manages to “carr[y] off” 
Nadeja’s sister Olga as her “social secretary.”31 
Targatt’s newly realized project of charm is therefore already linked to the 




end of “Charm Incorporated” demonstrates the stakes of capitalist gains, and charm as 
manipulative method. Targatt has just reached middle age, secure in his wealth and 
finally, happily rid of his in-laws when famous portraitist Axel Svengaart arrives in 
hopes of painting the beautiful Nadeja. But the story’s conclusion is less a satisfying 
survey of Targatt’s achievements than a twist on who has finally charmed whom. 
Targatt and his wife have a final match to be made in Nadeja’s final single, female 
relative, her “lovely but difficult”32 sister, Mouna, and plan to use Nadeja’s wiles to 
convince Svengaart of Mouna’s marriageability by agreeing to allow Svengaart to 
paint Nadeja. One evening while Nadeja is away on one of her visits to Svengaart for 
her portrait, Targatt suddenly worries that there is something more to her visits than 
sitting for a painting and singing Mouna’s praises. He becomes “surprisingly 
uncomfortable, and he reflected that it was the first occasion in their married life when 
he had suspected Nadeja of even the most innocent duplicity. And this, if it were true, 
could hardly be regarded as wholly innocent…”33 Targatt confronts his wife when she 
finally returns, asking whether Svengaart is interested in Moura, or in Nadeja. “‘Isn’t 
it always the way of men? What they can’t get—’,”34 she begins her reply. Targatt is 
overwhelmed with desperate jealousy, and the words he feels he should say (“‘You 
must feel yourself free--.’ Five words, and so easy to speak! ‘Perfectly free—perfectly 
free,’ a voice kept crying within him’35) never arrive. Instead, with “his face working 
like a frightened child’s,”36 he asks Nadeja what she wanted to do, and that whatever it 
is, he wanted it, too. Nadeja, with a “grave maternal” look, listens as he can only eke 
out half-phrases before the two come to an understanding:  




She continued to look at him […]. ‘Is this true, what you are now 
saying?’ she asked very low. Targatt nodded. 
A little smile wavered over her lips. ‘Well darling, if only I could have 
got Mouna safely married, I should have said: Don’t you think that now at last 
we could afford to have a baby?’37 
The understanding fails to be iterated, existing just beyond the reach of the narration at 
the tale’s close. The question of the baby is the final word of the story, and dangles the 
question: was Targatt truly at the helm of his own success, or was a Kouradjine again 
holding ultimate control, with the final aim of producing children? The answer seems 
clear, as Wharton’s play on charm’s “incorporation” becomes means of making 
explicit the dangerous pull of charm in the context of capital, and particularly, capital 
in the hands of non-white figures, including the immigrant Kouradjines. Nadeja has 
won at the story’s end, by making clear her mission—to reproduce her family by 
manipulating Targatt’s means. The question of who is controlling whom, and who is 
achieving success, is ultimately at the heart of Wharton’s story, as it is at the heart of 
modernism’s anxious white masculinity, a masculinity concerned about modes of 
financial and social emasculation. 
Wharton’s use of charm as complicit in distrust of non-white figures is 
previewed when we begin meeting the Kouradjines. Nadeja’s brother Boris, for 
instance, is cast as a Rudolph Valentino type. Wielding an ethnicity common to the 
popular romance novels of the 1920s – Middle Eastern sheiks and dashing Spaniards – 
Boris is only seventeen but “had the longest eyelashes of all” the Kouradjines,38 with a 




foreign, an immigrant who was ready to make his way in the New World by living off 
women and their restless desires.”39 It is a taboo attraction, a desire steeped in racist 
suspicion toward men of foreign origin, those who “were thought to be an insidious 
threat to the nation” should they mix with white American socialites. Such mixing was 
thought to produce children like the poor twins in Wharton’s The Children (1928), and 
showcase what protagonist Boyne calls “the incurable simplicity of the corrupt.”40  
Jim Targatt has immense difficulty with ethnicity and immigration throughout 
the story. This difficulty occasionally becomes quite literal. He and his wife, for 
instance, dine at a Ukrainian restaurant early in the tale, a choice made “at Nadeja’s 
instigation,” as she tends to seek “the most exotic that New York at the high tide of its 
prosperity had to offer.”41 But Jim’s alimentary system finds such exoticism difficult 
to digest by the evening’s close: “‘That sturgeon stewed in cream—’ he thought 
wearily.”42 Charm is quite literally in-corporated as the title notes, forced into 
embodiment, forced unpleasantly upon an unwilling and unassuming victim. Another 
restaurant Targatt visits–dubbed “The Transcaucasian”–has equally ill effects. This 
unease at the bodily “mixing” of white and non-white America is clear at the story’s 
end, when Nadeja effectively forces her husband into having children. Jim Targatt 
embodies the myths of white nationalism. The final scene makes Targatt a white 
America, infantilized and choking out notions of freedom while at the mercy of the 
manipulative, exploitative “other” who only seeks to use American wealth for 
corruptive purposes, to grow (or “breed”) foreign interests. 
Such anxiety was rife in early twentieth-century America. American science 




strains of nativism grew rampant. Immigration laws shifted with the Immigration Act 
of 1924, which cemented hierarchies of race, ethnicity, and nationality in its vision of 
America. The law “served contemporary prejudices among white Protestant 
Americans from northern European backgrounds and their desire to maintain social 
and political dominance.”43 Immigrants from all Asian countries were banned, a 
particular insult to Japan, which had previously enjoyed more open relationship with 
America than other Asian countries.44 As Mae Ngai argues, cultural nationhood 
became synonymous with racial nationhood—America was white, Western, and 
Anglo. Echoing Wharton’s language of “incorporation,” immigration restrictionists of 
the early twentieth century often complained about immigration as congesting the 
American melting pot, which itself insists upon racial and ethnic homogeneity. By 
World War I, restrictionists spoke of “racial indigestion,” and this notion furthered the 
study of eugenics.45   
Gender trouble abutted anxieties over race and immigration as having impact 
on American economy, and therefore, eugenic concerns about national identity were 
also concerns about economic insecurity. Gender was not far separated from race and 
ethnicity in this estimation. Hollywood film star Rudolph Valentino, for example, was 
in continual struggle through his brief career to prove his masculinity, even taking up 
boxing to prove his virility. Valentino’s appeal to American women became a coded 
threat of foreign charm on American capitalism as itself a reproductive machine. An 
anonymous writer commented on Valentino’s popularity after Rex Ingram’s The Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921) and most famously, The Sheik. Valentino, the 




The American woman is starving for romantic love… European men are far 
better versed in the game of love and the art of love-making than American 
men. They have, or take, more leisure. This is why a foreigner—especially a 
Latin—appeals so strongly to American women; and why so many American 
men lose out when competing with a European for a woman’s favor.46 
In the Chicago Tribune, a writer described Valentino as a “beautiful gardener’s boy,” 
responsible for the feminization of “Homo Americanus” as he turned Hollywood into 
“a national school of masculinity.” Valentino and other “Latin” or foreign stars were 
“prime example of the feminization of American culture that men feared,” the 
“woman-made” man.47 Valentino was frequently forced to fend off rumors. Tabloids 
accused him of being physically incapable of consummating his brief marriage to Joan 
Acker, who allegedly asked for a divorce mere days after their marriage. He was also 
alleged to wear bracelets, a feminine accessory. While he did wear one, given to him 
by his second wife Natacha Rambova, Valentino insisted the rest were wristwatches, 
an unusual sight at the time as a relatively new, postwar replacement to 
pocketwatches, inspired by wristwatches’ military use. Accusations of his femininity 
reached his body, as well. “The domineering behavior of the Sheik and an emphasis 
on Valentino’s muscular physicality,” Gaylyn Studlar says, “might have supported 
circulating views on manliness rooted in a cult of the body, but American men 
regarded Valentino as a foreign beauty rather than as an athlete,”48 such as Douglas 
Fairbanks.  
Race and ethnicity in combination with gender trouble is just one half of the 




early twentieth century. The other component is the challenge of the New Woman’s 
femininity to a melancholic masculinity. I turn now to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s works to 
elucidate charm as showcasing gender’s complicity in capitalist machinations. 
 
Fitzgerald and Masculine Charm 
The concern over men’s feminization and infantilization (juvenation) was 
common in American modernism, and has been described as an unusual form of what 
Greg Forter calls “literary melancholy”49 in Gender, Race, and Mourning in American 
Modernism. The viability of white manhood was called into question amidst 
widespread shifts in legibility and understandings of sex, gender, and racial difference 
occurring from 1880 to 1920. Such a shift affected authors including F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, and Willa Cather, who Forter finds 
responded to such a shift as a loss, and a loss grieved alongside melancholic 
ambivalence and unconscious aggression. This is not only a literary sensibility 
interested in gender, race, ethnicity, and social identity formation, but actually a 
literary rumination on the product of the success of the capitalist labor market, ones 
that tacitly based themselves on racial and gender divisions while masquerading as 
labor valuation. White masculinity thus secured itself for the new century, to be 
instead subject to gendered and racialized inspection as the burgeoning feminist 
movement insisted on revaluation of gendered spheres, and as black Americans and 
immigrants threatened the newly open labor market. This melancholy is clear in both 




When F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby was published in 1925, many 
readers pointed out its unmistakable similarities to a novella published some two years 
prior, Willa Cather’s “A Lost Lady” (1923).50 The premises of each are fundamentally 
alike – in each, an unreachable (and ostensibly undeserving) woman is the object of a 
young man’s unrequited ardor. These critiques were not lost on Fitzgerald. While 
asserting elsewhere that his “artistic conscience” was pure, Fitzgerald wrote to Cather 
upon the publication of Gatsby, declaring himself “one of [her] greatest admirers,” and 
wanting to “explain an instance of apparent plagiarism…” and perhaps “forgetting” 
his knowledge of Cather’s earlier story. Cather generously dismissed the passing 
resemblance, noting, “So many people have tried to say that same thing before either 
you or I tried it.”51 That “same thing” is the impact of charm. Cather responded to 
Fitzgerald’s letter and reassured him: 
I suppose everybody who has ever been swept away by personal charm tries in 
some way to express his [sic] wonder that the effect is so much greater than the 
cause,—and in the end, we all fall back upon an old device and write about the 
effect and not the lovely creature who produced it. After all, the only thing one 
can tell about beauty, is just how hard one was hit by it. Isn’t that so?52 
Cather seems to indicate that the effect of charm is in excess of its substance, and 
moreover, suggests a woman’s charm has violent impact – that one might be “hit by 
it.”53 This same charm illuminates what lies at the heart of Gatsby, to be sure, but 
more significantly, what Fitzgerald considered the driving force of his larger project, 




Fitzgerald’s Daisy Buchanan and Cather’s Marian Forrester are both described 
as dreamily alluring by male narrators. Marian’s allure is attributed to a sense of 
promise, made somehow legible by her eyes:  
Her eyes, when they laughed for a moment into one’s own, seemed to promise 
a wild delight that he has not found in life. ‘I know where it is,’ they seemed to 
say, ‘I could show you!’55 
Daisy is similarly described: 
Her face was sad and lovely with bright things in it, bright eyes and a bright 
passionate mouth—but there was an excitement in her voice that men who had 
cared for her found difficult to forget: a singing compulsion, a whispered 
‘Listen,’ a promise that she had done gay, exciting things just a while since and 
that there were gay, exciting things hovering in the next hour.56 
In both passages, a male observer is enticed by a near-indescribable feeling that each 
woman uniquely generates: a “promise,” a “wild delight,” an “excitement,” a sense of 
anticipation. Access points to this wild promise are each woman’s eyes, and more 
curiously, their disembodied voices. Marian’s laughing eyes seem to speak, while the 
“charm of her conversation was not so much in what she said, though she was often 
witty, but in the quick recognition of her eyes, in the living quality of her voice 
itself.”57 Daisy’s bright eyes and mouth pair together to create an unforgettable 
“singing compulsion,” a siren song of vocal allure and visual attraction. Charm 
appears to be present not in content, but in the stylistic qualities of each woman – 
Marian’s speech did not matter so much as her manner of speech, while Daisy’s voice 




Fitzgerald’s and Cather’s unrelated but mutual interest in the forms of a young 
woman’s allure link explicitly the dangerous “slip” of charm as bound to gender 
through a vampish twentieth-century femininity that masquerades as girlish innocence. 
This requires some historicizing. The modernist era was fascinated by—and concerned 
by—such a transformation of femininity and masculinity. The nineteenth century was 
characterized by essential divisions between men’s work and women’s domesticity. 
Men’s cultural identities and maturation rested upon this work, which included 
physical, intellectual, and moral education as part of their “autonomous self-making.” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1837 notion of the American scholar and Horatio Alger’s 
tales of self-made boys-turned-men (Ragged Dick was published in 1866), for 
example, are iterations of these nineteenth century projects in manhood. By the early 
twentieth century, however, this easy binary was in jeopardy. Professional labor was 
no longer driving component of the cultural promise of man’s ability to become “one’s 
own man.” Discourses of manhood as juxtaposed against boyhood were quickly 
“thwarted by a monopoly capitalism that reduced men to dependents in large 
bureaucratic structure” and resulted in “unmanly” dependence and disempowerment.58 
Manhood and boyhood became masculinity pitted against femininity.  
We see this allure and disgust at work in the figure of Fitzgerald’s Daisy 
Buchanan. Her voice, Gatsby tells Nick Carraway toward the end of the novel, is “full 
of money.”59 As we know at that point, Daisy, who has thrown herself into fashion 
(she cries at Gatsby’s “beautiful shirts”) and uses her “new” money as recklessly as 




That was it. I’d never understood it before. It was full of money—that was the 
inexhaustible charm that rose and fell in it, the jingle of it, the cymbals’ song 
of it…. High in a white palace the king’s daughter, the golden girl….60  
Nick trails off in two sets of ellipses, as he has suddenly encountered the “real” of 
Daisy’s allure—a romantic, false imaginary of “inexhaustible charm.” This 
additionally dramatizes how charm becomes devalued as mere put-on “style” of self 
rather than substance via Cather’s and Fitzgerald’s exchanges. Charm, as Gatsby 
demonstrates, holds a siren song, while making itself clear as already deceitful, 
manipulative, and mimicking. As it appears to cover modernist self-making, it instead 
reveals the machinations of an American mass market, a market that requires 
individuals to look away from the magic of capital and the connected means of 
subjectivation, and moreover, to look away from the system at work upon them. 
As Fitzgerald and Cather demonstrate, charm undeniably shaped the kinds of 
social, political, and aesthetic understandings made possible in early twentieth-century 
America. Charm thrived on duplicity and difference, and as an ostensibly slight, 
fleeting aesthetic feeling of delight or magic (its etymology points us to incantare and 
carmenere, or incantation, song—Fitzgerald’s description of Daisy’s voice as a 
“cymbals’ song” recalls this origin) it gave rise to a uniquely American “forgetting” of 
the magic of money, capitalism, and gendered and racialized labor in the modernist 
era.  
A lesser-known short story from Fitzgerald, “Magnetism,” was published a 
few years after Gatsby in a 1928 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. In the story, 




Wielding the familiar hallmarks of a successful philanderer, George is handsome, 
young, and famous. His smiles and greetings of “Hello, darling” cause multiple 
women to swoon – his Mexican housekeeper Dolores falls off the front steps when 
George arrives home (an event precipitated by Dolores’s thoughts, suddenly 
“contemplat[ing] having a love affair with him”61). Yet, the story’s title indicates not a 
genial quality of George, we find, but that George is “victim” of such a quality. In the 
throes of smoldering jealousy when he finds his glamour-seeking wife Kay in an 
affair, George finds himself inevitably pulled toward a young actress of just eighteen, 
Helen Avery, the latest in a string of what he considers to be platonic affairs. He 
muses on her attractiveness: “Helen Avery’s voice and the dropping of her eyes when 
she finished speaking, like a sort of exercise in control, fascinated him. He had felt 
[…] that if they rushed towards each other there would be a romantic communion of 
almost unbelievable intensity. It was this element of promise and possibility that had 
haunted him for a fortnight.”62 Part of Helen’s allure is the promise of something, 
much like Daisy Buchanan’s promises of “exciting things in the next hour.”63 Coming 
from the Latin promittere (pro- meaning “forward,” and mittere meaning “send”), the 
concept of promise characterizes male characters’ attractions to Helen and Daisy. 
These attractions are both out of the present time and future-focused, teleological 
propulsion – the very means for an end. And, so, George is magnetically propelled 
toward what we initially expect to be destruction; yet, despite being blackmailed and 
serving as cause for a young woman’s attempted suicide, George sees no direct 
punishment by the tale’s end. He and his wife, Kay emerge – like Tom and Daisy 




their money or their vast carelessness, or whatever it was,”64 says Nick Carraway – 
immune, aloof, confused, and careless. 
“Magnetism” weaves a radical distrust and denigration of charm, while 
simultaneously admiring it as capitalist force, and thereby belying its reliance on white 
masculinity. Charm lurks throughout the story as something dangerous, desirable, 
alluring, yet deadly for masculinity. The women who adore George and bolster his 
movie-star ego also threaten to break him – his wife capriciously leaves him after a 
party one night, suddenly declaring their marriage over, only to later return to say of 
the moment lightly, “I was just mad at you; you ought to have known that.”65 An old 
flirtation with a script girl, Margaret Donovan, comes back to haunt George when she 
and her brother turn up one evening, blackmailing George for adultery with forged 
love letters. George, of course, has forgotten the affair even happened until—in the 
back of a taxi, looking aimlessly out the window at a “pink horror” of an apartment 
building, “built to represent something, somewhere”—he remembers he “had once 
called for Margaret Donovan here the night of a Mayfair dance.”66 Even Dolores, 
enraptured by George at the start of the tale, watches him leave the house in the story’s 
final scene, “rubb[ing] her hands together in a gesture that might have expressed either 
ecstasy or strangulation.”67 
Margaret, in ultimately confessing the blackmail scheme was a hasty plot for 
money from her ex-convict brother, makes clear what charm is. She desperately 
declares her enduring love for George when he confronts her at her Santa Monica 
apartment. “‘I’ve loved you for years,’” she tells him, “‘since the first day you came 




Whoever it was, you walked right up to them and tore something aside as if it was in 
your way and began to know them. […] You drew people right up close to you and 
held them there, not able to move either way.’”68 Margaret pinpoints George’s charm 
as a “tearing something aside” between two people, that this parted curtain is a clarity 
of connection. Even Dolores the housekeeper feels this. When George smiles at her at 
the end of the story, the smile “faintly, fleetingly, t[ore] a veil from between them, 
unconsciously promising her a possible admission to the thousand delights and 
wonders that only he knew and could command.”69 Yet, this sense of clarity and 
connection is entirely at odds with what occurs in George’s life because of these 
“connections” – such as the blackmail scheme, for example, or his wife Kay 
threatening divorce. At hearing about his effects on Margaret, George grows 
uncomfortable, dismissing her love as “entirely imaginary,” and insisting “‘I can’t 
control—’” before Margaret interrupts him: 
“No, I know. You can’t control charm. It’s simply got to be used. You’ve got 
to keep your hand in if you have it, and go through life attaching people to you 
that you don’t want. I don’t blame you.”70  
Charm, according to Margaret, is uncontrollable and unavoidable. Yet, once again, 
there is a paradox to Margaret’s assessment. There is a conflicting sense of agency in 
Margaret’s phrasing. If it is unavoidable, it seems odd that you must “keep your hand 
in” and “attach people to you.” But charm, when understood less a sociable quality 
than a valuation or a move toward money, then the phrasing makes sense. Margaret’s 
brother’s motives clarify further: charm must be used, specifically for money and 




of “dirty” yet necessary, duplicitous attachment rings of the “charming” businessman 
or investor, a closeness to capital that renders understandably necessary discomfiture.  
Charm ought not to be coveted or trusted, Fitzgerald’s story seems to teach, 
since charm always makes clear what it is hiding—the more devious, duplicitous, or 
violent underlying motive of money. The narration’s highly limited point of view, full 
of slick, clean sentences and carefully curated details, practices this very allure. The 
story’s setup describes a locale that says less about the story to come than the 
narration’s own biases, and its pleasures in delimitation: “The pleasant, ostentatious 
boulevard was lined at prosperous intervals with New England Colonial houses—
without ship models in the hall. When the inhabitants moved out here the ship models 
had at last been given to the children.”71 The line opens the story, and deceives us. We 
are not in New England, or anywhere near it – the story is, we’ll soon find, deeply 
embedded in Hollywood and the film industry. The line glosses over the setting, in 
multiple senses of the word. It smooths over specifics, while putting an artificial sheen 
on something that has begun to deteriorate. A boulevard both “pleasant” and 
“ostentatious” conveys a bias toward just such a glossy aesthetic, an odd appreciation 
and castigation of excess. The now-missing ship models in the fall signify a kind of 
fallenness too—though the story is set prior to the Depression, the boom times at this 
boulevard seem to have already passed.  
These houses’ existence at “prosperous intervals” indicate an old money and 
old way of life that has been subsumed by what the next line will suggest to be the 
next generation of hopefuls, outcasts, the working class, and immigrants are taking 




exhibit of the Spanish-bungalow phase of West Coast architecture; while two streets 
over, the cylindrical windows and round towers of 1897—melancholy antiques which 
sheltered swamis, yogis, fortune tellers, dressmakers, dancing teachers, art academies 
and chiropractors—looked down now upon brisk buses and trolley cars.”72 We finally 
find our locale, on the West Coast, but the characters that populate it are fanciful, 
feminine, and deceptive. Swamis, yogis, and fortune-tellers are magically unreal, 
Oriental “others”; dressmakers, dance teachers, and art academies are feminized 
removals from any kind of “serious” professions; and lastly, chiropractors appear as 
the most grave of snake-oil salesmen, dabbling falsely in the medical profession. By 
the time we reach the end of the story, we feel doubly deceived – not only have we 
been misled with odd descriptors throughout the story, as exist here in the story’s 
opening lines, but the person who seems to represent this sly deception, George 
Hannaford, has not received his deserts, meeting an end more like Tom Buchanan. 
Unpunished and unwavering, he simply goes on.  
Considering Fitzgerald’s “Magnetism” and the earlier Gatsby, we find 
Fitzgerald presents a complex example of charm’s functionality as style – equally 
personal and narrative. As we the readers fall for George, only to become disgusted by 
him, we realize that everyone in the story – including the story itself – has been 
charmingly deceitful. George’s vain wife Kay both does and does not leave her 
marriage to have an affair, Dolores may or may not be contemplating violence, 
Margaret emotionally entraps George at her apartment (“he turned away—still not 
knowing that she was watching him and loving him until she thought her heart would 




Avery declares her flirtations with George to be scripted, a mere testament to their 
prowess at their craft: “‘Oh, we’re such actors, George—you and I […] It was a pity 
we didn’t have a camera.’”74 We are betrayed, in other words, as the façade drops, 
even though we knew it would. We forget; we are duped. 
 
The Non-Duped 
As Fitzgerald’s and Wharton’s works demonstrate, charm emerged as the name 
of the “magnetism” of white male power that is promulgated through the twentieth 
century’s new mass market. But this meteoric rise did not last. The rise and fall of 
Swedish financier, Ivar Kreuger, serves as example. Called the “Match King,” 
Kreuger negotiated large international monopolies throughout the 1920s to make 
fortunes on a product he did not invent – the safety match. As he bought up other 
companies, his success relied upon the perfection of his marketing schemes. Friends 
and business partners alike described him as mesmerizing. One colleague noted: 
There was an odd air of greatness about Ivar. I think he could get people to do 
anything. They fell for him, they couldn’t resist his peculiar charm and 
magnetism. Above all, there was a look about him that made a difference. I 
saw J.P. Morgan’s eyes many times in New York. They were like fire coals. 
But Ivar’s eyes were not like that. They had another quality. Though small and 
narrow, they seemed capable, if he desired, of looking right through you.75 
This quiet, poised man seemed destined to become one of the century’s great 
American success stories. Yet, the stock market crash hit Kreuger particularly hard, as 




Kreuger shocked the world when he shot himself in his Paris apartment on March 12, 
1932, bankrupt after the Great Depression. The Economist mourned the loss: “His 
death in Paris last Saturday by his own hand represents the veritably tragic wreck of a 
career which in its sphere was unsurpassed by that of any individual in living 
memory.” Yet, the same paper a few short weeks later reported that accountants 
uncovered “deception and manipulation of accounts” in his empire. The Economist 
and others were left “feeling bitterly humiliated” as $142 million in Italian bonds 
“supposedly sold to him by Benito Mussolini’s government” were uncovered, and 
Kreuger’s company owed more than Sweden’s national debt.76 Kreuger became a man 
of myth and mystery, a “confidence man” who managed to swindle international 
finance on the back of the new global economy and its reliance on a financial (and 
ultimately, interpersonal) credit system, a system that was burgeoning faster than rules 
could maintain it.  
“It is true that Mr. Kreuger was a charming man,” wrote modernist poet 
Archibald Macleish in a lengthy profile of the man for Fortune magazine in 1933, just 
a year after Kreuger’s death. “Everyone spoke beautifully of Mr. Kreuger—so 
beautifully that [a dinner guest of Kreuger’s] never heard a man more beautifully 
spoken of by everyone.” But Macleish – who himself would have a lengthy career as 
modernist poet, and believed capitalism to be dead – finds “charm” cannot fully 
explain the phenomenon of how “a match manufacturer from an unimportant 
European city was able over nine years to dupe the international financiers of New 
York and walk off with $250,000,000 of the country’s cash.” “Granted,” he notes, “the 




a slew of New York businessmen including John McHugh and Samuel F. Pryor (of 
Chase Bank) and Percy A. Rockefeller (nephew of John D. Rockefeller). Granted, too: 
that the French had called him l’oiseleur, the bird charmer. Nevertheless Mr. 
McHugh and Mr. Pryor and Mr. Rockefeller [et. al.] were not young partners. 
And neither were they birds. Moreover charm as a solution of the mystery runs 
into the obstinate and irrefutable fact that while it may explain the 
acquiescence of the Americans it does not explain the actions of the Swede. 
Commercial charm is the weapon of the vulgar swindler, the goldbrick man, 
the faker who wants something for himself. But Kreuger, although he pumped 
the better part of a quarter of a billion dollars out of America and into his own 
companies and enterprises abroad, was contemptuous of money for its own 
sake, lived, as one of his American banker friends put it, like a ‘cheap bank 
clerk’ (which is to say, in the argot of the ’20’s [sic], like a man of 
considerable but not spectacular wealth), and was chiefly remarkable for the 
extravagance with which he gave money away to his friends, his 
acquaintances, his competitors, and even to perfect strangers. To explain the 
deception of the American financiers on the ground that they were taken in by 
Kreuger’s charm is to imply that Kreuger was a mere swindler out for their 
gold and with art enough to persuade them to relinquish it. But the implication 
will not hold. It was something other than money that Kreuger wanted. And it 
was something other than money that he persuaded his victims to give up. A 
man, particularly the director of forty-nine corporations, does not permit 




Macleish goes on to explain that the two easiest theories as to why Kreuger was able 
to be so successful as the “Match King” are two sides of the same coin. One is that 
somehow, businessmen, bankers, and others were so goodhearted that they simply did 
not know any better. Yet, when met with critiques that the Kreuger company’s books 
were so poorly done that anyone with any ability in simple mathematics could have 
spotted inconsistencies in them, the theory switches to its opposite. Instead, such 
businessmen – from investors to bankers to Kreuger’s own accountants and 
bookkeepers – were not fooled by Kreuger’s “charm,” but rather, keen to make a 
profit at any cost. “The truth is,” Macleish concludes, “that New York and the ’20’s 
[sic] and Ivar Kreuger were made for one another as a patient is made for a disease as 
a disease is made for a patient. The money markets of New York turned Ivar Kreuger 
into a stock promoter and Ivar Kreuger as a stock promoter turned the New York 
money markets inside out.” In other words: 
Here then was a scene set for a swindler. Here was a city and a time in which 
inadequate audits opened the basic corporate structure itself, the unit cell of 
modern industry, to corruption and rendered the domestic holding company 
with subsidiaries abroad practically investigation-proof… [T]he… great 
Krueger mystery, the mystery of the dupes, is, to put it mildly, just as a 
hinterland which demanded to be swindled would have been obliged to create 
Wall Street had Wall Street not existed, so a Wall Street which demanded to be 
fooled would have been obliged to invent an Ivar Kreuger had Ivar Kreuger not 




Magnetically, Wall Street and Kreuger were drawn toward one another because they 
were actually mutually constitutive, made for one another to thrive on, and, eventually 
kill. When the charm of capital reveals its links to empty valuation, it forcibly ends 
things—the market itself and Kreuger’s life, which Macleish seems to insist are one 
and the same. The market always already demanded foolery, swindling, and fictive 
figures to propel itself. In other words, Macleish’s formulation suggests that the 
market did not crash because of the exceptional Kreuger and men like him. Rather, 
Kreuger was exactly like any man with access to the means of production, and 
Kreuger’s rise and fall exposed the American and global capitalist market for its 
fictions of valuation, a real that deflated the “magic” allure at the center of capitalism. 
 
Conclusion 
Charm in American modernism registers what I have previously deemed 
charm’s recognition of aesthetic loss or fallenness. Only in American modernism does 
white nationalist masculinity’s relation to the labor market, commodity, and capital 
take center stage as driving allure and detestable revelation of the mechanisms that 
allow social categorization into gender, race or ethnicity, class, and nation. In this 
way, it dramatically previews the intervention of critical race studies into Marxist 
thought. An activist hermeneutic, racial capitalism finds its origins as theory in Cedric 
Robinson’s Black Marxism: The Making of a Black Radical Tradition (1983). Black 
Marxism served as corrective to Marx and Engels’s belief, stated in Capital, that 
European bourgeois society would rationalize social relations. But Marx and Engels 




social ideology. Robinson explains: “As a material force… racialism would inevitably 
permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial 
capitalism’ to refer… to the subsequent structure as a historical agency.”79 Put simply, 
capitalism was always already racialized, or, divisive within a social ideological 
imaginary. Capitalism encourages certain kinds of human life to be valued over others, 
as it requires relations based on balances of unequal labor: those with access to means 
of production and workers without these means. These “uneven life chances that are 
inescapably part of capitalist social relations,” then, are placed onto “fictions of 
differing human capacities” – historically, racial difference.80 Supporting divides 
makes capitalism function, since the division between humans and their labor is 
integral for the “magic” of the system to ensure its continuance. Divisions that both 
Fitzgerald and Wharton point to on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, and even age 
through the notion of “charm” as literary project therefore expose the economic and 
sociopolitical underpinnings of American modernist aesthetic thought.
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CONCLUSION: CHARM’S NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MODERNIST STUDIES 
 
In this dissertation, I examine what mobilized the simultaneous discourses of 
charm and anti-charm rhetoric in modernist literature. Charm moves through late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Anglophone and American texts as a trojan 
horse of sorts, ostensibly supporting normative ideologies of the social order while its 
use imagines sociopolitical transformation. Charm does not foreclose non-normativity, 
but rather, opens the non-normative to be able to slyly destabilize accepted forms of 
sociality, individuality, and social bonds. I look to Oscar Wilde’s works to assess how 
charm possesses an aesthetic magic that creates new social forms, bonding persons 
across normative temporality and social stratification. Threads of charm as a 
thoroughly modernist experimental project are then taken up by Gertrude Stein and 
Sylvia Townsend Warner in the early decades of the twentieth-century, in whose 
works I find a rendering of charm as force of social friction by revising approaches to 
the feminine, to women’s bodies including those of women of color, and to women’s 
lives. Finally, in the years leading up to WWII, this rebellious force becomes 
subsumed by global capitalism, and re-latches to normativity; namely, to white 
masculinity, which repossesses and subsumes the rebellious powers of charm to 
become a purposeful slickness—the kind of slickness F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edith 
Wharton suggest is the familiar, repellant and yet compelling oiliness of the salesman.  
Throughout the years between 1890 and 1938, charm is alternately celebrated 
and denigrated in modernist literature, as ideas of charm as effeminate, supernatural, 




Charm’s presence in the era, I argue, not only helps to formulate a compelling 
narrative of modernism deserving of critical attention, but also a force that wounds 
accepted paradigms of modernist studies. As modernist studies attempts to move 
toward questions of theoretical approach as well as scale (historical, geographic, and 
even planetary), charm functions as example of what new approaches to modernism 
based in mechanisms of feminization, marginalization, and difference can do.  
Throughout this study, charm in modernist writers’ thought and works 
functions as clear interruption to the ease of modernism as having specific temporal or 
aesthetic boundaries. My study therefore joins with recent scholarship that attempts to 
overturn such strict delineations, such as Rachel Teukolsky’s The Literate Eye: 
Victorian Art Writing and Modernist Aesthetics (2009), or Jessica Feldman’s 
Victorian Modernism: Pragmatism and the Varieties of Human Experience (2002). 
This also includes recent work on modernist decadence. Following David Weir’s 
Decadent Culture in the United States: Art and Literature Against the American 
Grain, 1890-1926 (2007), new scholarship including Decadence in the Age of 
Modernism (2019) examines modernist writers’ engagements with decadent principles 
and aesthetics from Walter Pater and Algernon Swinburne. Charm’s emergence and 
eventual ubiquity in early twentieth-century literature suggests not a radical break 
from the past, but a deep thread of continuity. As such, charm flouts the narrative 
perpetuated by modernist studies today which arose from modernists themselves: that 
modernism was concerned with the new, in direct responsivity to a newly “modern” 
twentieth-century life that was rapidly changing. To focus on charm in literary 




practice, sixteenth to seventeenth-century English traditions of witchcraft and folklore, 
and ostensible emphasis on traditional (read: nineteenth-century) gender roles and 
social politesse is at odds with modernism’s stated goals. Charm also lessens 
modernism’s alleged attentions on the individual in favor of its engagement among 
persons and groups as a social binder. Finally, as itself an affective-aesthetic category, 
charm reinforces the ways in which form moves and works on us. Attention to 
charm’s evolving powers in the early decades of the twentieth-century, then, is to 
refocus our gaze on the era, its voices, and its textual forms.   
Separately, too, this dissertation emphasizes the advance of key scholarship in 
the growing subfield, feminist modernist studies. I envision charm as an example of a 
new sort of methodological and conceptual recovery work in direct support of feminist 
approaches to literary studies. Feminist modernist studies in particular aims at both 
utilizing contemporary feminist approaches or knowledges to re-encounter modernist 
texts and modernist thought, as well as drawing out modernism’s own approaches to 
the women’s movement, to feminism, to women’s bodies, and concerns of 
marginalization, minoritization, and oppression. The field answers the concern of 
many scholars who have recently argued that the study of women’s writing in 
modernism has passed its critical peak and entered into crisis. After the rise of New 
Modernist Studies in the 1990s, feminist criticism experienced four radical and 
resultant shifts that made the work of women’s writing more complex, notes Susan 
Stanford Friedman. The move from national to transnational frameworks and the push 
toward intersectionality of identity categories meant that the category of “women’s 




meant that the traditional archival work of feminist recovery shifted to digital 
initiatives performed by librarians and historical societies.  
Jane Garrity argues in a recent article, “Modernist Women’s Writing: Beyond 
the Threshold of Obsolescence?” (2014), that this has problematized critical projects, 
since we have long since passed the age of a “universal feminism” or universal 
concept of “women writers” as collective category. Many would say, Garrity notes, 
that “feminist scholarship on women’s modernism and women’s modernity is clearly 
at an impasse, but is this statement really true?”1 Garrity concludes that “the fact 
remains that the passionate interest in women’s writing that exploded in the 1970s is 
no longer pervasive.”2 Toril Moi accounts for this shift as the direct result of 1990s 
gender theory such as Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, works which marked the 
increased difficulty of talking about anything relating to “women” without first 
placing “women” in quotation marks, and prioritizing the social construction of gender 
and its organizational functions.  
Charmed Modernisms argues implicitly and explicitly that to believe feminist 
“recovery work” is stalling, or to continue to uphold traditional narratives of modernist 
projects, means that we have lost the ability to see other approaches of modernist 
studies. These approaches must not be merely additive, since recovering and adding 
still more female writers to the canon in itself often reifies what “female writers” 
means—a catch-all category that often hides its carriage of privilege—that “woman” 
is white, cisgender, upper-class, able-bodied, heterosexual, and so on—and flattens 
potential difference. These approaches must also not continue to bolster the often-




The work of re-texturizing what we consider to be modernism proper must continue in 
ways other than feminist recovery of voices. We must also propose ways to hear those 
voices, and understand how this plethora of figures alters what modernism as a 
movement has been seen to be, and more importantly, how it is taught.  
The stakes of accepting certain kinds of modernisms, then, have wide-ranging 
effects that are not only what we read, but how we read. Accepting this kind of 
modernism makes it difficult to assess what is on offer to modernist studies by Sylvia 
Townsend Warner’s career in historical fiction and fantasy, for example. Putting 
Warner or any writer outside of the white Anglophone world within both the fabric of 
modernism’s varied narratives about itself and its contextual history presents 
continued critical puzzles for us, reconnecting contemporary intellectual and social 
concerns of secularization, disenchantment, and the disintegration of community to 
their early twentieth-century explorations.3 This is itself a legacy of modernism—that 
modernist studies itself, like its object, must always redefine, reify, and remake itself, 
setting boundaries and removing them, making declarations and overturning them. 
This project’s work is important on a sociopolitical scale as well, one that 
extends beyond the literary much as charm itself extends beyond its literary 
expressions. Charm in literature opens forms of resistance and resilience. Following 
the work of the modernist writers addressed in this project, I offer modernist work on 
charm as an indication that re-stitching the social is possible. A radical new 
communality was once iterated by modernists as varied as Oscar Wilde, Sylvia 
Townsend Warner, and Gertrude Stein, who turned to charm as methodology of 




economic, and social marginalization. These bonds were set based on creative, 
imaginative relations rather than available existing ones, however nascent—this 
includes capitalism’s labor relations, systems of social stratification, and political 
identities. Moreover, these bonds insist not only on the cohesion of the marginalized 
for survival, but that within this survival is a lived, creative and occasionally perverse 
pleasure. 
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